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Abstract
This thesis comprises an overview (Chapter 1) and five main chapters (Chapters 2 to
6) on international trade and firm performance in developing countries.
Chapter 2 examines whether developing countries could benefit from having a
commodity exchange. We consider this question by studying the potential benefits
of a commodity exchange for coffee exports in Ethiopia. Using a triple-differencing
(DDD) approach, we find that that the introduction of coffee trading through a
commodity exchange has led to a significant increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export.
We also find that having a commodity exchange has helped Ethiopia to export into
new foreign markets. Therefore, policy intervention such as the establishment of a
commodity exchange can help to reduce market-related barriers of trade faced by
developing countries.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of landlockedness on trade by exploiting a novel
natural experiment associated with the transition of Ethiopia from a coastal to a
landlocked country. Ethiopia became de facto landlocked following a conflict with
Eritrea in 1998. Using triple-difference and synthetic control approach, we find
that landlockedness has a large negative effect on Ethiopia’s exports and imports.
Specifically, on average, landlocked geography has contributed to a 43-80% and
67-71% reduction in Ethiopia’s ocean-borne exports and imports, respectively. The
landlockedness “shock” of Ethiopia also has a persistent effect on trade across time,
suggesting that the influence of landlockedness in general is long-lasting.
Chapter 4 examines how landlockedness affects firm productivity by reducing
the firm’s access to imported inputs. We use the same quasi-natural experiment as
Chapter 3 to identify the casual effect of landlockedness on productivity and employ
a rich census dataset on Ethiopian manufacturing firms over the period 1996-2006.
We find that landlockedness leads to a productivity loss of 14% for firms that rely on
imported inputs. We also find that the negative effect of landlockedness is especially
x
strong for small and private-owned firms.
Chapter 5 uses data on over 33,000 firms from 94 countries to study if genetic
distance from the world technology frontier, the United States, influences firm
productivity in laggard countries. The thesis adopts a novel method on quantile
treatment models and find that genetic distance to the global frontier has an
economically and statistically significant effect on firm productivity. Firms operating
in a country that are genetically far from the technology leader tend to have
lower levels of productivity with the largest negative impact observed at the higher
quantiles.
Chapter 6 investigates if the presence of foreign-owned firms in sub-Saharan
African countries (SSAs) can help to reduce domestic firms’ financial constraints.
Using firm-level data spanning across 36 SSAs from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey, we find that an increase in foreign firm presence can ease the financial
constraints of domestic firms in the SSAs. One reason is that foreign-owned firms are
not only less financially constrained, they are also less likely to apply for bank loans.
Therefore, an increase in foreign firm presence may reduce the competition for loans




I would like to thank school of Economics, University of Adelaide for giving me the
chance to pursue my Ph.D. and Adelaide Scholarship International (ASI) for funding
throughout the doctoral program. I am especially grateful to my principal supervisor,
Dr. Nicholas C.S. Sim, who has been an excellent supervisor, a very committed and
supportive advisor. You are the kind of supervisor that is always available to discuss
ideas and life troubles alike, reads papers in detail, gives feedback on editing and
most importantly, you were available to support me even at late time. Working with
you gave me a great opportunity to learn more about how to write a good research
paper and upgrade my professional development. I am also sincerely grateful to my
co-supervisors, Dr. Firmin Doko Tchatoka and Professor Richard Pomfret for their
supervision, support and encouragement. All of you have been helpful of me since
my first day at the University of Adelaide. Your suggestion and advices considerably
improved my thesis. My special thanks also goes to Dr Benedikt Heid for your
invaluable comment in my research papers.
I would like to thank Dessie Tariko Ambaw and Dr. Yohannes Ewunetie who
co-author with me and helped me a lot during the last three and half years. I am
also thankful to Dr. Solomon Zena, Dr. Dereje Abegaz and Admasu Asfaw for their
regular comments and encouragements. All my friend and colleagues, I thank you so
much for your moral support and encouragement.
I would like to thank my mother-Yirged Tariku for your daily prayer, my brothers
Abiot Tesfaye, Yohannes Tesfaye and Yimesgenew Alene. Abiot Tesafye, you are
always my inspiration and mentor since day one at school. I would also thank my
dear friends Aziz Addis and Hamiro Abateneh for their daily moral support. Finally





To My Beloved Brother Abiyot Tesfaye Edjigu
Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last few decades, trade liberalization and market reforms have become
more widespread throughout developing countries. For example, in 2008, Ethiopia
introduced a modern commodity exchange market, the Ethiopian Commodity
Exchange (ECX), that had later generated much interest from policy makers in
Ghana, Nigeria, Mozambique, Rwanda and Kenya. This is despite the fact that
there is little empirical evidence of the efficacy of a commodity exchange. The goal
of Chapter 2 is to shed light on the benefits of having a commodity exchange for
developing countries by studying how the establishment of the ECX has affected the
export of coffee in Ethiopia.
Prior to the establishment of the ECX, commodities including coffee were traded
bilaterally between farmers and buyers who traveled to meet them. At that time,
farmers usually did not have information about the prevailing retail price in other
markets and the price offered by wholesalers or exporters. Consequently, exploitative
intermediaries or middlemen’, who were well informed about the market price,
would buy commodities from smallholder farmers at relatively lower prices and
sell them to wholesalers or exporters at higher prices. The lack of reliable price
information in other markets therefore limited the ability of farmers to negotiate
a better price. Moreover, farmers often faced high risk of default by buyers, as
there was very limited legal means that farmers could use to enforce contracts.
For example, Gabre-Madhin (2012) showed that 67% of the internal commodity
trade faced contractual default. Because of such risk, trade was limited to short
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distances and confined to networks of family members, friends and ethnic connections,
which made the sector unprofitable to invest in (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). According to
Gabre-Madhin (2001) and Gabre-Madhin and Goggin (2005), the weak infrastructure
combined with poor market institutions had limited the potential scale of coffee
production and volume of export in Ethiopia.
In 2008, the Ethiopian government sought to overcome these issues by establishing
a commodity exchange market, the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX), which
replaces the countrys traditional coffee auction floor to a modern market exchange
system with a market-clearing price determined competitively at the exchange itself.
The ECX provides several services to facilitate coffee transactions. For instance, it
provides daily market information through electronic display boards (ticker boards)
that are established in coffee producing villages, and disseminate information using
Interactive Voice Response (IVR), message services (SMS) and through the ECX’s
website. It also provides warehouses for storage and for facilitating quality testing of
coffee produced in the local villages. Finally, the ECX helps in the underwriting and
enforcing of standard trading contracts and payments through its partner settlement
banks. These services raise the profitability of coffee farming and motivate the
farmers to produce larger quantities of higher quality coffee for the export market.
Nevertheless, there is still a debate on whether ECX is successful. For example, some
had argued that a commodity exchange is an advanced market mechanism that only
functions well in industrialized countries (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2006). Sitko
and Jayne (2012) also document that the performance of agricultural commodities
exchanges in Africa remain poor due to the limited success in attracting financial
institutions, conflict of interest among brokers, and the high fixed costs of trading in
the commodities exchanges. In addition, exporters in Ethiopia has complained about
price-meddling by authorities (Ferreira et al., 2017).
In Chapter 2, we exploit the ECX as a quasi-natural experiment to study
the effect of a commodity exchange on coffee exports. To estimate the
effect of the ECX on the coffee exports of Ethiopia, we implement a triple
difference-in-differences (DDD) approach within a gravity framework. This approach
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exploits country-commodity-year variation in export.1 It also has certain advantages
over the standard difference-in-differences (DD) approach that is based either on a
commodity-level or country-level analysis. For example, a commodity-level DD would
consider the exports of coffee (the treatment) and non-ECX commodities (the control)
from Ethiopia and compare their trends before and after the establishment of the
ECX. However, such a comparison may falsely attribute the effects of macroeconomic
shocks on coffee to the ECX, especially if these shocks and the ECX had happened
at the same time. Similarly, a country-level DD approach would consider the exports
of coffee from Ethiopia (the treatment) and Kenya (the control) and compare the
response of their coffee exports before and after the establishment of the ECX.
However, such a comparison may also falsely attribute a response in Ethiopian
coffee exports, caused by institutional reforms and infrastructural improvements,
to the ECX. The triple difference-in-differences approach enables us to avoid these
confounding issues. In particular, when we employ this approach, we find that the
introduction of the exchange has a strong effect in increasing Ethiopia’s coffee exports.
In addition, we find that ECX has positive and statistically significant impact on the
country’s coffee export into new foreign markets.
Despite market reforms and trade liberalization, some countries may still
experience low levels of participation in international trade. One reason is due to
poor geography, such as landlockedness (Milner and Zgovu, 2006; Clark, 2014), which
increases the cost of trade. For the trade in goods, landlocked countries depend on
other countries for transit. As such, they face significant barriers of trade such as
the barrier of long distances to global markets, huge port fees, and inconvenient
transit procedures that contribute to high transport and time costs. Landlocked
countries have an import share to GDP of 11 percent compared with 28 percent for
coastal countries. Their average per-capita export volume is less than half of that of
their coastal neighbors (World Bank, 1998; Faye et al., 2004). While cross-country
studies on this area (e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Raballand, 2003; Coulibaly and
1Country-commodity-year variation refers to the three source of variation exploited to identify
the effect of the ECX on export : i) country variation (Ethiopia and Kenya), ii) commodity variation
(ECX product versus non-ECX products) and iii) year variation (before and after the introduction
of ECX).
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Fontagné, 2006; World Bank, 2014) suggest that landlocked countries trade less than
coastal countries, there is no evidence that this effect is causal.
In Chapter 3, we provide the first natural experimental evidence on the causality
and persistence of the effect of landlockedness on trade. Our natural experiment
comes from the sudden transition of Ethiopia from a de-facto coastal country to a de
facto landlocked one in 1998. Prior to the separation of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia
was a coastal country that uses Port of Assab, which is located in the province of
Eritrea, as its main seaport. In 1993, however, Eritrea became an independent state
and Ethiopia became a de jure landlocked. Despite so, there was an agreement
between Ethiopia for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of the port of Assab located
in the independent Eritrean state (IMF, 1997; Faye et al., 2004; Connell and Killion,
2010). This continued until 1998, where a territorial dispute led to the start of
Eritrean-Ethiopian war and Port of Assab was immediately closed. From this moment
onwards, Ethiopia became both de jure and de facto landlocked.
To estimate the effect of landlockedness, we employ two approaches: the triple
difference-in-differences approach and the synthetic control approach. The triple
difference-in-differences approach enables us to use a span of fixed effects to identify
the “treatment” effect of landlockedness on trade. The synthetic control approach
provides us with a data-driven method to obtain a control group that mirrors
Ethiopia’s pre-intervention trend as closely as possible. Our empirical results reveal
that landlockedness has a large negative impact on Ethiopia’s exports and imports:
on average, being landlocked reduces Ethiopia’s ocean-borne exports and imports
by about 43-80% and 67-71%, respectively.2 We also find that the landlockedness
shock has a persistent effect on trade, suggesting that the negative influence of
landlockedness is not easily overcome.
The negative effect of landlockedness on trade raises a question whether it could
affect the productivity of firms. Following on from Chapter 4, we exploit the 1998
Ethiopia-Eritrea war as a natural experiment to examine the effect of landlockedness
2Because landlockedness primarily affects land and sea freight than air freight, this “closing in”
of Ethiopia should affect the trade of bulky, low-valued goods more strongly than the trade of light,
high-valued goods.
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on firm-level productivity. We find that landlockedness leads to a productivity loss
of 14% for firms depend on imported inputs. To explain the possible channels
for why landlockedness has a negative effect on the productivity of firms, we show
that landlockedness has a negative effect on both the extensive margin (number of
importing and exporting firms) and the intensive margin (volume of imports and
exports per firm), which may explain why landlockedness could adversely affect the
productivity of firms.
Concerning firm productivity, recent literature has sought to explain why there
are large and persistent differences in productivity across countries. For example,
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) argue that genetic distance, which captures a wide
array of cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally over the long run within
populations, is a source of prolonged differences in productivity across countries.
The central argument of Spolaore and Wacziarg’s (2009) hypothesis is that genetic
distance hinders the diffusion of technologies from the technological leader to the
laggard countries. Thus, large genetic distances can explain large differences in
income per capita across countries. Building upon the existing literature (Ashraf and
Galor, 2013; Ang and Kumar, 2014; Bove and Gokmen, 2017, see, also,), in Chapter
5, we use firm-level data on over 33,000 firms from 94 countries and employ the group
quantile IV methodology proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016, Econometrica) to
show that genetic distance to the global frontier has an economically and statistically
significant effect on firm productivity. We find that firms operating in a country that
are genetically far from the technology leader tend to have lower levels of productivity.
Access to finance is one of the most important concerns for firms in sub-Saharan
Africa. In Chapter 6, we use firm-level analysis to study if the presence of
foreign-owned firm can help to reduce the financial constraints of domestic firms.
Using cross-country firm-level data that spans across 36 SSAs, we find that in
industries with a larger foreign firm presence, domestic firms tend to be less financially
constrained. We also find that foreign-owned firms are not only less financially
constrained, they are also less likely to borrow from banks. Moreover, in industries
where foreign firm presence is larger, domestic firms tend to have greater success in
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securing bank loans. Therefore, one explanation for why foreign firm presence can
help to reduce the financial constraints of domestic firm is that foreign firms are less
in need of credit. As such, the presence of foreign firms reduces the competition for
bank credit, which helps to improve financial access for domestic firms.
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Would developing countries benefit from having a commodity exchange? We
consider this question by studying its effects on coffee exports in Ethiopia. Coffee
farming is the most important agricultural activity in Ethiopia, as it supports the
livelihood of 15 million farmers and generates a quarter of the country’s export.
In April 2008, the government of Ethiopia introduced the Ethiopian Commodity
Exchange (ECX) to provide reliable market information and storage facilities to
farmers, especially coffee producers, which help them engage in the export industry.
Using a triple-differencing (DDD) approach, we find that the introduction of
coffee trading through the ECX has led to a significant increase in Ethiopia’s
coffee export. We also find that the ECX has led to the export of coffee into
new foreign markets. Our paper is related to recent initiatives by governments
and international organizations to introduce agricultural commodities exchanges in
developing countries. We provide quasi-natural experimental evidence to show that
such initiatives can help to reduce market-related barriers of trade faced by these
countries.
Key Words: Commodities Exchange, Coffee Export, Ethiopia, Triple Differences
JEL Codes: D47, Q13, F14, F6
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2.1 Introduction
Many developing countries rely on the exports of agricultural commodities sector
as a main source of national income (Reardon and Timmer, 2007; World Bank,
2008; Gollin, 2010).1 However, in these countries, there are also structural
issues that prevent markets for agricultural commodities from functioning well.
For example, agricultural producers require reliable price information, sound
contractual agreements, and extended marketing chains, which these countries
lack (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005; Mutenyo, 2011; Gabre-Madhin, 2012)(Tiffin
and Irz, 2006; Byerlee et al., 2009; Islam, 2016). Moreover, they also require
strong institutions to protect themselves from being exploited by intermediaries
(Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2006; Goyal, 2010). Without
strong institutions, the profitability of farmers, their incentives to produce, and
consequently their export earnings could be curtailed (UNCTAD, 2009; Goyal, 2010).
It has been argued that these structural challenges can be addressed with the
help of an agricultural commodity exchange, which is a centralized market place
where sellers and buyers meet to transact commodities in an organized fashion
(UNCTAD, 2009). Modern commodity exchange platforms, for instance, may
eliminate exploitative intermediaries, provide more transparency on the prevailing
market price to farmers, and ultimately, promote agricultural production and exports.
For this reason, governments and international organizations have worked together
to introduce agricultural commodities exchanges in their own countries, which they
hope would reduce such market-related barriers.2 Empirically, while it seems intuitive
that commodity exchanges would help the agricultural commodities sectors, we do
not have strong evidence that developing countries would benefit from having a
commodity exchange, especially when it is an advanced market mechanism.
In this paper, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment to study how having a
1Different studies illustrate that agriculture is the primary source of income in developing
countries. For example, 65% of the labor force is employed in agriculture (World Bank, 2008).
Moreover, for African and South Asian countries, the share of agricultural output to GDP exceeds
40% and agricultural export constitute 15-30% of GDP (World Bank, 2008; Gollin, 2010).
2For example, UNCTAD is working with the African Union, with national governments and the
private sector to develop agricultural commodity exchanges. Many emerging countries such as India,
Brazil, China, Malaysia and the South Africa have also introduced modern commodities exchanges.
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commodity exchange affects coffee exports in Ethiopia. In April 2008, the Ethiopian
government introduced a commodities exchange market, called the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange (ECX), to replace the countrys traditional coffee auction floor.3
The ECX provides several services to facilitate coffee transactions. For instance, it
provides daily market information through electronic display boards (ticker boards) to
coffee producing villages, where information are disseminated using Interactive Voice
Response (IVR), message services (SMS) and through the ECX’s website. It also
provides warehouses across the country that facilitate storage and quality testing.
Finally, the ECX facilitates standard trading contracts and payments through its
partner settlement banks. These services raise the profitability of coffee farming and
motivate the farmers to produce larger quantities of higher quality coffee for the
export market.
To estimate the effect of the ECX on the coffee exports of Ethiopia, we implement
a triple difference-in-differences (DDD) approach within a gravity framework. For
identification, the triple differencing approach has certain advantages over the
standard difference-in-differences (DD) approach. If we implement the latter,
we could only compare the treatment and control between commodities (for the
same country) or between countries (for the same commodity). For example, a
commodity-level DD would look at the exports of coffee (the treatment) and non-ECX
commodities (the control) from Ethiopia and compare how their trends before and
after the establishment of the ECX. However, such a comparison may falsely attribute
the effects of macroeconomic shocks on coffee to the ECX, if these shocks and the ECX
occurred at the same time. Similarly, a country-level DD approach would consider
the exports of coffee from Ethiopia (the treatment) and Kenya (the control) and
compare the response of their coffee exports before and after the establishment of the
ECX. However, such a comparison may also falsely attribute a response in Ethiopian
coffee exports, caused by factors such as institutional reforms and infrastructural
improvements, to the ECX.
3Ethiopian coffee farmers are now required to sell their coffee at designated primary markets,
where only certified buyers are allowed to make purchases. Similarly, coffee processors must receive
approval to use designated warehouses, where their products are graded based on whether they are
suitable for the export market or are only for sale in the domestic market.
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The triple-differencing approach addresses these issues by comparing the difference
between the exports of coffee (an ECX product) and a non-coffee product (a non-ECX
product) of Ethiopia to the difference between the exports of coffee and a non-coffee
product of Kenya.4 Because the triple difference exploits country-commodity-year
variations in exports, we may employ fixed effects with more complex structures
to deal with potential confounders that a standard DD approach cannot deal with.
Here, we follow Magee (2008) and Cheong et al. (2017) to include the full set of
country-pair, exporter-year, exporter-product, product-year, and importer-year fixed
effects into our gravity model.5
Our estimates show that as a policy, the establishment of the ECX has been
an effective means for promoting exports. Specifically, Ethiopia has seen an 84%
increase in coffee export on average after the ECX was established. This impact is
twice as large as the impact of joining regional trade agreements, trade concessions,
and importer tariff reductions.6 Our estimates also show that the establishment of
the ECX does not have spillover effects on non-ECX products, in the sense that
while the ECX has led to a significant increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export, there is
no evidence that it has reduced the export of a non-ECX commodity. Finally, our
results show that the ECX not only affects coffee exports along the intensive margin,
but it also has a statistically significant impact on coffee exports along the extensive
margin.
This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, it speaks to the debate on whether
a commodity exchange is effective for promoting exports in developing countries.
For Ethiopia, the ECX potentially affects over 4.2 million smallholder farmers and
4We consider Kenya as a control country since this country is the largest coffee Arabica exporter
in Africa. Kenya has also no functional agricultural commodities exchange.
5According to Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008), the gravity model is sensitive to
the choice of different covariates. Magee (2008) demonstrate that controlling a whole set of fixed
effects in the gravity model allows to capture the different determinants of trade. For example,
importer-exporter fixed effects helps to capture all unobserved time-invariant factors that affect the
bilateral trade between two countries. Similarly, importer-year fixed effects capture all time-invariant
and time-varying characteristics of the importer country, such as GDP per capital and population.
6For example, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) show that export may increase by as much as
40% due to US trade concession policy for Africa (also known as AGOA), and Cheong et al. (2017)
shows that Pakistan export increases by around 45% following a temporary removal of tariff.
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more than a quarter of the countrys export earnings,7 but its effect on export
is not empirically investigated. While a commodity exchange seems to be useful
for promoting exports, some have argued that an exchange is an advanced market
mechanism that only functions well in industrialized countries.8 The differing views
on this issue, however, are based mainly on anecdotal evidence. Therefore, our paper
hopes to provide some statistical evidence to shed light on this issue.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the literature methodologically by providing
quasi-natural experimental evidence on the impact of the commodity exchange in the
developing countries context. The original ECX project was aimed at facilitating the
exchange of food grains including wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food
crisis adversely affected the domestic grain market, and led to a tripling of prices.
The slowdown of trading food grains, which is an external shock, resulted in the
introduction of coffee trading into the exchange. Therefore, the introduction of coffee
in the ECX platform was not pre-meditated, but was driven by events that affected
food supply.9 It is in this regard that the ECX is the best quasi-natural experiment
for studying the impact of a commodity exchange in the developing countries context.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
on Ethiopian Commodities Exchange. Section 2.3 describes the empirical strategy.
Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 present results and finally section 2.7
concludes.
7See Minten et al. (2014) and Craparo et al. (2017) for more detail.
8For example, Sitko and Jayne (2012) have shown that the performance of agricultural commodity
exchanges in Africa is poor because of the limited success in attracting financial institutions to the
modern market platform, conflict of interest among brokers, and the high fixed costs of trading
in the commodity exchanges. In fact, Van der Mheen-Sluijer (2010) has expressed doubts on the
ECX’s success in achieving the demands of coffee importers. Ethiopian coffee exporters were also
complaining about issues of price-meddling by government authorities (Ferreira et al., 2017).
9A program is endogenous when the program itself is non-random and/or when the program
participants are non randomly selected
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2.2 Background
A. Coffee Market in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a long history in coffee production and is now the largest coffee producer
in Africa.10 Coffee is also the main export commodity of Ethiopia. It contributes to
nearly 25 percent of the country’s total export and supports the livelihood of more
than 15 millions of people (Moat et al., 2017). Therefore, policy makers in Ethiopia
look towards coffee production as a means of raising smallholders income, government
revenue, and foreign currency (Petit, 2007).
Prior to 1991, the coffee market in Ethiopia was regulated by the government
through its agency, Ethiopia Coffee Market Corporation (ECMC). During this time,
the government tightly controlled the trade and price of coffee. Farmers in the main
coffee growing area were given a certain quota to supply coffee, at a fixed price, to
the government (through the ECMC). The Central Bank of Ethiopia also sets the
minimum export price while the Ministry of Coffee and Tea determined the domestic
price (Petit, 2007; Gemech and Struthers, 2007; Andersson et al., 2017).
Following the dismantling of Ethiopia’s socialist regime in 1991, the transitional
government undertook market reforms that affected coffee production and marketing.
For example, the ECMC was closed, the coffee market was deregulated, and license
fees and tariffs for coffee trading were reduced. The export price controls and local
coffee price floors were also abolished (Petit, 2007). All these reforms were made to
encourage and expand the private sector’s participation in the coffee market, and to
stimulate production and improve export earnings from coffee (Gemech and Struthers,
2007).
However, while these reforms had led to a larger number of private firms in
the coffee trade, little had changed in the marketing and distribution of coffee and
other agricultural products (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2006). In fact, prior to the
establishment of the ECX, coffee farmers often did not know what the prevailing retail
price in different markets and the price offered by wholesalers or exporters were. This
10For example, Ethiopia is believed to be the origin of coffee Arabica.
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gave rise to exploitative intermediaries or middlemen, who were well informed about
the market price, to buy coffee from smallholders farmers at lower prices and sell them
to wholesaler or exporters at higher prices. The lack of reliable price information in
other markets had also limited the farmers’ bargaining power in price negotiation.
Moreover, the farmers also faced high risk of default as there were limited legal
means of enforcing contracts. For example, Gabre-Madhin (2012) showed that 67%
traders faced contractual default. To manage such risk, trade was limited to short
distance markets and confined to network of family members, friends and ethnic
connection, which made the sector unprofitable to invest in (Gabre-Madhin, 2001).11
Therefore, weak infrastructure and market institutions, which affected the marketing
and distribution of coffee, had limited the potential scale of coffee production and
export in Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005).
B. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
The establishment of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) was preceded by
a series of events unrelated to the coffee industry. In 2000 and 2001, Ethiopia had
a bumper crop, mostly grains, which led to a 60 to 80 percent drop in price of
these surplus goods (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). Because of weak market systems and
transportation costs, the surplus agricultural production were not transported and
distributed to regions that had relatively less supply, which curtailed farmers’ profits
of harvesting grains in those years. As such, many were unable to pay for fertilizers,
which led to a cut-back on fertilizer use,12 and consequently, a significant decline in
agriculture production in the following year (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). This series of
events culminated into a major food crisis, which subjected 14 million Ethiopians to
potential famine, highlighted the need for Ethiopia to adopt a modern agricultural
commodities marketing and distribution system (Gabre-Madhin, 2001).
Faced with such risk, the Ethiopian government launched a modern market system
– the ECX – in 2008. The ECX started with a spot trading and “open outcry” bidding
11Because there was no warehousing and clearance system, coffee had to physically moved to the
trading floor. Moreover, since there was no warehousing across coffee producing villages, producers
bear most of the transportation costs associated with selling to exporters.
12Farmers were unable to pay for fertilizer. Thus, fertilizer use was reduced by 27 percent.
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system, which was appropriate for the level of technology and institutional system
of the country at that time. The original ECX project was aimed to facilitate the
trading of food grains including wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food
crisis adversely affected domestic grain price, causing it to rise by 200 percent in June
2008. The slowdown of food grains trade resulted in the introduction of coffee to the
exchange and the suspension of Ethiopia’s traditional coffee auction floor.13
Coffee trade has benefited from three main services provided by the ECX. Firstly,
the ECX provides daily market information through electronic display boards (ticker
boards) to coffee producing villages. In addition, information is disseminated using
Interactive Voice Response (IVR), short message services (SMS) and through the
ECX website. Secondly, it provides warehouses for storage and to facilitate quality
testing of coffee supplied by coffee producing villages. Thirdly, the ECX facilitates
standard trading contracts and payments through its partner settlement fbanks. The
main rationale for introducing the ECX is to avoid exploitative intermediaries (i.e.
the middlemen), increase farmers’ revenue and production, ultimately, to raise export
earnings.
The ECX is successful in many aspects. For example, after the ECX was
established, coffee farmers were able to receive up to 70% of the final export price
than the 38% they had received prior to the ECX (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). In 2011,
the total value of the ECX trade reached USD 1.1 billion and the ECX expanded its
number of warehouses to 55 with a total capacity of 250,000 tons.
The ECX had also settled USD 20 million or more on T+1 (next day) basis
with no single default. They also now disseminate market price information through
their outdoor electronic ticker boards located in 32 rural sites, through their website
that attracts visitors from over 107 countries, and directly to their 256,000 mobile
subscribers, radio, TV and print media (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). The ECX enables
farmers to make both production and marketing decision on the basis of information.
13With the help of international donors such as Agency for International Development, the
Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development Programme, World Food Program
and the European Union, Eleni Gabre-Madhin was the main driving force behind the successful
establishment of the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (Gabre-Madhin, 2012; Andersson et al., 2017).
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In particular, they will help farmers know the quality grading of their product
and the price premium they will earn from improving the quality of their coffee
(Gabre-Madhin, 2012). All of these services may help to promote production and
increase export earnings.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the impact of the establishment of the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange
(ECX) on coffee export, we estimate the following triple difference-in-difference
(DDD) specification within a gravity framework:
Exportijkt = exp[β1Treati×ECXk ×Postt + µit + µik + µkt + µij + µjt]εijkt (2.1)
where Exportijkt is export value of coffee k from country i to country j during year
t. Country i denotes either Ethiopia or Kenya; whereas country j represents the top
trading partners of Ethiopia or Kenya.14 Treati is in an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the country is Ethiopia (the “treated” country) and 0 for Kenya (the
“control” country). ECXk is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 for coffee (the
ECX commodity) and 0 for non-ECX commodities including flower, fruit & vegetable,
spices, leather and hide & skin. Postt is a binary variable that switches from 0 before
2008 to 1 from 2008 onwards for both countries and products.
In our estimations, we take advantage of our disaggregated export data to
condition on an extensive set of fixed effects that account for differences over time
across countries (i.e., importers and exporters) and products (ECX and non ECX
products). The remaining terms of Eq. (2.1) corresponds to fixed effects. Thus,
µit is a set of export-year fixed effects that subsume the typical gravity regressors
(such as such as importer and exporter GDP and multilateral resistance terms); µik is
exporter-product fixed effects that captures, for example, exporters preferential trade
14The thirty-three major trading partners of the two country are Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Egypt Arab Rep., France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran Islamic Rep.,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States.
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policies on products that may affect commodity exports differently; µkt is a set of
product-year fixed effects that controls for potential commodity specific time varying
unobserved factors; µij represent the exporter-importer fixed effects to account for
time invariant unobserved factors such as bilateral distance, language etc. εijkt is the
error term.
The coefficient of interest (i.e. β1) captures the average impact of the ECX on
coffee export of Ethiopia. To estimate Eq. (2.1), we use Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimation proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The PPML
approach has several methodological advantages over the common OLS estimation,
which involves the log-linearization of Eq. (2.1) and then estimating the parameters
of the log-linearized model. Firstly, log-linearizing the gravity equation will alter
the properties of the error term, such that the conditional expectation of the log
of the error term (i.e E(lnεijct)) will be a function of the regressors, which could
cause the estimates to be inconsistent (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Secondly, the
log-transformation of the gravity equation requires data with zero bilateral trade to
be dropped. For a typical developing country such as Ethiopia, there are many zero
bilateral trade values. Thus, we will lose a large amount of data if drop the zeros.
Importantly, the zeros are themselves informative. If we parse our bilateral trade data
to those with positive values, this could generate a sample section problem that could
bias our OLS estimates. For these reasons, it will be more appropriate to estimate
the multiplicative form of the gravity equation using the PPML approach (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006, 2010).
Threats to Identification of the ECX: We highlight some concerns related to
identifying the impact of the ECX on export of coffee in Ethiopia. While some of
this concerns are common to all impact evaluation analysis, some are specific to the
ECX program.
Obtaining a Counterfactual : The first challenge in estimating the impact of the
ECX on coffee export is to identify the appropriate counterfactual group. We
consider a neighboring country, Kenya, as the control since it is the second largest
African country that produces and exports Coffee Arabica but does not have a
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commodity exchange. However, country-level difference-in-differences model may
falsely attribute a change in Ethiopia’s coffee export, caused by factors such as
institutional reforms and infrastructural improvement, to the ECX. To address this
concern, we add non-ECX commodities ( flowers, fruits and vegetables, hide and
skin, leather and spices) as an additional control group. Hence, we estimate the
impact of the ECX on coffee export using the triple differences (DDD) approach.
The triple difference approach by comparing the difference between export if coffee
(and ECX product) and other products ( non-ECX products) of Ethiopia to the
different between the exports of coffee and other commodity product of Kenya.
Because triple difference exploits country-commodity-year variations in exports, we
are able to control fixed effects to deal with potential confounding factors (Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck, 2010).
Parallel Trends : One of the main assumption for the validity of our identification is
that the change in export over time would have been the same across coffee and other
commodities, in the absence of the EXC. Using coffee export data between 2003 to
2007, we perform a placebo test that falsely assumes 2006 as the starting period of
the ECX. In addition, we test the parallel trend assumption by comparing trends
in export of non-ECX commodities in Ethiopia and Kenya using data for the whole
sample period (2003-2013). The trends in export of non-ECX commodities of both
countries should follow the same trend regardless of the ECX.
Idiosyncratic or Covariate Shocks : The second issue comes from the fact that when
estimating β1, there are potential confounding factors. During the sample period,
there could be improvements in infrastructure, irrigation and trade facilitation that
could increase production and exports of coffee in Ethiopia. Without addressing this
possibility, we may falsely attribute these potential benefits to the ECX itself. To
address this issue, we include product-year fixed effects in Eq. (2.1) that partial out
all confounding time-varying or invariant factors affecting coffee exports.
In addition, the two coffee exporting countries– Ethiopia and Kenya – may
experience other institutional or policy reforms during the treatment period that
affects their coffee exports differently. To address this concern, we include
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exporter-year fixed effects in Eq. (2.1) that capture the effects of aggregate shocks
on coffee export. These dummies also capture changes in GDP, income per capita,
population and other aggregate variables that affect coffee export in both countries.
We have also added exporter-product fixed effect to control for the possibility
of exporters preferential trade policies on product types that may affect different
products export differently.
Importers of Ethiopian coffee may also experience positive or negative
idiosyncratic shocks that affect Ethiopia’s coffee export. If these potential shocks
coincide with the ECX, the estimated effect of the ECX on exports may not reflect the
true impact. To address this issue, we include importer-year fixed effects in Eq. (2.1)
that eliminate the confounding effects of shocks to the importing countries. Similarly,
we also include the exporter-year fixed effect, as it takes care of all exporter specific
factors of exports – observed or unobserved, time-varying or time-invariant – such as
the exporter’s institution, GDP, per capita income and population. Furthermore, we
include importer-exporter fixed effects to partial out all characteristics between the
importer and exporter that affect how much they trade.
2.4 Data
We use data on exports of Ethiopia and Kenya to their common major trading
partners (Appendix 1A provides the full list of the major trading partners of the
two countries) for the period between 2003 and 2013. The export flow data is taken
from the UN Comtrade data base. If export flow is not reported in a given year,
it is set be zero during that particular year. For the model capturing the extensive
margin, we create a dummy dependent variable that is equal to 1 for non-zero exports
and 0 if otherwise.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the data. Columns (1) and (2) report
the mean and standard deviation of Ethiopia’s export of agricultural commodities
including coffee, flower, spice and fruit and vegetable. Furthermore, Columns (3)
and (4) present the mean and standard deviation of Kenya’s export of the same
commodities. The summary statistics shows that the average coffee export of Ethiopia
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Ethiopia Kenya
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Product (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coffee 441503.4 241646.6 96931.5 59316.7
Flower 54109.8 30328.3 367741.9 250960
Fruit and vegetable 95992.1 41469.3 221969.8 104748.9
Hide and skin 9438.3 9211.7 3889.9 3744.1
Leather 48349.8 23024.9 20358.9 9208.5
Spices 82825.5 1152.8 4895.7 3516.8
All agricultural products 169862.6 213051.9 120638.1 160419.5
All manufacturing products 26049.02 22284.46 24199.5 23330.3
Note: All the summary statistics values are in thousands (‘000) of US dollar. All agricultural
products include coffee, flower, spices and fruit & vegetable. Similarly all manufactured
products include leather and hide & skin.
($441,503,400) is higher than the average coffee export of Kenya ($96,931,500) for the
2003-2013 period. Moreover, Ethiopia average exports of hide & skin, leather and
spices are larger than Kenya. The last two rows of Table 2.1 report the average
exports of agricultural and manufactured products of the two countries. The average
export values indicate that Ethiopia and Kenya generate nearly equal amount of of
revenue from the export of agricultural and semi-processed manufactured goods in
the sample period.
Figure 2.1 presents the time series plots of coffee exports for Ethiopia and Kenya
during 2003-2013. The blue dotted line shows the quantity of coffee export for
Ethiopia and the red dotted line shows the quantity of coffee export for Kenya. These
two plots show that the trends in coffee exports before the introduction of the ECX
were quite similar for both countries. However, the trend of Ethiopia’s coffee export
shows a significant increase following the establishment of the ECX. This suggests
that the introduction of the ECX has led to an increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.2 presents the triple difference (DDD) estimates of the impact of the ECX
on Ethiopia’s coffee export, based on Eq. (2.1). In Column (1), we include the
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Note: This figure shows the overtime aggregate export of coffee for Ethiopia and
Kenya in thousands of 60 kg bags.
exporter-year, exporter-product, and product-year fixed effects. In Column (2) we
add importer-exporter fixed effects. In Column (3), we include all the above fixed
effects. In all specifications, exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
In all specifications, the coefficient of interest (i.e. Treatment × ECX × Post) is
positive and statistically significant at 1%. In particular, the ECX increase Ethiopia’s
coffee export by 84%.15 From the policy perspective, this large effect has significant
implication for the following reasons. Firstly, coffee export accounts a quarter (i.e.
25%) of Ethiopia’s export earning. Hence, the 84% increase in coffee export represents
a 21% (i.e. 25% × 84% ≈ 21%) boost in total export for Ethiopia. Secondly, coffee
faming provides a livelihood for 15 million Ethiopians (Moat et al., 2017). We would
therefore expect an increase in coffee exports to have a positive social economic
impact in Ethiopia. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that market
15The formula to compute the effect of a dummy variable in a PPML model is (eβi − 1)× 100%,
where βi is the estimated coefficient of dummy variable i (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
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Table 2.2: The Impact of the ECX on Coffee Export: Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.616***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.721 0.771
Note: Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (2.1).
Treatment is an indicator variable that is equal 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and 0 for
Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other five export products
(i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008 and
zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
reform in developing country could have higher effect than joining regional trade
agreements, trade concessions, and importer tariff reductions. For example, Frazer
and Van Biesebroeck (2010) show that US trade concession policy for Africa (also
known as AGOA) increases export by about 40% and Cheong et al. (2017) finds that
temporary removal of tariff following a natural disaster increases Pakistani export
by around 45%. These responses are only about one-half of the increase in coffee
exports, which follows from the introduction of coffee to the ECX platform.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we examine the robustness of our results by performing five checks
consists of placebo test, alternative estimation method, alternative control groups
and assessments based on restriction of trading partners in the gravity model.
A. Placebo Test
The main assumption required for the internal validity of our triple differenced
approach is the parallel trend assumption. This assumption requires export of coffee
for both Kenya and Ethiopia have the same trends if the treatment had not occurred.
Hence, we examine whether or not the export of coffee (the treated group) and the
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other commodities (the control group) had parallel trends before the introduction of
the ECX, we falsely assume 2006 to be the treatment year (i.e the introduction of
the ECX) and estimate the model using only pre-treatment data ranges from 2003
to 2007 (because there is no treatment during these years).
Table 2.3 presents the results from the placebo test. In Column (1), we control
for the exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year fixed effects. In Column
(2), we control for importer-exporter fixed effects. In Column (3), we control for all
the interactive fixed effects. The estimated coefficients of the placebo tests are all
statistically insignificant. This suggests that there are nothing else, besides the ECX,
that had caused the ECX and non-ECX products to have divergent trends.
Table 2.3: The Impact of ECX on Coffee Export with False Treatment Year
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post-2005 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 1584 1584 1584
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.697 0.704
Note: Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (2.1).
Year 2006 is used as false treatment period to check the validity of our identification strategy.
Hence, Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero
for Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other five export products
(i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post − 2005 is 1 for 2006
and 2007 and zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B. Alternative estimation method
The question of how to estimate gravity model is not trivial. Our baseline
results in Table 2.2 are based on Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML)
estimation. This approach provides consistent estimates in the presence of conditional
heteroskedasticity caused by log-linearizing the gravity model. However, its downside
is that it is a nonlinear regression approach; thus, it is not suitable for estimating
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models with a large number of fixed effects (Magee, 2008).16 To check if our baseline
result is an artifact of the estimation approach chosen, we re-estimated the model
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which allows us to control for many
fixed effects in the model.
Table 2.4: The Impact of the ECX on Coffee Export: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 1.170*** 1.170*** 1.170***
(0.141) (0.143) (0.148)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
R2 0.25 0.40 0.41
Note: OLS is used to estimate Eq. (2.1) using log(1 + Exportijkt) as the dependent variable.
Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for
Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other five export products
(i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008 and
zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The OLS results, provided in Table 2.4, show that the coefficients on Treatment×
ECX × Post are positive and statistically significant at 1% level.17 Therefore, there
is no evidence that the statistical significance of our baseline results is dependent on
the estimation method chosen.
C. Restricting the “control” (non-ECX) commodities
In the baseline results, our control group (non-ECX commodities) consists of
both agricultural items (flower, spices, fruit and vegetable) and non-agricultural
items (leather, hide and skin) that are not traded via the ECX. However, there
may be a concern that factors such as agricultural policy may affect export of
coffee and agricultural commodities more uniformly than export of non-agricultural
16For example, although it is infrequent, the PPML estimator automatically excludes some of our
fixed effects (due to collinearity) in our baseline model which might be a bit concerning.
17Notably, the OLS estimates are quite large compared to the PPML estimates of Table 2.2.
This results are consistent with the evidence documented by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) that OLS
overestimates the effect of trade attributes in gravity model due to misspecification issues.
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Table 2.5: Using only Agricultural Goods as Control Group
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.661***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 2376 2376 2376
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.735 0.787
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero
for Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other three agricultural
export products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, and spices); and Post is 1 after 2008 and zero
otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(2.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
commodities. Thus, by including of non-agricultural commodities into our regression,
this may accentuate the contrast between coffee and non-coffee exports after the
ECX was established, and therefore, drive the statistical significance of our results.
To reduce such potential contrast, we restrict the control group to agricultural
commodities only. Table 2.5, shows that the impact of ECX on coffee export remains
positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level, which suggests that our
baseline results are not driven by the inclusion of non-agricultural commodities into
the control group.
D. Varying the sample of trading partners
In the baseline regressions (Table 2.2), we have used data on bilateral coffee and
non-coffee exports of Ethiopia and Kenya to 33 major trading partners. One concern
about the gravity model is that its estimates are potentially sensitive to the sample of
trading partners included in the analysis (Magee, 2008). For example, Haveman and
Hummels (1998) have shown that the effect of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) on
trade is sensitive to the sample of trading partners used in the analysis. When the
number of the sample countries is changed, the effects of RTA vary dramatically as
well.
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Here, we explore if our baseline results are robust to the use of different sample
countries. As a robustness check, we have re-estimated our model using the top 20, 15
and 10 trading partners and with all the interactive fixed effects (i.e. exporter-year,
exporter-product, product-year, importer-exporter and importer-year fixed effects).
In Table 2.6, Columns (1)-(3) present the estimation results associated with the use
of the top 20, 15 and 10 trading partners, respectively. Based on these results, we
find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the triple interaction term
increases when we reduce the number of trading partners. In addition, the estimated
coefficients of the triple interaction term are positive and statistically significant at
least at 5% significance level. This suggests that the statistical significance of the
ECX for exports is not driven artificially by the sample of countries
Table 2.6: The Impact of ECX on Coffee Export: Using Different Top Trading
Partners
(1) (2) (3)
Top 20 partners Top 15 partners Top 10 partners
Treatment × ECX × Post 1.046*** 1.177*** 1.190**
(0.252) (0.216) (0.589)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2160 1590 1060
Pseudo R2 0.793 0.800 0.867
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero
for Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other five export products
(i.e. flower, leather, hide & skin, fruit & vegetable, and spices); and Post is 1 after 2008 and zero
otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(2.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
E. Alternative definition of the “treatment” year
The Ethiopia Commodities Exchange was established in April 2008 and launched
its operation by trading wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food price
crisis that affected Ethiopia’s grain market has led the ECX to introduce coffee trade
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into the exchange.18 Hence, we address this concern by re-defining the treatment
year as 2009 instead of 2008 and assess the impact of the ECX. Table 2.7 shows the
triple-difference results when we assume 2009 as a beginning of the treatment year.
The estimated coefficients in Columns (1)-(3) show that the ECX has a positive and
statistically significant effect on coffee export. Compared to the baseline results (when
2008 is defined as the treatment year), the coefficients of the triple interaction term
in Table 2.7 only vary slightly. Thus, whether we use 2008 or 2009 as the treatment
year will not affect our conclusion about the statistical significance and impact of the
ECX.
Table 2.7: The Impact of ECX on Coffee Export: an Alternative Treatment Year
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post2009 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.720 0.771
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero
for Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee export and zero for the other five export products
(i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post2009 is 1 after 2009 and
zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(2.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.6 Further Analysis
2.6.1 Does the ECX Matters for the Export Extensive
Margins?
The previous results primarily focus on the effect of the ECX on the intensive margin
(i.e. volume) of coffee exports. However, the establishment of the ECX may also
18After a serous of intensive discussions with the government and other stake holders, in July
2008 a law was passed to trade and export coffee through ECX.
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increase the number of destinations, the extensive margin, to which coffee is exported.
In this section, we examine the effect of the ECX on coffee export extensive margin.
Following Cheong et al. (2017), we re-estimate Eq. (2.1) using the PPML estimator,
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if positive trade
flows occur to a certain product-destination-year and zero otherwise.
Table 2.8: The Effect of ECX on Coffee Export: Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.095** 0.095** 0.095**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.231 0.319 0.345
Note: Our dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if positive trade flows occur
to a certain product-destination-year and zero otherwise. Treatment is an indicator variable that
equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for Kenya’s export products; ECX is 1 for coffee
export and zero for the other five export products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather,
and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (2.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8 reports the DDD results on how ECX affects the extensive margin of
coffee exports. As the coefficients in Columns (1) to (3) show, regardless of the
fixed effects used in the gravity model equation, the introduction of coffee in the
Ethiopian agricultural exchange system increases the probability of coffee export
to new destinations by about 10%. The estimated coefficients are also statistically
significant at least at the 5% level. This suggests that besides the intensive margin,
a commodity exchange could also increase the extensive margins of the commodity
trade.
2.6.2 ECX and the Export of Non-ECX Commodities
In the previous sections, we have find that that the Ethiopian Commodity
Exchange–ECX– is associated with increase in coffee export. In this section, we
assess whether the ECX affect export of non-ECX commodities.
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In carrying out this analysis, we use the following regression specification:
Exportijkt = exp[β1Treati × Productk × Postt + µit + µik + µkt + µij + µjt]εijkt
(2.2)
where Exportijkt indicates the export of non-ECX product k (i.e. flower, fruit &
vegetable, spices and hide & skin) from country i to country j at time t. µij, µit,
µik, µkt, and µjt represent the importer-exporter, exporter-year, exporter-product,
product-year and importer-year fixed effects respectively. Our coefficient of interest
in this DDD model is β1. If ECX does not have any spillover effects, β1 will be
statistically insignificant.
Table 2.9: The Effect of the ECX on Export of non-ECX Commodities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flower export Fruit & Veg.
Treatment ×Product× Post -0.102 -0.102 -0.075 -0.075
(0.073) (0.073) (0.092) (0.092)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes No Yes
Importer × Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 2970 2970 2970 2970
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.836 0.062 0.836
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero
for Kenya’s export products; Product is 1 for Flower export (Column (1) and (2)) or for fruit and
vegetable export (Column (3) and (4)) and zero for the other four non-ecx export products (i.e.
spices, leather, and hide & skin, flower or fruit & vegetable); and Post2008 is 1 after 2008 and
zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(2.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (2.9) presents estimates of Eq. (2.2). The coefficient of interest (Treatment
× Product ×Post) is statistically insignificance suggesting that ECX does not have
effect on the exports of non-ECX commodities (flower and fruit & vegetables). The
absence of spillover effect further evidence in favor of the a causal interpretation of
the ECX effect on coffee export.
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2.7 Conclusion
The establishment of a agricultural commodities exchange in developing countries
are often justified by presuming such exchange markets would help farmers expand
their production and increase export revenue. However, while it seems intuitive
that commodity exchanges would help the agricultural commodities sectors, we do
not have strong evidence that developing countries would benefit from having a
commodity exchange, especially when it is an advanced market mechanism.
In this paper, we examine whether developing countries benefit from having a
commodity exchange. We consider this question by studying its effects on coffee
exports in Ethiopia. Coffee farming is the most important agricultural activity in
Ethiopia, as it supports the livelihood of 15 million farmers and generates a quarter
of the country’s export. In April 2008, the government of Ethiopia introduced the
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) to provide reliable market information and
storage facilities to farmers, especially coffee producers, which help them engage in
the export industry.
Using a triple-differencing (DDD) approach, we find that the establishment of
the ECX has led to an increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export by about 84%. To put
things into perspective, the impact of the ECX on exports is twice the impact of
joining regional trade agreements (Magee, 2008) or trade concession policies such as
AGOA (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010) and temporary removal of tariff following
a natural disaster (Cheong et al., 2017) on trade.
We also find that the ECX has led to the export of coffee into new
foreign markets. Our paper is related to recent initiatives by governments and
international organizations to introduce agricultural commodities exchanges in
developing countries. We provide quasi-natural experimental evidence to show that
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Appendix A.
Table A1: List of Trading Partners of Ethiopia and Kenya
Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria
Canada China Egypt Arab Rep. France
Germany Greece India Iran Islamic Rep.
Israel Italy Japan Korea Rep.
Kuwait Malaysia Morocco Netherlands
Pakistan Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia
South Africa Sweden Switzerland Thailand
Turkey Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom
United States
Note: We consider the exports of Ethiopia and Kenya for their 33 common trading partners. The sample
period extends from 2003-2011.
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It is argued that landlocked countries are usually less developed due to landlockedness
being a significant barrier to trade. Empirically, however, there is little evidence
on how large the causal effect of landlockedness is, as exogenous variations in
landlockedness useful for addressing this question are rare. In this paper, we exploit
a novel natural experiment when Ethiopia’s became a de facto landlocked country
following a conflict with Eritrea in 1998. Because landlockedness primarily affects
land and sea freight than air freight, this “closing in” of Ethiopia should affect the
trade of bulky, low-valued goods more strongly than the trade of light, high-valued
goods. To estimate the effect of landlockedness, we employ two approaches: the triple
difference-in-differences approach and the synthetic control approach. The triple
difference-in-differences approach enables us to use a span of fixed effects to identify
the “treatment” effect of landlockedness on trade. The synthetic control approach
provides us with a data-driven method to obtain a control group that mirrors
Ethiopia’s pre-intervention trend as closely as possible. Our empirical results reveal
that landlockedness has a large negative impact on Ethiopia’s exports and imports:
on average, being landlocked reduces Ethiopia’s ocean-borne exports and imports
by about 43-80% and 67-71%, respectively. We also find that the landlockedness
shock has a persistent effect on trade, suggesting that the negative influence of
landlockedness is not easily overcome.
Key Words: Landlockedness, Trade cost, Ethiopia, Difference-in-Differences
JEL Codes:C21, F14, F15, O10, P33
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3.1 Introduction
It is well-known that landlocked countries tend to be less developed than their coastal
neighbors. One explanation is that landlockedness is a significant barrier to trade,
which stifles the development of countries with landlocked geography (Raballand,
2003; Faye et al., 2004; Arvis et al., 2010). For example, among developing countries,
landlocked developing countries have only a third of the import share of coastal
developing countries (World Bank, 1998), and they export less than half of the
per-capita volume of their coastal counterparts (Faye et al., 2004). Consequently,
they do not trade as much, landlocked developing countries usually have lower levels
of socio-economic development as well. Currently, about half the population in these
countries live on less than US$2 per day and about 1 in 10 newborns are not expected
to live past the age of five.
Given the poverty levels faced by many landlocked developing countries,
economists have sought to understand how serious and persistent the problem of
landlockedness might be. Unfortunately, this issue is also an extremely difficult
one to shed light on. Although landlocked developing countries tend to be poorer,
it is unclear if this is due to landlockedness itself, other geographical attributes,
unobserved institutions that are somehow correlated with landlocked geography, or
other factors. Currently, research on the effects of landlockedness are mostly carried
by estimating the coefficient on the landlocked dummy in cross-country regressions
with cross-sectional data (e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Raballand, 2003; Coulibaly
and Fontagné, 2006; World Bank, 2014). This estimated coefficient, as researchers
have acknowledged, may not reflect the causal effect of landlockedness, since it could
be confounded by the effects of other time-invariant country characteristics (Carrere
and Grigoriou, 2008; Paudel et al., 2014). Although these confounding effects could
be eliminated by employing panel regressions with country fixed effects, the trouble is
that landlockedness is itself time-invariant. Thus, its effect will be purged by country
41
fixed effects along with other time-invariant confounders.1 Consequently, even though
it is intuitive that landlockedness adversely affects trade, there are no causal estimates
to show how serious (or not) this problem actually is.
In this paper, we will provide the first natural experimental evidence on the
causality and persistence of the effect of landlockedness on trade. Our natural
experiment comes from the sudden transition of Ethiopia from a de-facto coastal
country to a de facto landlocked one in 1998. Eritrea had been a province of
Ethiopia.2 In 1991, however, pro-independence rebel forces initiated combat and
defeated the Ethiopian forces, and Eritrea’s independence was secured following a
referendum two years later. Despite the de jure separation, there was a protocol of
understanding between the government of Ethiopia and the newly-formed state of
Eritrea for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of the Eritrean port of Assab (IMF,
1997; Faye et al., 2004; Briggs and Blatt, 2009; Connell and Killion, 2010). As
stated under the intergovernmental transit and port service agreement and customs
arrangement of the protocol of understanding, both governments had agreed that
Ethiopia would be granted continued free access to the port of Assab with its own
customs branch office. Under this agreement, Ethiopia’s imports and exports through
the port of Assab, which accounted for 95 percent of the country’s trade throughput
(Briggs and Blatt, 2009; Connell and Killion, 2010), were exempted from Eritrean
customs duties and related charges (IMF, 1997). As such, even though Ethiopia was
de jure landlocked, the port of Assab was practically a de facto Ethiopian port within
Eritrea.3
This arrangement, however, fell apart in 1998 when war broke out between Eritrea
and Ethiopia due to border related issues.4 The escalation of this border-dispute had
1To quantify the impact of landlockedness, existing studies typically use a time invariant dummy
variable – an indicator of landlockedness - that takes a value of one if a country is landlocked.
However, the country fixed effect will partial out the time invariant landlocked indicator, causing
the effect of landlockedness to be unidentified.
2Eritrea was a colony of Italy from 1998-1941. Following the independence from Italy, British
took over the administration from 1941-1952. Eritrea become an autonomous region of Ethiopian
and become again province of Ethiopia in 1952 and 1961 respectively.
3Ethiopia was a de jure landlocked country with coastal access since 1993, but a de facto coastal
country until 1998.
4Both countries disputed over the control of the border town of Badme.
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“taken everybody by surprise, including Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi”
(Abbink, 1998, p. 551). Due to this conflict, the port of Assab, which is Ethiopia’s
main commercial outlet to the world, was immediately closed. From that moment
on, Ethiopia became truly landlocked. Besides Ethiopia, no other sovereign states in
modern times had gone from being a coastal to a landlocked country.
Empirically, we employ two estimation methods to study the treatment
effect of landlockedness on trade for Ethiopia. First, we employ a triple
difference-in-differences (DDD) approach to estimate the impact of landlockedness
on the bilateral trade of Ethiopia within a gravity model. Our triple-differencing
approach exploits three sources of variation: country variation (landlocked
country–Ethiopia– and coastal country–Kenya), product variation (bulky oceanborne
freight and light airborne freight) and time variation (before and after “de facto”
landlockedness).5 To estimate our gravity model, we used 13 years disaggregated
bilateral trade data of the treated and the control countries along with more than
30 common major trading partners of the two countries. The data ranges from 1993
to 2005. In addition, to address the sensitivity of gravity model to the number
of variables included in the regression,6 we control a large set of exporter-year,
exporter-product and product-year fixed effects (Magee, 2008; Cheong et al., 2017).
Second, we employ the synthetic control approach to study the impact of
landlockedness on the aggregate exports and imports of Ethiopia. This method
enables us to obtain a data-driven counterfactual, known as a synthetic control,
as a weighted average of all the coastal countries in Africa for which data is
available.7 Unlike the conventional approach of choosing a single comparison
group, the weighting of the potential control groups (i.e. other coastal African
5We define the export of four major ocean-borne products including coffee, leather, vegetable
and hide & skin as ‘treated’ and airborne–gold–as ‘control’ commodity. Similarly, we define twelve
major ocean-borne imports as ‘treated’ and airborne – medicine and pharmaceutical—as ‘control’
products
6According to Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008), gravity model is sensitive to the
number of variables included in the regression.
7We use 34 coastal countries altogether to construct the synthetic control. The list of coastal
African countries are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo
Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Arab Republic of Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Tunisia.
43
countries) enables the weighted average, which is the synthetic control, to achieve
a pre-intervention trend that mirrors Ethiopia’s even more closely (See, for example,
Abadie et al., 2010; Cheong et al., 2017). More importantly, the synthetic control
is data-driven, in the sense that the weights used to construct it are not arbitrarily
imposed, but are chosen (based on some loss criteria) so that its characteristics and
those of Ethiopia are as similar to each others’ as possible.
Our empirical results show that Ethiopia’s export and import products are
strongly affected by landlockedness. Specifically, landlockedness on average reduces
Ethiopian’s exports of coffee, leather, crude vegetable and hide & skin by about 43%,
49%, 80% and 72%, respectively. In addition, it reduces Ethiopian’s ocean-borne
imported goods, such as petroleum, fuel and fertilizer, by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%,
respectively. These large reported effects are robust to various robustness checks,
such as placebo test and sub-sample analysis.
To further investigate how persistent the negative effect of landlockedness is, we
estimate the size of the treatment effects across years. We find that the effect of
landlockedness on Ethiopia’s export and import products is not short-lived, but is
persistent, to the extent this effect is stronger further down the years for certain goods.
The synthetic control method also provides evidence that after the landlockedness
shock, there is an increasing divergence between the aggregate exports and imports
of Ethiopia and those of the synthetic control. As such, the negative effect of
landlockedness on trade is not merely a level effect, but also has an effect on slowing
down trade relative to the counterfactual.
Our work is most closely related to the literature that looks at the effect of
geographical barriers on trade, especially landlockedness, on the export and import.
For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998) studied the effect of geographical isolation and
shipping cost on manufactured export and found that the manufacturing exports of
landlocked countries are significantly lower than that of coastal countries. Similarly,
Limao and Venables (2001), Raballand (2003), Coulibaly and Fontagné (2006),
Carrere and Grigoriou (2008), Paudel et al. (2014) and World Bank (2014) argued
that landlockedness had a negative impact on trade. To estimate the effect of
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landlockedness, they estimated the coefficient on a time-invariant landlocked country
dummy contained in a cross-sectional cross-country regression. The problem with
these results is that they lack a causal interpretation, since it is not possible to
disentangle the effects of landlockedness from the effects of other time-invariant
country factors, as country fixed effects will partial all of them out. Our work
overcomes these issues by providing the first quasi-natural experimental evidence
on the effects of landlockedness that are estimated from a panel model with a rich
fixed effects structure.
Our work is also broadly related to the literature that studies the relationship
between trade cost and international trade. Trade economists have long been
concerned about the source of trade costs and how they affect trade. A vast
literature has attempted to estimate the causal effects of policy barriers (tariffs and
non-tariff barriers), transportation (freight costs, time costs), and the effects of the
costs associated with the use of different currencies on exports and imports (see
Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008; Christ and Ferrantino,
2011; Djankov et al., 2010; Hummels and Schaur, 2013; Silva and Tenreyro, 2010).
In this regard, our paper speaks to this literature by establishing results on the effect
of landlockedness, which is a geographical barrier of trade.
The reminder part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the
background information about how Ethiopia becomes landlocked in 1998. Section 3.3
discusses the model specification and the estimation method of the study. Section
3.4 discusses our data sources and the descriptive statistics of the key variables.
Section 3.5 presents our main findings as well as several robustness checks. Section
3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Ethiopia’s Access to the Port of Assab
The port of Assab had been Ethiopia’s main gateway to the global market. Since the
early 1980s, infrastructure additions and reconstructions had been made to improve
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Table 3.1: Time-line for the Independence of Eritrea and the Border War with
Ethiopia.
1991 · · · · · ·•
Ethiopian rebels and
Eritrea defeat the central
government of Ethiopia.
1993 · · · · · ·• Eritrea becomes
independent state.
1998 · · · · · ·•
Eritrean-Ethiopian border
war and Ethiopia become
de facto landlocked.
2000 · · · · · ·• End of Eritrean
Ethiopian war.
the port. These included the widening of its harbor, the addition of warehouses
and container berth, the construction of shipyards with ship building capabilities,
and the expansion of road transportation infrastructure with the assistance of World
Bank, African Development Bank, Norway and China (Fair, 1988). The port had a
well-functioning transportation infrastructure, and was connected by 624 km highway
to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. At some point in time, it had even
accounted for 95 percent of the country’s main ocean-borne export and import cargo
throughput (Connell and Killion, 2010; Murphy et al., 2013).8
Up to the early 1990s, Ethiopia had sovereignty over Assab. However, this changed
when the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF ) and Ethiopian rebel forces from
secessionist and dissident groups initiated combat against Ethiopia to establish their
full independence and shared government power. After three decades of war against
successive governments of Ethiopia, the EPLF and Ethiopian rebel forces defeated
the Ethiopian central government forces in 1991 (see the time-line in Table 3.1). The
defeat of the then government of Ethiopia was followed by a successful referendum
for independence among the people of Eritrea, which led to Eritrea’s independence in
8Until the federation of Eritrea in 1952, Ethiopia was landlocked country. Its routes to external
world was the 780 km railway from Djibouti constructed in 1917. Following federation and then
annexation of Eritrea, Ethiopia became a coastal country until 1998.
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27 April,1993 (Pool, 1993). Because all of Ethiopia’s coastline are located in Eritrea,
Ethiopia became de jure landlocked and thus lost sovereignty over Assab when Eritrea
declared independence.
However, notwithstanding the loss of its coastline, Ethiopia did not become
de facto landlocked. This is because there was an agreement (a protocol of
understanding) between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the
state of Eritrea for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of the port of Assab. As
stated under an intergovernmental transit and port service agreement and customs
arrangement, both governments agreed that Ethiopia would be granted continued free
access to the port of Assab with its own Ethiopian customs branch office, and the
imports and exports of Ethiopia would remain exempt from Eritrean customs duties
and related charges (IMF, 1997; Faye et al., 2004; Connell and Killion, 2010). Thus,
the port of Assab was used almost exclusively for export-import trade to Ethiopia’s
capital city Addis Ababa, the population of Assab was predominantly Ethiopian, the
telecommunication system was connected with Ethiopia, and the economy of Assab
was entirely built on businesses from Ethiopia (Connell and Killion, 2010).9 As such,
Assab essentially remained an Ethiopian town within Eritrea.
3.2.2 Eritrean-Ethiopian War and the Landlockedness of
Ethiopia
This arrangement over the use of port of Assab fell apart on May 6, 1998 when
Ethiopia and Eritrea went into war over a border dispute. From then on, the
port of Assab was immediately closed to Ethiopia and the country became de facto
landlocked. With the “closing in” of Ethiopia, it is now the most populous landlocked
country in the world, with a population size fast approaching 100 million. Since
becoming de facto landlocked in 1998, Ethiopia’s has redirected its trading routes to
a neighboring country, Djibouti, which now handles the great majority of Ethiopia’s
trade. Unlike trading through the port of Assab, Ethiopia’s trade flow is subjected
9Morvover, Port of Assab was purchased by Rubattinio shopping company, Italian company, in
1869 from two Ethiopian sultans prior to the establishment of Eritrea as a region. Hence, Port of
Assab can be considered as historical property of Ethiopia.
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to fees for using the sea ports of other countries and to other related costs associated
with the crossing of another sovereign country (Lorton, 2000; Begashaw, 2008).10
As discussed, we are primarily interested in the impact that landlockedness might
have on development, with trade as the key focus here. Why, then, do we look towards
Ethiopia to address this question? Firstly, Ethiopia is the only sovereign country in
modern times that had been both coastal and landlocked. Secondly, the availability
of trade data before and after the landlockedness for Ethiopia (without Eritrea)
enables us to study the causal effect of landlockedness on trade with Ethiopia as an
example. Finally, the timing of Ethiopia’s de facto landlockedness was unanticipated:
not only did Ethiopia become de facto landlocked, the circumstance that led to its
landlockedness caught “everybody by surprise” (Abbink, 1998) .11 Thus, from an
econometric perspective, the landlockedness of Ethiopia was a plausibly exogenous
shock, which we could use to identify the causal effect of landlockedness.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical framework estimates the impact of landlockedness on trade using the
gravity model. In its simplest form, the traditional gravity model assumes that trade
flows between country i and country j are positively related with the economic size of
the two countries and negatively related with their distance.12 The most widely used
standard gravity equation comes from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). They
show that besides economic size and distance, multilateral resistance terms could
also determine trade flows between countries, and these can be controlled for by
exporter and importer fixed effects. In this study, we augment the Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003) gravity model by adding an indicator variable that measures
the effect of landlockedness on trade, and then apply a triple difference-in-differences
10Begashaw (2008), report the estimated annual fees that Ethiopia pay for using Djibouti Port.
According to the author, Ethiopia pays more than USD 850 million to DP World Djibouti annually
before the 2008 increase in port fees.
11Abbink (1998) wrote that The violent Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute which erupted on May
6 1998 has taken everybody by surprise, including Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi.
12Theoretical explanation for the gravity model are provided by (Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998)
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estimation approach.13 Thus, we estimate the following equation:
Tijkt = exp(β1 Treati ∗Bulkyk ∗ Postt + µit + µik + µkt)εijkt (3.1)
where Tijkt is either the 3-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
level of import or export flow from country i to country j at time t; Treat is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Ethiopia and 0 for Kenya; Bulky is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for bulky (ocean freight goods) and 0 for light goods that
are transported by air freight; Post is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after 1998
and 0 otherwise. Following the recent literature on gravity models (see, for example,
Magee, 2008; Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Cheong et al., 2017), we also include
a large set of interacted fixed effects, where µit denotes the export-year fixed effects
that subsume the typical gravity regressors (such as changes in exporter’s income),
and µik and µkt represent the exporter-product and the product-year fixed effects,
respectively. Finally, εijkt is the idiosyncratic error term of product j traded between
countries i and j at time t. We estimate Eq. (3.1) for different sets of import and
export sectors. The coefficient on the triple interaction term (β1) measures the net
impact of landlockedness on trade.
Estimation Issues We discuss two key empirical issues and how we take care of
them. The first issue comes from that fact that if there are many zeros in the bilateral
trade data (which there are), our estimated gravity equation could be biased and
inconsistent. This stems from the practice of transforming the gravity equation (e.g.
Eq. (3.1) into its log-linear version first, and then estimate the log-linearized gravity
equation by OLS. However, to accommodate the modeling of bilateral trade in its log
form, we need to drop all country-pair observations with zero trade, since the log of
zero is undefined. Consequently, this could cause severe sample attrition.
One stop-gap approach of handling the zero trade problem is to add one dollar
to the value of trade (Tijkt + 1) before taking the log transformation. However, this
procedure is ad-hoc and may still yield inconsistent estimates (Silva and Tenreyro,
13Silva and Tenreyro (2010) employs the difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect
of currency union on trade through a gravity model framework.
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2006). Moreover, trade data are usually heteroskedastic (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
The expected value of the log-linearized error term in the gravity equation is likely to
be a function of economic size, distance and other multilateral resistance variables,
which makes OLS regression inappropriate. To address this issue, we follow Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) to estimate Eq. (3.1) using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator. The PPML estimator estimates Eq. (3.1) in its multiplicative
form. Thus, it has the advantage of retaining zero trade values and provides consistent
estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity.14
The second issue comes from the fact that the effect of landlockedness of Ethiopia
could be confounded by the potential effect of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Recall that
Ethiopia became (both de jure and de facto) landlocked after it went into war with
Eritrea in 1998. Since both the border war and the landlockedness of Ethiopia occur
at the same time, it may be challenging to identify the net effect of landlockedness
on trade flows using a pure difference-in-differences analysis.
To address this problem, we take advantage of the variation in the traded products
that landlockeness can affect. The idea is the following. The war with Eritrea
should affect both ocean-borne and airborne trade of Ethiopia, but landlockedness
should affect only ocean-borne trade but not airborne trade. Thus, the change in the
trend of ocean-borne trade before and after 1998 should capture the effects of both
landlockedness and the war, but the change in the trend of airborne trade before
and after 1998 should only capture the effects of the war (i.e. not landlockedness).
As such, we could use the latter to partial out the effects of war in the trends of
ocean-borne trade. For this reason, we include airborne commodities (light and
expensive products) as an additional ‘control’ group. In doing so, we will have
contrast between commodities, countries and time, and therefore, we will estimate the
effect of landlockedness on trade by implementing the triple difference-in-differences
approach that compares the difference between the export or import of bulky versus
light goods of Ethiopia, to the difference in the export or import of bulky versus light
14The dependent variables (that include disaggregated import and export) are used without log
transformation but the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as elasticities (Silva and Tenreyro,
2006; Paudel and Burke, 2015).
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goods of Kenya, before and after 1998.
Besides dealing with the confounding effects of war, the triple-differencing
approach also has the advantage of enabling us to partial out differences in trends
that have nothing to do with landlockedness. For example, our estimates could be
capturing the effects of systematic shocks to ocean-borne and airborne goods that
are not associated with the landlockedness. If we include the ocean-borne trade of
Kenya as an additional control group, we could partial out the potential divergence
of trends in ocean-borne and airborne trade caused by systematic shocks.
More generally, by exploiting variations at the country, year and product levels as
our triple-differencing approach does, we could include a rich set of fixed effects, such
as exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year, to better identify β. These fixed
effects ensure that we are not attributing the influence of year-specific commodity
or country traits (shocks) to landlockedness. For example, following Ethiopia’s
landlockeness, exporter of bulky commodities may enjoy new infrastructure such
as roads that may affect bulky and light commodities differently. Such potential
confounder, however, could be controlled for by product-year fixed effect. Similarly,
the two exporting countries-Ethiopia and Kenya may experience country-specific
institutional or policy changes during the treatment period. To partial out the effects
of country-specific policies or shocks, as well as the effects of all country-specific
factors for trade, we could control for exporter-year fixed effects.15 Finally, the
possibility of referential trade policies on products may affect exports differently.
Such confounding effects could also be dealt with by exporter-product fixed effects.
3.4 Data
The data for this analysis is taken from the UN Comtrade database. We use bilateral
export and import data of bulky (ocean-borne) and light (airborne) commodities
of Ethiopia and Kenya between 1993 and 2007.16 The import and export data are
15The country-year fixed effects also capture the effect of exporters’ change in GDP, income per
capital, population and other gravity variables.
16We use 33 major trading partners of Ethiopia and Kenya to construct the bilateral panel data
set. We also use the data from 1993-2010 for the synthetic control regression.
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constructed using mirror data as these are likely to be more accurate in a developing
country context (Paudel and Burke, 2015).17 The data used in the analysis is at the
one-digit (aggregated) and three-digit (disaggregated) Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC).
For ocean-borne exports, We consider four major ocean-borne export products
including coffee, leather, vegetable and hide & skin, which will be our “treated”
goods. For the airborne exports, we consider gold, which will be our “control” good.
For ocean-borne imports, we consider fertilizer, fuel, petroleum, chemicals, iron
and steel, metal, industrial machines, special machines, rubbers, transportation,
textile, dyeing, perfume, and miscellaneous manufacturing materials. Like before,
these ocean-borne imports will be our ‘’‘treated’ goods. For airborne imports, we
consider light commodities such as medicine and pharmaceutical products, which will
be our “control” goods. Data on the exports and imports of these goods for Ethiopia
(without Eritrea) prior to the closure of Assab port are available for 1993-1997.
3.5 Triple Difference-in-Differences Analysis
3.5.1 Landlockedness and Export
A. Baseline
Table 3.2 presents the triple difference-in-differences estimation results for the
different major export products. Columns (1)-(4) report the effect of landlockedness
on coffee, leather, crude vegetable (that includes natural gums, resins, cut flowers,
gum resins and other similar export products), and hide and skin export, respectively.
For these results, we have included exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year
fixed effects into the model. For inference, we report robust standard errors that are
adjusted for two-way clustering by exporter and product.
Column (1) reveals that landlockedness has a large negative and statistically
significant effect on Ethiopia’s coffee export. Specifically, the estimated coefficient
17Export from Ethiopia and Kenya is constructed from the import by largest trading countries.
Similarly, the import from Ethiopia and Kenya are constructed form Export reported by major
trading partners
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.561*** -0.681*** -1.589*** -1.271***
(0.014) (0.091) (0.050) (0.130)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.022 0.069 0.041
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for
Kenya’s export products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and zero for light (air-borne) export
product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. Poison Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
on the triple interaction term shows that coffee exports are reduced by about 43%
following the landlockedness of Ethiopia, on average.18 This 43% reduction in coffee
exports is significant: coffee faming provides the livelihood income of 15 million
Ethiopians (Moat et al., 2017) and coffee exports account for a quarter (i.e. 25%)
of Ethiopia’s export earnings. Hence, through a back-of-the-envelop calculation, a
43% reduction in coffee exports translates into a 11% (i.e. 25% × 43% ≈ 11%)
decline in total export earnings. This is just coffee alone: the total negative effects
of landlockedness are likely to be much larger.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) also show that lack of access to the Assab port reduces
Ethiopia’s export of leather, crude vegetable, and hide and skin by 49%, 80% and
72%, respectively. All these estimates are statistically significant at 1%. Overall, the
negative effects of landlockedness observed here appears to be larger than the negative
effects reported in the previous studies. These studies usually estimate the effect of
landlockedness by estimating the coefficient on the landlocked dummy. As such, they
cannot deal with confounding factors like country fixed effects. For example, Limao
and Venables (2001) finds that a median landlocked country trades 28% less than a
maritime country. In addition, Paudel et al. (2014) shows that landlocked developing
18The formula to compute the effect of a dummy variable in a PPML model is (eθi − 1)× 100%,
where θi is the estimated coefficient of dummy variable i (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
53
countries (LLDCs) export about 25% less than other least developing countries. By
contrast, our study shows that for the ocean-borne goods considered, landlockedness
has caused exports to decline by about 50% or more.
B. Placebo test
Next, we conduct a placebo test for our baseline results in Table 3.2. The placebo test
evaluates the effect of landlockedness on export before Ethiopia actually became a de
facto landlocked country in 1998. If our identification strategy in Table 3.2 is valid,
then landlockedness should not have any statistically significant effects before 1998.
As such, we employ 1996 as a false treatment year (i.e. placebo), and present the
triple-differenced estimate of its effect on the four major export items of Ethiopia in
Table 3.3.19 Across all columns, we find that the placebo is statistically insignificant.
Thus, there is good evidence that our baseline estimate is capturing the effect of
landlockedness and not other coincidental events.
Table 3.3: Placebo: the Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.110 -0.380 0.169 -0.648
(0.322) (0.328) (0.326) (0.490)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.083 0.024 0.058
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for
Kenya’s export products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and zero for light (air-borne) export
product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 for 1996 and 1997; and 0 for 1993 to 1995. Poison
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Importer
country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
19Therefore, the pre-treatment period is from 1993-1995 and the false treatment period is from
1996-1997.
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C. The dynamic effect of landlockedness on export
Previously in Section A., we estimate the average effect of landlockedness on exports
during the treatment period. However, such an estimate does not tell us if the
negative effects of landlocked is short-lived or persistent.20 In this section, we
investigate how persistent the negative effect landlockedness is. To do so, we interact
the triple-difference term with year dummies (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010), and
compare the exports in each treatment year with the exports in the pre-treatment
years to track the evolution of the effect of landlockedness on exports overtime.
In Table 3.4, we report the year-by-year effects of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s
coffee exports (Column (1)), leather exports (Column (2)), crude vegetable exports
(Column (3)), and hide & skin exports (Column (4)). All the coefficients of
the quadruple interaction term show that the average effect of landlockedness is
persistent. Thus, the effect of landlockedness does not appear to be short-lived.
That being said, there is also no evidence that the negative effect of landlockedness
is becoming stronger over time.
D. Restricting the sample of countries
To obtain the results reported earlier, we have used data on thirty three major trading
partners of both the treated country (i.e. Ethiopia) and the control country (Kenya)
to investigate the effect of landlockedness on export. It is well known that estimates
from the gravity model are potentially sensitive to the sample of countries included in
the analysis (Haveman and Hummels, 1998; Magee, 2008).21 As a robustness check,
we re-estimate the model using data on exports with Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s top 20,
15 and 10 trading partners.
In Table 3.5, we only include the top 20 most important trading partners of the
two countries. As before, we find that landlockedness has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the exports of Ethiopia. These results continue to hold when
20There is a presumption that landlockedness has long-lasting negative impacts on trade and
economic development (Arvis et al., 2010; World Bank, 2014).
21Haveman and Hummels (1998) shows the effect of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) on trade
is sensitive to change in sample of countries used in the analysis: the impact of of RTA varies when
the sample of countries in the regressions is changed.
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Table 3.4: The Dynamic Effect of Landlockedness on Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DDD × D 1998 0.318*** -0.651*** -0.524*** -0.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 1999 0.534*** 0.787*** -0.624*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2000 -0.767*** -0.904*** -1.321*** -1.191***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2001 -2.236*** -1.792*** -1.692*** -1.638***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2002 -3.129*** -2.951*** -2.836*** -2.589***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2003 -1.959*** -1.406*** -1.916*** -1.625***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2004 -2.044*** -1.263*** -2.098*** -2.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2005 -1.716*** -0.546*** -1.748*** -2.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.069 0.019 0.040
Note: DDD ≡ Treat × Bulky × Post. Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s
export products and zero for Kenya’s export products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and
zero for light (air-borne) export product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero
otherwise. D year is a dummy variable that equals 1 for that specific year and zero otherwise.
Poison Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Importer
country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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restrict our sample to the top 15 or 10 trading partners (see Table B1 and Table
B2 in Appendix B). Hence, the impact of landlockedness on export is similar to the
baseline in terms of sign and statistical significance, and is not sensitive to the number
of trading partners considered in the analysis.
Table 3.5: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export: Top 20 Partner
Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.650*** -0.722*** -1.653*** -1.222***
(0.017) (0.089) (0.051) (0.130)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.026 0.067 0.047
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for Kenya’s
export products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne export and zero for light (air-borne) export product (i.e.
export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. Poison Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.2 Landlockedness and Import
A. Baseline
In this section, we look at the effect of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s ocean-borne
imports. For each of the major imports, we re-estimate Eq. (3.1) by replacing the
dependent variable, which was exports, with the imports from the major trading
partners. The key variable of interest is once again “Treat×Bulky×Post” and the
coefficient on the triple-interaction term measures the the effect of landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s ocean-borne imports.
In Columns (1)-(16) of Table 3.6, we find that all the coefficients of
“Treat × Bulky × Post” are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that
landlockedness reduces the major imports. The difference in the magnitude of the
estimates across the product types indicates the presence of heterogeneity in how
landlockedness affects imports. For example, landlockedness severely affects the
import of petroleum, mineral fuel and fertilizer,22 but has a smaller impact on the
import of general industrial machinery, machinery specialized for particular industries
and inorganic chemicals.23
22According to the point estimates, landlockedeness reduces the import of petroleum, fuel and
fertilizer by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%, respectively.
23One plausible explanation why some heavy items has a relatively smaller coefficient for import
is that Ethiopia as a developing country has price (cost) inelastic demand for import, especially for
products that are not easily produced within the country. The infant industries in Ethiopia would
not able to import substitute products such as industrial and special machinery relative to other
import items such as perfume imports. Thus, though landlockedness reduce the import of these
goods to some extent, it was not affected strongly as other goods. Hence, the coefficients for the
import of these products are smaller. .
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material Chem related Dyeing Perfume Inorganic chem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Bulky × Post -1.106*** -1.161*** -1.264*** -0.389*** -0.256*** -0.370*** -0.135*** -0.085***
(0.028) (0.081) (0.086) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.078 0.079 0.125 0.272 0.165 0.152 0.171
Types of import item
Rubber Textile yarn Metal Iron steel Mis manu Special machinery Indus machinery Road vehicle
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.674*** -0.399*** -0.329*** -0.239*** -0.257*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.085***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.048 0.080 0.040 0.101 0.064 0.084 0.051
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for Kenya’s import products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero
for light (air-borne) import products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. Poison Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Similarly, landlockedness has also a detrimental effect on the import of foreign raw
materials and intermediate inputs in manufacturing sector. In our regression, we find
that landlocked status reduces import of rubber, steel, textile yarn and dyeing by 49%,
21%, 32.9% and 30.9%, respectively. This reduction may have a large implication
for firms in the manufacturing sector as technology may diffuse through the used of
imported intermediate inputs. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), for example, show that
foreign inputs improves productivity through learning, variety and quality effects. ?
also argue that importing foreign intermediaries raise firm’s productivity.
Overall, the strong adverse effects on almost all major imports support the
argument that landlockedness is indeed a serious impediment to access global markets
(see, for example, Limao and Venables, 2001; Faye et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2010;
Christ and Ferrantino, 2011).
B. Placebo test
The key identification assumption in our estimation is that in the absence of
landlockedness, there should be no difference in the trends between the imports of
ocean-borne and airborne cargo. Using import data from 1993 to 1997, we perform
a falsification test, in which we assume that Ethiopia was landlocked in 1996 (i.e.
a placebo) instead of 1998. Table 3.7 presents the estimation results, where the
coefficients on the triple-interaction term are statistically insignificant. This suggests
that the effect on imports post-1998 is not a placebo effect.
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Table 3.7: Placebo: the Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post 0.316 0.347 0.312 0.119
(0.364) (0.274) (0.300) (0.195)
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.056 0.062 0.074
Types of import item
Chem related Metal Road vehicle indust machinery
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Bulky × Post 0.286* 0.200 0.143 0.400
(0.168) (0.277) (0.241) (0.256)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.043 0.068 0.072
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero for light (air-borne)
import products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after
1996 and zero before 1996. Poison Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed
to estimate Eq. (3.1). Importer-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C. The dynamic effect of landlockedness on import
Table 3.8 presents the year-by-year effects of landlockedness on imports. The strong
negative effect of landlocked status on import does not disappear; instead the impact
of landlockedness increases significantly over time for certain goods. For example,
landlockedness has reduced the import of fertilizer from 14% to 88.6%; mineral fuel
from 41.7% to 71.7% and petroleum from 41.6% to 71.6%. For fertilizer, petroleum
and mineral fuel, the impact of landlockedness during the last year of our sample
(88.6%, 71.7% and 71.6%) is larger than the average effect of landlockedness measured
over the previous eight years period (68.6%, 71% and 66.7%, from Table 3.6). This
is consistent with the presumption that landlockedness has persistent negative effect
on trade.
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Table 3.8: The Dynamic Effect of Landlockedness on Import
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel import Petroleum Chem material Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DDD × D 1998 -0.151*** -0.541*** -0.538*** -0.374*** -0.243*** -0.135*** -0.343*** -0.227***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 1999 -1.070*** -0.241*** -0.236*** -0.061*** -0.167*** -0.133*** 0.397*** 0.193***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2000 -1.010*** -0.584*** -0.581*** -0.121*** -0.272*** -0.288*** -0.038*** -0.050***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2001 -2.110*** -1.211*** -1.210*** -0.559*** -0.352*** -0.513*** -0.683*** -0.309***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2002 -1.372*** -1.447*** -1.478*** -0.825*** -0.549*** -0.448*** -0.905*** -0.391***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2003 -1.320*** -1.251*** -1.589*** -0.474*** -0.413*** -0.153*** -0.522*** -0.337***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2004 -1.848*** -1.433*** -1.434*** -0.941*** -0.496*** -0.602*** -0.867*** -0.356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2005 -2.173*** -1.263*** -1.259*** -1.329*** -0.618*** -0.818*** -1.507*** -0.797***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.065 0.066 0.124 0.272 0.048 0.050 0.101
Note: DDD ≡ Treat ∗ bulky ∗ Post. Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s imports and zero for Kenya’s imports;
Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import and zero for light (air-borne) import product; and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. D year
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for that specific year and zero otherwise. Poison Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator
is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Importer country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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D. Restricting the sample of countries
We re-estimate our model by restricting the number of trading partners. Table
3.9 reports the triple-difference analysis using only 20 main trading partners and
shows that the sign and statistical significance of the triple interaction term are
unchanged from the baseline. In Table B3 and B4 of Appendix B, we conducted
further robustness checks by restricting the sample to 15 and 10 main trading partners
and find that our results are not sensitive to the selection of major trading partners
for the analysis.
Table 3.9: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods: with Top 20
Partners
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -1.306*** -1.416*** -1.537*** -0.447***
(0.036) (0.121) (0.128) (0.021)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.096 0.097 0.151
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.341*** -0.556*** -0.272*** -0.387***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Pseudo R2 0.329 0.057 0.072 0.124
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero for light (air-borne) import
products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and zero
otherwise. Poison Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(3.1). Exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.6 Synthetic Control Analysis
For the previous results, we have used Kenya, a neighboring coastal country, as
a comparison. In this section, we implement the synthetic control approach, a
data-driven approach that enables us to construct comparison group from the set
of possible comparisons that mirrors Ethiopia’s pre-intervention trend as closely as
possible. To construct the comparison group, we take weighted sum of the export





where T̂t is the synthetic control for annual aggregate Ethiopia’s export (import)
in year t. Tjt is the period t aggregate annual export (import) of the 34 coastal
African countries; and ωj is the weight to coastal country c (note that:
∑
ωj = 1 and
ωj ≥ 0). The weights are calculated by minimizing the mean squared errors of the
export (import) of the landlocked country (Tit) with the coastal country (Tjt) in the
pre-landlocked period (i.e. from 1993-1997) as follows:
ωj = arg min
1997∑
t=1993
(Tit − ωjTjt)2 (3.3)
Figure 3.1 plots the aggregate annual exports of Ethiopia and the synthetic
control. The export of the synthetic control nearly perfectly matches the export
of Ethiopia before 1998 (the start of the treatment period). However, after Ethiopia
becomes both de facto and de jure landlocked, the total exports of the synthetic
control increase dramatically and reaches at its highest level in 2007 (during the
start of the great financial crisis period), while for Ethiopia, total exports decline
immediately after being landlocked and remain low for a long-period of time. A
benefit of using the synthetic control approach is that it provides a visual examination
of the progress of the effect of the treatment (i.e. landlockedness). As shown in Figure
3.1, the difference in the exports of Ethiopia and the synthetic control has widen over
time since 1998. This, again, suggests that landlockedness has a long-lasting effect.
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Figure 3.1: The Effect of Landlockedness on Aggregate Export
Note: This figure shows the synthetic control plot of the effect landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s total export. Ethiopia’s export is the treated unit and the exports of 34
African coastal countries are the potential controls. The treatment period starts in
1998 as shown by the vertical dotted line.
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Similarly, Figure 3.2 shows the impact of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s imports.
The dotted line plots the total imports for the synthetic control and the unbroken line
plots the total imports of Ethiopia. Just as before, the imports of the synthetic control
and Ethiopia are nearly identical before the treatment. However, from 1998 onwards,
Ethiopia’s imports have lagged far behind the synthetic control’s. This suggests that
landlockedness has a negative effect on the volumes of Ethiopia’s imports. Although
the divergence is not as large as that for exports, the effect of landlockedness on
import is nonetheless persistent across time.
Our main identification strategy is based on the idea that the war with Eritrea
should affect both ocean-borne and airborne trade of Ethiopia, but landlockedness
should affect only ocean-borne trade but not airborne trade. Thus, the change in the
trend of ocean-borne trade before and after 1998 should capture the effects of both
landlockedness and the war, but the change in the trend of airborne trade before and
after 1998 should only capture the effects of the war not landlockedness. One might
be concerned the spillover effect of landlockedness on light goods.
To address your concern about spillover effect of landlockeness on airborne goods,
we examine the effect of landlockedness on gold export using synthetic control
approach. As show in Figure 3.3, Ethiopia’s gold export has not decreased following
landlockedness. Rather it stays equal for four year (1998-2001) and increased after
2001. If landlockenss had a negative effect on Gold export, the result would have
been the reverse, meaning that Ethiopia gold export would decline after 1998.
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Figure 3.2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Aggregate Import
Note: This figure shows the synthetic control plot of the effect of landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s total import. Ethiopia’s import is the treated unit and the imports of 34
African coastal countries are the potential controls. The treatment period starts in
1998 as shown by the vertical dotted line.
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Note: This figure shows the synthetic control plot of the effect landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s gold export. Ethiopia’s export is the treated unit and the exports of 34
African coastal countries are the potential controls. The treatment period starts in
1998 as shown by the vertical dotted line.
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3.7 Conclusion
Landlocked developing countries are among the poorest of developing countries. The
limited participation in the international markets, due to typical high cost of trade, is
often presumed as one of the main contributor of poverty in this countries. Existing
studies on this area use a time invariant dummy variable, landlockedness indicator,
that takes one if a country is landlocked and zero otherwise to quantify the impact
of landlockedness on trade and development outcomes. However, the country fixed
effect will partial out the time invariant landlocked indicator causing the effect of
landlockedness to be unidentified. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence that
examine whether the impact of landlockedness on trade in developing countries is
temporal or permanent.
We have evaluated the impact of landlockedness on trade and how it evolves over
time using the de facto landlockedness of Ethiopia in 1998 as a natural experiment.
After Eritrea’s independence in 1993, there was a protocol of understanding between
the government of Ethiopia and the state of Eritrea for Ethiopia’s free and
unrestricted use of the port of Assab which is located in Eritrea (IMF, 1997; Faye
et al., 2004; Briggs and Blatt, 2009; Connell and Killion, 2010). Therefore, the
port of Assab was Ethiopia’s main gateway to access global markets until 1998. In
1998, war broke out between the two countries (Eritrea and Ethiopia) due to border
related issues. Port of Assab, Ethiopians main commercial outlet to the world, was
immediately closed and Ethiopia become a de jure and de facto landlocked country.
We exploit this natural experiment to isolate the causal effect of trade cost due to
landlockedness on trade. We use triple-difference and synthetic control approach
to investigate the impact of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s major export and import
products.
We find that landlockedness has a large negative and statistically significant
effect on export and import of ocean-borne products. Specifically, we find that
landlockedness on average reduces export of coffee, leather, crude vegetable and hide
& skin by about 43%, 49%, 80% and 72%, respectively. In addition, landlockedness
has a strong negative effect on different ocean-borne import goods of Ethiopia. For
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example, landlockedness reduces the import of petroleum, fuel and fertilizer by 71%,
68.6% and 66.9%, respectively. For a developing economy that highly depends on
agriculture, 68.6% reduction in fertilizer import, for instance, has an important
implication on the productivity of the sector.
Moreover, we examine whether the negative effect of landlockedness is short-term
or long-lasting. The international community including the World Bank and IMF
are supporting landlocked developing countries presuming that being landlocked
has a long-lasting negative impact on trade and economic development. Our
quadruple-difference results show that the effect of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s
export and import products is not short-lived. Rather its effect is persistent as the
estimated coefficient increases every year after the landlockedness shock.
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Appendix B
Table B1: Landlockedness and Export: Top 15 Partner Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.658*** -0.745*** -1.676*** -1.243***
(0.016) (0.093) (0.051) (0.142)
Exporter × Year Y Y Y Y
Exporter × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.026 0.067 0.047
Note: Treat is a dummy that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exports and zero for Kenya’s exports;
Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne and zero for light export; and Post is 1 after 1998 and 0 otherwise.
Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B2: Landlockedness and Export: Top 10 Partner Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.341*** -0.909*** -2.165*** -1.241***
(0.021) (0.088) (0.078) (0.142)
Exporter × Year Y Y Y Y
Exporter × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.026 0.065 0.060
Note: Treat is a dummy that equals 1 for Ethiopia and zero for Kenya’s exports; Bulky is
1 for ocean-borne exports and zero for light export; and Post is 1 after 1998 and 0 otherwise.
Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B3: Landlockedness and Import: Top 15 Partners Countries
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.726*** -1.792*** -1.804*** -0.452***
(0.047) (0.168) (0.167) (0.023)
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Importer × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 780 780 780 780
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.111 0.110 0.184
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.265*** -0.512*** -0.294*** -0.414***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Importer × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 780 780 780 780
Pseudo R2 0.329 0.068 0.089 0.140
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for Kenya’s
import products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import and zero for light (air-borne) import products (i.e.
import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and zero otherwise. Poison
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1). Exporter-product
clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B4: Landlockedness and Import: Top 10 Partners Countries
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.852*** -0.783*** -0.783*** -0.399***
(0.132) (0.082) (0.080) (0.047)
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Importer × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.255 0.255 0.244
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.201*** 0.026 -0.292*** -0.451***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.024) (0.040)
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Importer × Product Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Observations 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R2 0.434 0.072 0.127 0.171
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for Kenya’s
import products; Bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import goods and zero for light (air-borne) import
products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and zero
otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (3.1).
Exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,




and Productivity: Evidence from
Natural Experiment
Habtamu Edjigua




It is well-known that landlocked geography stifles trade by raising the cost of
trade. Trade is important for development. Firms, for instance, tend to become
more productive as they engage in international trade, especially if they have access
to imported inputs. This paper exploits a novel natural experiment to show that
landlockedess has non-trivial negative effects on firm productivity. The experiment
is based on Ethiopia, which became de facto landlocked after its free access to the
Eritrean port of Assab was cut-off following a war between them. Using a rich census
dataset from Ethiopian manufacturing firms over the period 1996-2005, we find that
landlockedness leads to a 14% productivity loss for firms that use imported inputs
versus the counterfactual. We also find that the negative effect of landlockedness on
productivity is stronger for small size firms and private-owned firms.
Key Words: Landlockedness, Trade cost, Ethiopia, Difference-in-Differences
JEL Codes:C21, F14, F15, O10, P33
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4.1 Introduction
A well-known but little understood trade cost is the cost of landlocked geography
to a country. For the trade in goods, landlocked countries depend heavily on other
countries for transit. As such, they face significant barriers of trade such as long
distance to global markets, huge port fee and inconvenient transit procedures that
contribute to high transport and time costs. In 2014, the average cost to import
a standardized container of cargo was $4,343 in landlocked developing countries,
while only $1,559 in coastal developing countries (UN-OHRLLS, 2014). Landlocked
countries have an import share to GDP of 11 percent compared with 28 percent for
coastal countries. Their average exports are less than half of the per-capita volume
of their coastal neighbors (World Bank, 1998; Faye et al., 2004).
Although the literature has attempted to study the effects of landlockedness, we
have two observations about how the existing studies are carried out. Firstly, there
are several cross-country studies that have shown how landlockedness (e.g. Limao
and Venables, 2001; Raballand, 2003; Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2006; UN-OHRLLS,
2014) are associated with lower trade volumes. However, these results may not
represent the causal effect of landlockedness, as it can be confounded by other
time invariant country characteristics (Head and Mayer, 2014). The reason is that
the existing studies usually estimate the effect of landlockedness by estimating the
coefficient on a landlocked indicator variable (i.e. dummy variable that indicates
if a country is landlocked). However, because the landlocked indicator is time
invariant, country fixed effects will partial its effect out along with all the other
invariant factors. Secondly, the existing studies have focused primarily on the effect
of landlockedness on trade. By reducing firms’ access to foreign inputs, landlockedness
could also decrease the productivity of firms, as the foreign inputs expand the choice
of intermediates goods for producers and may facilitate technological diffusion by
embodying technological advances.1
1Recent studies also draw attention to the extent to which lower trade costs leads to higher
productivity through access to foreign intermediate inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Nataraj,
2011; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). However, landlockedness, by increasing international trade
cost, may act as a barrier to import and reduce technology diffusion.
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This paper estimates the effect of landlockedness on firm productivity using the
sudden transition of Ethiopia from a de facto coastal country to a de facto landlocked
one in 1998. Ethiopia was a coastal country until 1993. Its main seaport – Port of
Assab – was located in the province of Eritrea.2 In 1993, Eritrea separated from
Ethiopia , and thus Ethiopia became de jure landlocked but remained de facto
coastal as the two countries agreed for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of port of
Assab located in Eritrea (IMF, 1997; Faye et al., 2004; Connell and Killion, 2010).
However, in 1998, a territorial dispute led to the start of Eritrean-Ethiopian war and
Port of Assab was immediately closed. As a result, Ethiopia became both de jure
and de facto landlocked. Consequently, Ethiopia redirected its international trade
through the seaport of a neighboring country, Djibouti, which now handles the great
majority of its import and export. Hence, Ethiopian trade flow is subjected to huge
fee and cumbersome transit procedures for using other countrys sea port and other
related costs associated with crossing a sovereign country (Lorton, 2000; Begashaw,
2008).
To estimate the effect of landlockedness on firm-level productivity, we follow
the standard approach in the literature (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and
Rodrigue, 2008; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). First, we estimate production
function at two digit industries level and construct firm-level productivity measures
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. Next, we examine the
relationship between landlockedness and the estimated firm-level productivity. We
then goes to investigate whether landlockedness has affected firms that import their
inputs relative to non-importing firms. We hypothesize that if the productivity loss
are due to reduction of importing foreign inputs then forms that import their inputs
should be disadvantaged more than non-importers.
We find that landlockedness has a large negative impact on firm-level productivity.
The results show that landlockedness lead to a 14 percent productivity loss for firms
that import their inputs. Our result is robust to a variety of approaches to deal with
time varying fixed effects and the confounding effect of concurrent events, including
2Eritrea was one of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia until 1991.
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Ethiopian-Eritrean war.
To explain the possible channels for why landlockedness has a negative effect
on the productivity of firms, we show that landlockedness has a negative effect
on both the extensive margin (number of importing and exporting firms) and the
intensive margin (volume of imports and exports per firm), which may explain why
landlockedness could adversely affect the productivity of firms
We also document heterogeneity in the impact of the landlockedness across
firms. We find that the effect of landlockedness varied across ownership type with
private-owned firms showing a much higher negative effect than state-owned firms.
Firms in different size categories also affected differently. Small and medium size
firms significantly and negatively affected. However, there is no evidence that
landlockedness led to loss in productivity for large firms.
The main contribution of this paper is to uncover new findings about the impact
of landlockedness on firm-level productivity by exploiting a novel natural experiment.
Using the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea war a natural experiment, we provide a microlevel
evidence and address the potential concern in identifying the effect of landlockedness
in the literature. Previous studies on the cost of landlockedness has mainly focused
on aggregate trade and they estimate the effect of landlockedness by estimating the
coefficient on the landlockedness indicator (time invariant variable) in cross-country
regressions (e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Raballand, 2003; Coulibaly and Fontagné,
2006; UN-OHRLLS, 2014). However, their results can be driven by other time
invariant country characteristics.
This paper also adds to the literature that looks at the effect of importing
raw material on firm productivity while using a different natural experiment as an
identification strategy (see, for example, Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and
Rodrigue, 2008; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Abreha, 2014). Our methodology is
similar to the approach by Amiti and Konings (2007). Amiti and Konings investigate
the effect of reducing input and output tariff on productivity of firms using Indonesia’s
trade reform of in 1995 as identification strategy. Similarly, Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011) analyze the impact of India’s trade liberalization in 1991 on the productivity
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of manufacturing firms. Unlike these papers, we examine the effect of trade cost
driven by landlockedness on productivity of manufacturing firms using Ethiopia’s
1998 de facto landlockedness as a natural experiment. In addition, this paper explore
the mechanisms by which landlockedness may affect the firm productivity, including
extensive margin (number of importing and exporting firms) and intensive margin
(volume of imports and exports per firm).
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section (4.2) provides the
historical background on how Ethiopia became de jure landlocked in 1993 and de
facto in 1998. Section (4.3) reports the model specification, the estimation method
of the study and data sources. Section (4.4) presents the main findings and the
various robustness checks of the paper; and finally section (4.7) concludes.
4.2 Eritrean-Ethiopian War and Landlockedness
of Ethiopia
Until 1998, Ethiopia was a coastal country using Port of Assab which is located in
the province of Eritrea (currently state of Eritrea) as a main seaport of the country
to access global markets (Connell and Killion, 2010; Murphy et al., 2013). About
95 percent of the country’s international trade were shipped through this port (Faye
et al., 2004).
For more than three decades, the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF )
initiated combat to establish their full independence. After a long years of war
against the successive government of Ethiopia, EPLF and other Ethiopian rebel
forces defeated Ethiopian central government forces in 1991 (as shown in the time
line: Figure 1). Following the defeat of the then government of Ethiopia, Eritrea
conducted a referendum for independence which leads to the formation of a state of
Eritrea in 1993 (Pool, 1993).
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Figure 1. Time-line for Ethiopia’s landlockedness






















































































































































After the establishment of Eritrea state in 1993, there was protocol of
understanding between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the
state of Eritrea for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of the Port of Assab.3 As
stated under an intergovernmental transit and port service agreement and customs
arrangement, both governments agreed that Ethiopia would be granted continued
free access to the Port of Assab with its own Ethiopian customs office. In addition,
Ethiopia’s import and export remains exempt from Eritrean customs duties and
related charges (IMF, 1997; Faye et al., 2004; Connell and Killion, 2010). Thus,
Port of Assab remained practically an Ethiopian port in the state of Eritrea that
makes the country a de jure landlocked but de facto coastal one.
In 1998, a border dispute leads to the starting of Eritrean-Ethiopian war and Port
of Assab was immediately closed. As a result Ethiopia became both a de jure and
de facto landlocked country. Currently, Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked
country, among the 46 landlocked countries, in the world with population size fast
approaching 100 million. Since becoming a de facto landlocked country in 1998 ,
3There has also been a claim that Port of Assab is a historical, legal and geographical property
of Ethiopia (Abbay, 2006; Abreha, 2014). The main argument is that port of Assab was purchased
by Rubattinio shopping company, Italian company, in 1869 from two Ethiopian sultans (sultan of
Rahita- locates in the current Afar region of Ethiopia) prior to the establishment of Eritrea as a
region. Hence, Port of Assab can be considered as historical property of Ethiopia
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Ethiopia has shifted its international trading routes to a neighboring country’s port ,
Djibouti port, which now handles the great majority of its import and export. Hence,
Ethiopian trade flow is subjected to huge fee and cumbersome transit procedures for
using other countrys sea port and other related costs associated with crossing a
sovereign country (Lorton, 2000; Begashaw, 2008).
This episode on how Ethiopia became landlocked is a good natural experiment for
estimating the impact of landlockedness on firm productivity for the following reasons.
Firstly, the timing of Ethiopia becoming landlocked was unanticipated to the firms
(Abbink, 1998). Therefore, th sudden transition of Ethiopia’s de facto coastal to
de facto landlockedness facilitate the causal interpretation of the results. Secondly,
the availability of firm-level census data before and after Ethiopia’s landlockedness
enables us to study the impact of landlockedness on firm productivity. The census
includes the universe of all importing and exporting manufacturing firms with more
than 10 workers that use electric power driven machines in Ethiopia. Finally, Ethiopia
is the most populous landlocked country in the world. Therefore, even though this
natural experiment is local to Ethiopia in nature, we may draw useful lessons about
how landlockedness affects firm productivity from Ethiopia itself given that it is the
largest landlocked country.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of firms across zones in 1996
Figure 4.2: Port of Assab and Port of Djibouti
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4.3 Empirical Strategy and Data









where Lit, Kit and Mit are respectively labor, capital and other raw materials that
firm i uses in producing Y level of output in period t. The total factor productivity
of the firm –the portion of output that is not explained by the amount of inputs
used–is measured by Ait. Our objective is to estimate the impact of landlockedness
on firm-level productivity (TFP). In the first step we estimate firm-level total fator
productivity and second, we specify how landlockedness affect productivity.
Taking the natural logs of equation 4.1, we estimate
yit = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3mit + ωit + εit (4.2)
where small letters refer to natural logarithms, εit is firm specific time varying
unobservable productivity shock (lnAit = β0 + ωit + εit), and β0 is the average
productivity level across firms and overtime; ωit is firm specific time varying
productivity shock observable to the profit maximizing decision maker in the firm but
not for the econometricians, and thus can affect the variable input choices that causes
simultaneity problem. Therefore, we correct it using a variable input, intermediate
inputs, as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that demand for raw
materials depend on observed capital and unobserved productivity: ωit = ωt(kit,mit).
Assuming ωt = (.) is monotonic function, the unobserved productivity can be
expressed in terms of observed capital and raw material. Thus, ωit = ωt(kit,mit)
can be substituted in equation 4.2 and the coefficients in the production function can
be consistently estimated.
After we obtain the input coefficients, we construct the firm’s total factor
productivity for each period, tfpit. This is achieve by subtracting firm i’s predicted
output from its actual output at time t. However, since data on physical output,
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capital, labor and raw materials are not available, we estimate the firm’s TFP
by following the literature to use deflated revenue and value of all inputs as a
proxies for the physical quantities. It would be ideal, of course, if we could use the
actual physical output; but unfortunately, like most firm-level productivity research,
we do not have such information, and thus, must rely on revenue TFP measure.
Although a concern about revenue TFP estimates is that they may reflect firm-level
differences in mark-ups, these estimates will capture the true technical efficiency as
long as price-mark ups are correlated with true efficiency (Topalova and Khandelwal,
2011). Moreover, truly highly productive firms will tend to appear efficient in
the productivity estimates regardless of the specific way that their productivity is
measured (Syverson, 2011).
Landlockedness The empirical strategy employed in this paper uses the timing of
landlockedness (i.e before and after 1998) as well as the share of firm’s imported raw
materials to identify the effects of imported input on TFP. In a regression framework,
the baseline specification takes the following form:
tfpit = α0 + αi + αj + αt + γ1(landlockednesst)
+ γ2(Imported inputsit) + γ3(landlockednesst)FMit +X
′γ + εit
(4.3)
where tfpit the productivity estimate of firm i at time t, landlcokedness is an
indicator variable that equals to 1 after 1998 and 0 otherwise; imported inputsit
is a measure of value of imported input by firm i at time t; FMit is an indicator
variable that equals to 1 if a firm i import its inputs at time t and 0 otherwise; Xit is a
vector of firm characteristics including age, size, export and firm ownership types. We
also include firm fixed effect (αi) to control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.
In some specification, we include full sets of fixed effect, which includes (αt), to
control for unobserved macroeconomic factors and trends that affect productivity
across all firms and industry fixed effect (αj), to control unobserved industry-specific
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heterogeneity. 4
We are particularly interested in estimating γ1 & γ3 using firm fixed effects
estimation technique. γ1 capture the effect of landlockedness on firm productivity
and γ3 measures the impact of landlockedness on firms that import their inputs. We
hypothesize that by increasing trade cost and stifle firms trade in the global market,
landlockedness will reduce productivity (γ1 < 0).
Recent studies also draw attention to the extent to which lower trade costs leads to
higher productivity through access to cheaper and high quality foreign intermediate
inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Nataraj, 2011; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011).
Firms may benefit from imported inputs through access to more variety inputs and
higher quality inputs. However, landlockedness, by increasing international trade
cost, may act as a barrier to import and reduce technology diffusion. We hypothesize
that if the loss in productivity is due to the reduction of imported intermediary
inputs, the importing firms should bear the largest loss from this direct effect. As
such, we interact landlockedness with a firm-level dummy variable that indicates
whether the firm import any of intermediate inputs or not. A negative and significant
(γ3), therefore, imply that firms that import raw materials bear a higher loss than
non-importing firms.
One of the main econometric issues in estimating the the effect of landlockedness
is the time invariant nature of landlockedness. As a result, it is confounded by
other time-invariant country characteristics (Head and Mayer, 2014). Although
these confounding factors could be eliminated by employing panel data methods, the
effect of landlockedness is unidentified since it will be partialled out after a within
transformation. A time varying Ethiopia’s landlockedness used in this paper gives
rise to an excellent natural experiment to isolate the effect of landlockedness on
trade and firm productivity.
4Moreover, when we do not control for time dummy, we include linear time trend to control the
overall direction of the productivity movement across time and war period dummy that takes 1
between 1998 and 2000 that absorb the effect of the war on productivity of firms.
91
Data Our main data source is the Manufacturing Survey of Large and
Medium-sized firms from 1996 to 2005. This survey, provided by Central Statistic
Authority (CSA), is an annual census of all manufacturing firms in Ethiopia with 10
or more employees. The CSA data capture the formal manufacturing sector with
firm-level data on sale, output, local intermediate inputs, imported intermediate
inputs, labor, capital, exports, ownership types etc. We use data on sale and inputs
to obtain productivity estimates.
The CSA questionnaire provides the value of intermediate inputs used in the
production. It also indicate whether these inputs are local or imported. Thus, we
have total expenditure on domestic inputs and imported inputs, but not by individual
type of input. We aggregate the data within two-digit industry categories to create
a 13 manufacturing sectors. The source of input data are of particular importance
for this study as they enable us to construct an imported input share that is directly
affected by landlockedness.
Table 4.1: International Trade participation of Ethiopia’s Manufacturing Firms
Year #Importers #Exporters %Importers %Exporters Total firms
1996 348 23 67.70 4.47 514
1997 376 25 69.76 4.64 539
1998 419 28 74.29 4.96 564
1999 405 36 70.93 6.30 571
2000 438 39 74.49 6.63 588
2001 382 36 68.71 6.47 556
2002 445 32 68.04 4.89 654
2003 565 41 79.35 5.76 712
2004 574 46 75.53 6.05 760
2005 486 50 72.54 7.46 670




The results from estimating equation (4.3) using firm fixed effects for the period
1996 to 2005 are presented in Table 4.2. All specification includes firm fixed
effects and standard error are clustered at industry level. Column (1) shows that
without controlling for micro-level covariates and some fixed effects, there is a highly
significant, negative relationship between landlockedness and firm productivity.
In Column (2), we control for age, import and export and find the effect of
landlockedness remains high and statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Columns (3)-(6), we include Landlockednesst × FMit to examine the effect of
landlockedness on productivity of firms that use imported raw materials. In Column
(4), we include firm fixed effect only. In Column (4), we additionally, control for
regional fixed effects and linear time trend. In Column (5), we add war period and
war regions dummies. In Column (6), we control for year fixed effects. However, we
do not include landlockedness dummy as year fixed effect partial out the landlocked
indicator, causing landlockedness to be unidentified. For the main specification,
reported in Column (5) , we find that landlockedness reduces firm TFP by 28 percent,
on average.5
If productivity losses from landlockedness are due to the reduction in imported
inputs, we would expect firms that import raw materials suffer the most from this
direct effect. To check this, we interact landlockedness with a dummy variable that
indicates firm’s import participation, FM . We classify firms as importing if they
import any of their inputs. In Column (5), we find that the coefficients on this
interactive term is negative and statistically significant, equal to -0.14. This suggest
that landlockedness leads to a 14% productivity loss for firms that use imported
inputs versus the counterfactual. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis
that landlockedness affect importing firms more than non-importing firms if they
were enjoying from higher quality imported inputs prior to Ethiopia’s landlockedness.
5The formula to compute the effect of the landlockedness is (eγ2−1)×100% plus (eγ3−1)×100%.
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There may be a concern that the key result is affected by time varying fixed effects
that confound Ethiopia’s landlockedness. One way to rule this out is to include year
fixed effects into the regression. This is what we have done in Column (6), which
shows that that the coefficient of Landlockednesst×FMit is negative and statistically
significant, which is very close to the estimate for importing firms in Column (5).
In addition, Columns (5) and (6) show that exporting firms have higher
productivity than non exporting firms. The coefficient on export is positive and
statistically significant showing that a 1% increase in export results a 1.6% increase
in firm productivity.
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Table 4.2: Effect of Landlockedness on Productivity
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Landlockednesst (=1 if year > 1997) -0.329
∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.040) (0.046) (0.073)
log(Imported raw materialit) 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
log(Exportit) 0.012
∗ 0.012∗ 0.013∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Ageit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.000)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.148∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.145 ∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no no no yes yes yes
Time trend no no no yes yes no
War year dummy no no no no yes no
War region dummy no no no no yes yes
Year fixed effect no no no no no yes
Observations 6823 6778 6778 6778 6778 6778
Note: Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness. The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005.
TFP is calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Our interest variable in the interaction term FM denotes importing firm dummy. Robust
standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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4.4.2 Landlockeness, Firm Characteristics and TFP
In this section, we investigate the impact of landlockedness across firms of different
ownership type and firm sizes-categories. Firms ownership are classified either private
or state-owned (public) and their size is placed in to either large, medium or small size
categories. We first examine if privately-owned firms affected by landlockedness than
public-owned firms. Table 4.3 presents the results of the impact of landlockedess
across ownership type. The results in the preferred specification (see Columns
(3) and (6)) show that while landlockedness reduces productivity of private-owned
firms, government owned-firm did not experience the same impact. One possible
explanation is evidence that public firms likely to get various forms of governments
favoritism and enjoy the benefit of participating in the international trade.
We also examine whether the effect of landlockedness on productivity varies across
firm categories. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4.4 indicate that the effect of landlockedness
in firm productivity is not similar across firms of different size. Using definition
of World Bank, we classify firms with 19 and less workers as small, 20-99 workers
as medium and above 99 workers as large firms. One observes that the negative
impact of landlockedness on productivity is different across firm size categories. The
point estimate in the sample of small firm categories are bigger in magnitude and
statistically significant while the estimate is not significant for large firms. This
finding perhaps can be explained by the fact that large firms have high capital such
that they keep importing even after landlockedness.
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Table 4.3: Effect of Landlockedness on Productivity: Public versus Private
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Landlockednesst -0.330
∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.041) (0.040) (0.079) (0.053) (0.057) (0.131)
log(Imported raw materialit) 0.015
∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.006 0.011
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
log(Exportit) 0.029
∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.000 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.170∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗
(0.051) (0.068)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no no yes no no yes
Time trend no no yes no no yes
War year dummy no no yes no no yes
War region dummy no no yes no no yes
Observations 5407 5379 5379 1416 1399 1399
Note: Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness by firm ownership. The
dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005. TFP is calculated using Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003). The column heading indicates whether the sample includes only private or
public. Our interest variable in the interaction term FM denotes importing firm dummy. Robust
standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Ageit -0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.007) (0.000) (0.003)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.224∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.124∗
(0.086) (0.062) (0.065)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes
Region fixed effect yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes
War year dummy yes yes yes
War region dummy yes yes yes
Observations 2041 3073 1764
Note: Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness by firm size categories.
The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005. TFP is calculated using
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The column heading indicates whether the sample includes only
small, medium or large. Our interest variable in the interaction term FM denotes importing
firm dummy. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses are
reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
98
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results controlling exporters effect,
exclusion of war period (1998-2000), exclusion of war region and adding industry fixed
effect. We also present a falsification test.
4.5.1 Controlling Exporters Effect
Our primary focus in this paper is to examine the effect of landlockedness on those
firms that import their inputs. However, there may be a concern that the key results
are affected by exporters effect assocaited with landlockedness. One way to examine
this is to re-estimate the equations using an interaction term of landlockedness and
exporter dummy in the regression. We see from Table 4.5 that the coefficients on
landlockedness intracted with export dummy (Landlockednesst × export dummit) is
insignificant. Hence, the negative effect of landlockedness on productivity is due to
decreased in imported raw material.
4.5.2 Excluding Ethiopia-Eritrea War Period
There may be a concern that the main results are affected by the Ethiopia-Eritrea
war, which happed between 1998-2000 that confound the landlockedness timing. One
way to test this is to re-estimate TFP and then estimate equation 4.3 using data that
exclude this war period (1998-2000). Table 4.6 presents regression result that are
estimated excluding data of 1998, 1999 and 2000, to ensure that the estimates are
not capturing the effect of the war. We see that in Columns (3)-(6), the coefficient
on landlockedness interacted with importing dummy (Landlockednesst × FMit) is
negative and statistically significant. Column (5) is our preferred specification and
the magnitude of the coefficient of Landlockednesst × FMit (-0.132) is very close
to the point estimate of the baseline results shown in Table 4.2. This may not be
surprising , given that we include war-period dummy that could pick up the effect of
the war on the baseline regression.
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Table 4.5: Controlling Exporters Effect
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Landlockednesst (=1 if year > 1997) -0.238
∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.124∗
(0.041) (0.046) (0.069)
log(Imported raw materialit) 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Exportit) 0.022
∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Ageit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Landlockednesst × import dummyit -0.146∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Landlockednesst × export dummyit -0.159 -0.154 -0.153 -0.151
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no yes yes yes
Time trend no yes yes no
War year dummy no no yes no
War region dummy no no yes yes
Year fixed effect no no no yes
Observations 5915 5915 5915 5915
Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness.
The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005.
TFP is calculated using (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003)
All regression includes industry fixed effects.
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses are reported.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Excluding Eritrea-Ethiopia War Period (1998-2000)
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Landlockednesst -0.357
∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.053) (0.081) (0.092)
log(Importit) 0.009
∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log(Exportit) 0.016
∗ 0.016∗ 0.016∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Ageit -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.135∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.132∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.056)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no no no yes yes
Time trend no no no yes yes
War region dummy no no no no yes
Observations 5165 5123 5123 5123 4260
Note: Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness excluding data of 1998,
1999 and 2000.The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005. TFP is
calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Our interest variable in the interaction term FM
denotes importing firm dummy. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.5.3 Excluding War Region
We may still be concerned that the statistical significant effect of landlockedness on
firm productivity is driven by the location of firms, specifically stemming from firms
located in the war region. In this robustness check, we re-estimate Eq. (4.3) excluding
firms located in the Ethiopia-war region.
As documented by Negash and Tronvoll (2000) , the EritreanEthiopian War
began as a territorial dispute, at border of Tigray region (one of Ethiopia’s region)
and most of the battles took place in the Tigray region. Hence, due to geographic
exposure, firms operating in this region might be affected more than those in regions
farther away from the war. As such, one may suspect that results are stemming
from the inclusion of firms operating in the war-region in the regression. To check
the robustness of our result, we re-estimate equation 4.3 excluding sample of firms
operating in war region (Tigray). The results in Table 4.7 show that the interactive
term (Landlockednesst × FMit) is still negative and statistically significant at the 1%
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level. Therefore, there is no evidence that the statistical significance of landlockedness
is driven by the inclusion of firms operating in war region.
Table 4.7: Excluding Eritrea-Ethiopia War Region (Tigray)
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Landlockedness -0.326∗∗∗ -0.194 -0.245∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗
(0.033) (0.210) (0.041) (0.046) (0.074)
log (Imported inputs) 0.025 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log (exported inputs) -0.010 0.014∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age -0.036∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.146∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no no no yes yes
Time trend no no no yes yes
War period dummy no no no no yes
Observations 6506 6465 6465 6465 5665
Note: Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness excluding data of Tigray
region (war-region). The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005.
TFP is calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Our interest variable in the interaction
term FM denotes importing firm dummy. Our interest variable in the interaction term FM
denotes importing firm dummy. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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4.5.4 Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects
So far, all estimation have been using firm fixed effects. In this section, we examine
whether the main results are robust to alternative econometric specifications that
includes industry fixed effect instead of firm fixed effects. In Table 4.8, we use
industry (two-digit ISIC) fixed effects and control for firm characteristics such as size
categories and ownership type. The sign and statistical significance of our estimates
are generally consistent with the firm fixed effect model reported in Table 4.3.
Table 4.8: Controlling Industry Fixed Effect
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Landlockednesst -0.398
∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.163∗∗
(0.037) (0.051) (0.056) (0.079)
log(Imported raw materialit) 0.019
∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
log(Exportit) 0.023
∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Landlockednesst × FMit -0.450∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059)











Industry Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effect no no no yes
Time trend no no no yes
War region dummy no no no yes
War period dummy no no no yes
Observations 6823 6778 6778 6778
Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness.
The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005.
TFP is calculated using (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003)
All regression includes industry fixed effects.
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses are reported.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.5.5 Placebo Test
In this section, we conduct a falsification test to study the validity of our identification
strategy. The main assumption in our estimation is that by increasing trade cost,
landlockedness has a direct negative affect on productivity of importers and exporters.
It hinders trade participating firms from accessing higher quality foreign inputs, more
varieties of inputs and lower competition. Thus, if the loss in productivity is related
with the reduction in foreign inputs and competition, landlockedness should not affect
firms that are not participating in the international market during the sample period.
Table 4.9 presents the estimation results using sample of firms that do not import
or export during the sample period. In Column (4), the coefficient on landlockedness
is insignificant. This supports our observation that landlockedness has a negative
effect on the productivity of firms by affecting exports or imports.
Table 4.9: Placebo test: Using Sample of Firms Neither Import nor Export
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Landlockednesst -0.371
∗∗∗ -0.220 0.172 0.176
(0.131) (0.153) (0.248) (0.248)
Ageit -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Firm Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Time trend no yes no yes
Region fixed effect no no no yes
War region dummy no no no yes
War period dummy no no no yes
Observations 617 615 615 615
Table reports regression of firm productivity on landlockedness excluding data of nonimporter .
The dependent variable is TFP of firm i at time t between 1996-2005 .
TFP is calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). .
or exporting firms. Our interest variable in the interaction term Landlockedness
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at industry level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.6 Possible Channels
In this section, we attempt to explore the channels through which landlockedness
affect productivity of firms. We ask why firms productivity reduce following
Ethiopia’s landlockedness?6
We attempt to answer the above question by examining whether landlockedness
reduce the extensive margin (number of firms that use imported inputs and exporting
firms) and the intensive margin (average imports and exports per firm). We
hypothesize that if the reduction in productivity is due to a reduction in intensive
and extensive import and export following Ethiopia’s landlockedness, we should see
a negative relationship between landlockedness and extensive and intensive margin
of import and export.
In Column (1) (Table 4.10), we estimate the relationship of landlockedness and
intensive margin of import (volume of imported inputs) using fixed effect estimation.
We find that the coefficient of landlockedness is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that landlockedness reduce the volume of imported inputs. Similarly, the
result in Column (2) shows that landlockedness has a significant negative effect at
the intensive margin ( volume of firm’s export). Hence, one channel through which
landlockedness reduce productivity of firms is by reducing their export and imported
inputs at the intensive margin.
In Table 4.11, we examine the effect of landlockedness on extensive margin of
firm’s import and export. As the estimated coefficients in Columns (1)-(6) show,
regardless of the fixed effect controlled, landlockedness reduces the probability of
importing inputs. The estimated coefficients are also statistically significant at least
at 5%. However, we find no significant effect of landlockedness on firms’ export at
the extensive margin.
Overall, the results from Table 4.10 and 4.11 suggest that landlockedness reduce
productivity of Ethiopian manufacturing firms: through reducing extensive margin
6Amiti and Konings (2007) document that trade liberalization increase importing input that
leads to an increase in productivity. They point that the possible channels that trade liberalization
improve firm’s productivity is through increasing access to more varieties of imported inputs and
access to higher quality inputs. Similarly, Bai et al. (2017) show that by increasing competition,
exporting helps firms to achieve higher productivity levels.
105
(i.e number of firms that use imported inputs) and the intensive margin (i.e volume
of imported inputs and exports per firm)
Table 4.10: Landlockedness on Import and Export






Firm fixed effect yes yes
Region fixed effect yes yes
Time trend yes yes
War year dummy yes yes
War region dummy yes yes
Observations 7016 7016
Note: The dependent variable is import and export. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at industry level in parentheses are reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table 4.11: Extensive Margin
Dependent variable: Import inputsit Exportit
LPM Probit Logit LPM Probit Logit
Landlockednesst -0.082
∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.016 -0.015
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020)
Ageit 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.003
∗ 0.005
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006)
Firm fixed effect yes no yes yes no yes
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
War year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
War region dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6101 6101 6101 6101 6069 6069
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.Our dependent variable is an
indicator variable that equals to 1 if positive import or export occur to destination-year and
zero otherwise ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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4.7 Conclusions
It is well-known that landlocked geography stifles trade by raising the cost of trade.
Trade is important for development. Among its benefits, firms tend to become more
productive as they engage in international trade, especially when they have access to
imported inputs. This paper examine the effect of landlockedness on productivity of
manufacturing firms using Ethiopia’s landlockedness in 1998 as a natural experiment.
This study is the first to estimate the effect of landlockedness on firm-level
productivity. We followed the standard way of estimating total factor productivity,
using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology, which correct for simultaneity in
the firm’s production function. We find that landlockedness significantly decrease
productivity among Ethiopian firms. We also show that the evidence is robust
to exclusion of Ethiopia-Eritrea war period, war region, alternative econometric
specification.
We hypothesize that if productivity losses from landlockedness are due to
reduction in imported inputs, We would expect that importing firms would suffer
the largest loss from this direct effect. Consistent with our expectation, we find th
importing firm suffer a higher productivity loss compared to nonimporting firms. We
also find that the negative effect of landlockedness on productivity is stronger for
small sized firms and private-owned firms.
We show that among the possible channels, landlockedness may reduce
productivity of firms through reducing extensive margin (number of importing and
exporting firms) and the intensive margin (volume of imports and exports per firm).
A further disentangling of the channels that can help to reveal why landlockedness
reduces firm productivity is an interesting area for future research.
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Recent studies show that genealogically distant populations tend to differ more in a variety
of characteristics transmitted intergenerationally, such as language, appearance, norms, values,
customs, beliefs, and habits. Differences in these traits between countries and the world technology
frontier, the US, can deter the exchange of ideas and reduce opportunities for learning, adoption of
technologies, and innovations. Most of these studies, however, have often focused on country-level
data and little is known at a micro-level analysis. In particular, whether genetic distance from
the world technology frontier influences firm productivity in laggard countries or not is yet to be
established. Building on earlier study by Comin and Hobijn (2010), we proposes a theoretical
framework highlighting the mechanism through which genetic distance from the world leader
acts as a barrier to technology adoption in laggard countries, thus influencing negatively firms’
productivity in those countries. There are some challenges in testing this theory empirically. First,
the treatment variable (genetic distance) is measured at country-level while the outcome variable
(firm productivity) is available at firm-level, which renders the standard panel data method useless
in identifying the causal effect since the treatment is dropped out after a within-type transformation.
Second, there is a substantial heterogeneity across the distribution of firms’ productivity so that a
mean-type regression analysis such as the two-stage least squares method is not appropriate. Using
a novel method on quantile treatment models with group-level unobservables recently proposed
by Chetverikov et al. (2016), we show that the impact of genetic distance on firm productivity
is consistently negative and near inverted U-shaped across the distribution of firms’ productivity.
Clearly, firms operating in a country genealogically far from the technology leader tend on average
to have lower level of productivity but it is often the case that two countries, one with a very low
technology adoption and the other with a moderate or relatively high technology adoption can be
impacted identically by the same shock on current genetic distance. This may justify why some
countries that appear closer to the US have not benefited from technology adoption compared with
their peers that are genealogically far from the US, or vis-versa.
Key Words: Genetic distance; Barriers; Technology diffusion; Firm productivity; Quantile
treatment models; Near inverted U-shape.
JEL Codes: C21; C26; O12; O14
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5.1 Introduction
Many empirical studies document substantial and persistent measured productivity differences
across countries— e.g., see Hsieh and Klenow (2010) and the review by Syverson (2011). Such
differences are also observed across firms within a country, even at a narrowly defined industry code
(e.g., four-digit SIC); Syverson (2004). Studies aiming to explain these differences often focus on
the aggregate productivity growth— the source of almost all per capita income differences across
countries into various micro-components, with the intent of better understanding the sources of such
growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Foster et al., 2001; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, 2010). It is well known
that various factors— such as geography, climate, luck, institutions, culture, policies, rule of law,
and corruption— can explain income differences across countries through their direct influence on
human/physical capital and total factor productivity (TFP); see Hsieh and Klenow (2010). Most of
these theories have been assessed empirically with some for successes (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009;
Bove and Gokmen, 2017; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016; Jäggi et al., 2018) with country-level data.
However, we know little on why do firms differ so much in productivity across countries.
Earlier studies that addressed differences in productivity across countries includes Hsieh and
Klenow (2010), Bartelsman et al. (2013), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
and Midrigan and Xu (2014). For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2010) discuss why total factor
productivity (TFP) varies across countries, highlighting misallocation of inputs across firms and
industries as a key determinant. In this paper, we look at a different chain of causality that
may explain differences in firms’ productivity across countries. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)
shows that genetic distance can capture cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally over the
long run within populations, thus acting as a prominent source of large and persistent variations
in income across countries. Following this idea and earlier study by Comin and Hobijn (2010), we
proposes a theoretical framework highlighting the mechanism through which genetic distance from
the world leader, the United States, acts as a barrier to technology adoption in laggard countries,
thus influencing negatively the TFP of firms in those countries.
There are some challenges in testing this theory empirically. First, the treatment variable
(genetic distance) is measured at country-level while the outcome variable (firm productivity) is
available at firm-level, which makes the standard panel data method useless in identifying the
causal effect since the treatment variable will be dropped out after a within-type transformation.
Second, there is a substantial heterogeneity across the distribution of firm productivity, hence a
mean-type regression analysis is not appropriate, i.e., a distributional method, such as a quantile
regression analysis, is warranted. Third, due to the presence of group-level unobservables (country
fixed effects) in the model, a standard quantile regression such as in Koenker and Bassett (1978)
will yield inconsistent estimates, thus is also not appropriate in dealing with this type of problems.
Using a novel method on quantile treatment models with group-level unobservables recently
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proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016) that accommodates the above problems, along with more than
32,000 firms from 94 countries, we show that the impact of genetic distance on firm productivity
is consistently negative and near inverted U-shaped across the distribution of firms’ total factor
productivity (TFP). This means that the relationship between genetic distance and TFP is not
monotonically decreasing. Indeed, although firms operating in a country genealogically far from
the technology leader (the US) tend to have lower level of productivity, it is also the case that
a country with a very low technology adoption (i.e., a very low TFP) and that with a moderate
or relatively high technology adoption can be impacted identically by the same shock on current
genetic distance. This may justify why some countries that appear genealogically closer to the US
have not benefited from technology adoption compared with their peers that are far from the US, or
vis-versa. We provide several robustness checks that show that the near inverted U-shape property
of the relationship between genetic distance and the distribution of firms’ TFP is: (i) robust to
alternative measures of productivity and genetic distance; (ii) robust to inclusion of institutional
quality and trade openness in the model; (iii) the exclusion of European countries whose genetic
data are likely less measured with errors than non-European countries.
Moreover, we discuss a plausible chain of causality that my explain differences in firms’ TFP
across countries. Indeed, we document that current genetic distance is negatively correlated with
technology adoption in the in the 1500AD, which in turns is strongly positively associated with
current median firms’ TFP across countries. As such, we expect current genetic distance to have
a negative impact on the distribution (at least the median) of firms’ TFP, thus corroborating the
main findings of our study. It is nonetheless important to note that the latter analysis is only
based on correlations, so more investigations are required to clarify if genetic distance influences
firms’ productivity through its impact on the technology adoption in the 1500AD. We leave these
investigations for future research.
Our study contributes to the emerging empirical literature on the impact of genetic distance on
technology diffusion.1 For example, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) show that genetic distance is a
key determinant of differences in income across countries, and their result is robust to the inclusion
of covariates such as geographical distance, climatic differences, transportation costs, and measures
of historical, linguistic, and religious distance. Bove and Gokmen (2017) show that the negative
impact of genetic distance on income across countries is stable over time, while Proto and Oswald
(2017) establish that some nations may have a genetic advantage in well-being– e.g., the closer is
a nation to the genetic makeup of Denmark the happier this nation is. Similarly, Ang and Kumar
(2014) investigate the impact of genetic distance from the world technology frontier on financial
development. They find that genetic distance negatively affects financial development through its
influence on countries ability to adopt innovations from the frontier technology. Although all these
1See Giuliano et al. (2006), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), Guiso et al. (2009),Ang and Kumar
(2014), Bove and Gokmen (2017), Ashraf and Galor (2013b) and Ashraf and Galor (2013a).
115
studies have some similarity with ours, there are two fundamental differences. First, our study
examines the impact of a group-level treatment (genetic distance, that is measures at country-level)
on a micro-level outcome (firms’ TFP, that measures at firm-level), while theirs focus on a group-level
analysis as both their treatment (genetic distance) and the outcome (income/financial development)
variables are measured at country-level. Second, while their studies focus on a mean-type regression
analysis, we show that a distributional approach is warranted to capture heterogeneity across the
distribution of the outcome variable. As such, applying a mean-type regression approach, such as
the 2SLS method, often yields an inconsistent estimate of the treatment impact on the outcome
variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the theoretical framework
that leads to a testable empirical econometric specification. Section 5.3 presents the empirical
specification and describes the estimation strategy. Section 5.4 provides a brief description of the
data, including the data sources and the main variables used in the paper. Sections 5.5 presents the
baseline results, while Section 5.6 provides some robustness checks. Section 5.7 introduce a brief
mechanism that may justify the main results of the paper, while Section 5.8 contains the concluding
remarks. The description of the variables and basic summary statistics are included in the appendix.
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5.2 Theoretical Framework
A theoretical model describing the mechanism through which genetic distance from the frontier
country can endogenously affects technology adoption in laggard countries (thus impacting on firms’
productivity) was first developed Comin and Hobijn (2010). In this section, we show how this
theoretical framework can be adapted to a micro level analysis. In particular, we demonstrate how
genetic distance can influence firms’ total factor productivity (TFP), and we test the theory with
an econometric specification.
Following Comin and Hobijn (2010), we consider a three sectors model: the households, the
world technology frontier, and the firms. We assume there are identical households in the economy
with unit mass. Each household supplies inelastically a unit of labor, receives wage (w), and saves in
bonds that are available in the domestic market with zero net supply. The representatives household
maximizes his life time utility subject to the budget constraint and the no-Ponzi scheme condition
on bonds. The technology frontier country is characterized by a set of technologies and vintages
specific to each technology at time t. At each instant t a new technology (τ) exogenously appears.
Denoting a technology by the time it was invented, the range of technologies invented by the frontier
country are given by (−∞, t]. For each existing technology, a new and more productive vintage
appears in the world frontier at every t. We denote the vintage of technology τ by Vτ . Vintages
are indexed by the time in which they appear. Hence, the set of existing vintages of technology τ
available at time t is [τ , t]. The productivity of a technology has two components: Z(τ, Vτ ) and
aτ . The component Z(τ, Vτ ) is common across countries and is purely determined by technological
attributes, i.e.
Z(τ, Vτ ) = e
(χ+γ)τ+γ(Vτ−τ) = e(χτ+γVτ ) (5.1)
where (χ+γ)τ is the productivity level associated with the first vintage of technology τ and γ(Vτ−τ)
represents the productivity level associated with the introduction of new vintages. The second
component, aτ , is the country specific productivity term that is described in (5.2) below.
Identical firms operate competitively in each country. They adopt a new technology τ from
the frontier countries, combine it with labor and intermediate goods to produce output. We assume
countries that are adopting a technology τ are below the world technology frontier country. If Dτ
denotes the adoption lag that reflects the time lag between when the best vintage in use was invested
and when it was invented for production in the economy, then the vintage of technology τ is defined
as Vτ = [τ, t−Dτ ] and represents the set of technology-τ vintages available in the economy. We
also assume that new vintages (τ, V ), where V ≡ Vτ hereinafter, are used in production through
new intermediate goods that embody them. Intermediate goods Xτ,V are combined with labor Lτ,V
to produce output Yτ,V associated with a given vintage. The form of the production function for
Yτ,V is given by:






In (5.2), aτ represents the factors that reduce the effectiveness of a technology in a country. Comin
and Mestieri (2014) designate it as barriers to the diffusion of technology. aτ also determines the
long-run penetration rate of technology in a given country, thus is usually referred to as the intensive
margin of technology adoption.
The representative firm combines the outputs associated with the different vintages of the same









for some µ > 1. (5.3)









for some θ > 1, (5.4)
where τ denotes the most advanced technology adopted in the economy.
As shown by Comin and Hobijn (2010), the ‘factor demand’ and ‘final output can be derived
straightforwardly. More precisly, taking the price of the final output as the numeraire, both he
demand for an output produced with a given technology and that of a particular technology vintage
are given by:








where Pτ is the price of sector τ output and Pτ,V refers to the price of the (τ, V ) intermediate
good. Equation (5.5) indicates that both the national income (Y ) and the price of the technology
(Pτ ) affect the demand of output produced with a given technology τ . Due to the homotheticity
of the production function, the income elasticity of technology τ output is one. Thus under perfect




























the productivity level associated with technology τ , and Zτ denotes the total amount of intermediate

























Equation (5.11) indicates clearly that the productivity of technology τ is determined by three
factors: the intensive margin (aτ ), the embodiment effect (which shows the productivity of the best
vintage), and the variety effect (which represents the productivity gains from using more vintages).
As such, the adoption lag Dτ has two effects on Zτ . First, the shorter Dτ the more productive are
the vintages used. Second, a shorter Dτ implies that more varieties are used, which in turns leads
to higher productivity.












Following Comin and Hobijn (2010), the process that governs the diffusion of technology in this
model is given by:
yτ − y =
θ
θ − 1
[zτ − (1− α)(y − l)], (5.13)
where yτ is the log of sectoral output produced with technology τ , y is the log of final (aggregate)
output, hence yτ − y is the log of the share of sectoral output with technology τ in the total output,
θ is the elasticity of substitution, zτ is the log of productivity associated with technology τ , 1 − α
is the share of labor in the production of yτ , l is the log of the total amount of labor employed in
the production of Y , and (y − l) represents the log of per capita output.
From (5.11), we can write zτ when max{t−Dτ , τ} = t−Dτ as:













Applying a double Taylor expansions to (5.14) as in Comin and Hobijn (2010) yields:2
zτ = ln(ατ )+(χ+γ)τ +(µ−1)ln(t−τ −Dτ )+
γ
2
(t−τ −Dτ )+R(t−Dτ −τ ; γ, µ), (5.15)
where R(·) is the accumulated error resulting from the two expansions and is a function of t−τ−Dτ
and the parameters γ and µ. The log intensive margin, ln(ατ ), appearing on the RHS of (5.15)
incorporates all the sets of barriers for the adoption of technology τ by the country, (χ + γ)τ is
the associated productivity level, µ is the elasticity of substitution parameter in the sectoral output
production function, while Dτ is the age of the best vintage available for production in the country
for technology τ.
By substituting (5.15) into (5.13), we can write yτ − y as:













2 , γ2 =
θ
θ−1 (µ− 1), δ1 =
θ
θ−1 , δ2 = −
θ
θ−1 (1− α), and
R(t−Dτ − τ ; γ, µ, θ) = θθ−1R(t−Dτ − τ ; γ, µ). Clearly, (5.16) is the linear projection of yτ − y on
a constant, time trends t and ln(t− τ −Dτ ), the log intensive margin aτ , and the log of per capita
output, where R(t−Dτ − τ ; γ, µ, θ) can be viewed as the error associated with this projection. As
such, the long-run barriers to the diffusion of technology to a country are captured by the intensive
margin ατ [similar to Comin and Ferrer (2013) and Comin and Mestieri (2014)]. In particular,
Comin and Mestieri (2014) highlights that the factors that determined the intensive margin (ατ )
for a given country are: genetic distance from the frontier country, human capital, geographical
factors (such as landlockedness, distance from the technology frontier, tropical land area), openness
to trade, institutional factors and other cultural factors. Therefore, we can specify a linear model
for the intensive margin (in natural log) as:
ln(ατ ) = φ0 +GDφ1 +Xφ2 + vτ , (5.17)
where GD is the measure of genetic distance from the technology frontier, X includes other control
variables (landlockedness, absolute latitude, tropical land area, legal origin, language distance, and
religion distance), φ0 is the intercept, φ1 is the coefficient on genetic distance, φ2 denotes a parameter
vector on X, and vτ is an error term. By substituting (5.17) into (5.16), we obtain the specification
yτ − y = βτ + γ1t+ γ2ln(t− τ −Dτ ) +GDβ1 +Wβ2 + ετ , (5.18)
2Where we first take a Taylor expansion of order 2 of 1 − e−
γ
µ−1 (t−Dτ−τ) around the starting
adoption date, and then apply the log operator to the result, and take again a Taylor expansion of
order 1 of the latter result.
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′, W = [X
... y− l], and ετ = R(t−Dτ − τ ; γ, µ, θ) + δ1vτ . In this
study, we investigate how a relationship such as (5.16) evolves at a micro-level (i.e., at firms level),
rather than a country-level as usually done in the literature on this topic.
To enable a micro-level analysis, we look at the diffusion of total factor productivity (TFP) of
firms as oppose to output in the country-level specification (5.16). In particular, our main objective
is to identify the effect of genetic distance on firms’ TFP in developing countries. We stress the fact
that TFP is often regarded as a measure of technology in the economy, especially in the early versions
of real business cycle (RBC) models where it is well documented that growth in TFP drives growth
in the long term. The main difficulty in our analysis is that genetic distance (treatment variable of
interest) is measured at country-level while TFP data are available at firm-level. This render the
standard panel data method such as fixed estimation useless in identifying β1 since the variable GD
will disappear after a within-type transformation. Using recent developments on quantile treatment
models with group-level unobservables, we are able to identify β1 (the effect of genetic distance on
TFP) despite the presence of grup-level unobservable confounding factors. Section 6.3 details the
empirical specification as well as the estimation strategy.
5.3 Empirical Specification
To identify the effect of genetic distance on TFP, we use a quantile treatment approach when
group-level unobservables are present. Section 5.3.1 presents the specification used, while issues
related to model identification are discussed in Section 5.3.2. Finally, Section 5.3.3 describes briefly
the measurement of firms’ total productivity (TFP) by the World Bank analysis unit.
5.3.1 Model
Let U denote a set of quantile indices and consider the framework of IV quantile regression for
grouped-level treatments (Chetverikov et al., 2016):




cγ2(u) + εc(u) (5.19)
εc(u) = f(u, ηc), (5.20)
where QTFPic|GDc,Xic,Zc,εc(u) is the uth conditional quantile of TFPic given (GDc, Xic, Zc, εc) for
firm i in country c, GDc is a measure of genetic distance of country c with respect to the global
technological frontier (here the US), Xic is a vector of firm-level characteristics
3 that affect the
3These include age, size and ownership types.
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productivity of firm i in country c, Zc is a vector of country-level control variables,
4 εc ≡ {εc(u) :
u ∈ U} is a set of country-level unobserved random shifters which maps the unobserved country-level
covariates ηc affecting TFPic but not included in Zc through an unknown function f(·). There
is no parametric restriction on the form of f(u, ηc), hence any arbitrary nonlinear effects of the
country-level unobserved covariates are allowed. The parameters β(u) and γj(u) (j = 1, 2) are
unknown: β(u) and γ2(u) represent the effect of group-level covariates, while γ1(u) represents those
of individual-level covariates. Industry specific effect is omitted from (5.19)-(5.20) because the study
focuses on manufacturing firms only and the estimation of the TFP (see Section 5.3.3) assumed
homogeneity in technology within each sub-sector of industries, including the manufacturing sector.5
We assume that Xic and Zc are exogenous, i.e., E[Xicεc(u)] = 0 and E[Zcεc(u)] = 0, but GDc may
be endogenous due to various reasons discussed in the next subsection.
We are particularly interested in estimating β(u), which measures the effect of genetic distance
on TFP at the uth quantile. As discussed previously, most studies on the topic have taken the mean
regression approach which does not allow to account for heterogeneous effect of genetic distance
across the distribution the TFP variable. For example, one expect the effect of genetic distance to be
higher on the upper quantiles of the distribution of TFP than the lower quantiles, but the mean-type
regression cannot pick up these differences. Chetverikov et al. (2016) outlined the difficulty to
identify β(u) using the traditional fixed effect panel data method. Indeed, the genetic distance
variable (GDc) is measured at country-level, hence is constant across firms in a given country. As
such, a within-group transformation will eliminate it from the regression. Chetverikov et al. (2016)
propose a quantile estimation method that can be applied even in the presence of country-level
unobservables [i.e., εc(u)]. Before moving on to the description of this method, it is important
discuss issues related to the identification of β(u) in model (5.19)-(5.20).
5.3.2 Threats to Identification and Estimation Strategy
The presence of country-level unobservables render the use of standard quantile regression
techniques, such as the methodology of Koenker and Bassett (1978), inconsistent, and this is true
even if the country-level treatment variable, GDc, were exogenous. Recent studies have expanded
Koenker and Bassett (1978) framework to models similar to (5.19)-(5.20); see Kato et al. (2012)
and Kato and Galvao (2011). However, these studies often focus on estimating γ1(u) (rather than
β(u)) so that a within-group transformation still applies. As the focus of our study is to estimate
4These include GDP, per capita income, trade openness, institution, tertiary education, legal
origin, language, and religion distance and geographical variables such as landlockedness, absolute
latitude, tropical region, land area, distance.
5The World Bank classifies industries into sectors of two-digit ISIC codes, and estimates TFP of
each firms by controlling for sectoral fixed effects. Due to homogeneity in the production function
across firms within sub-sectors, sectoral fixed effects constitute good approximation of industries
specific effects, and the latter are quite constant within each sub-sector in the classification of the
World Bank.
122
β(u), the techniques in Kato et al. (2012) and Kato and Galvao (2011) are not applicable and an
alternative method is warranted.
Another problem is that GDc is possibly endogenous in (5.19)-(5.20). This, along with the
presence of country-level unobservables εc, complicate further the identification of β(u). They are
various reasons sustaining the endogeneity of GDc in this model. First, the unobserved country
specific effect (ηc) affecting firms productivity are likely to be correlated with genetic distance (e.g.,
see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). Second, genetic distance is possibly measured with error due
to migration (e.g., see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Ang and Kumar, 2014), therefore cannot be
exogenous. Third, they may be a problem of reverse causality as migration could lead to a pattern of
genetic distances today that is closely linked to technology adoption and productivity. To identify
the causal effect of GD on TFP , it is important to account for these problems. Since we are
interested only on the effect that genetic distance exert on TFP, we did not specify a full system
showing all interactions between GD and TFP. Rather, we adopt the limited information approach
as described in (5.19)-(5.20). In particular, we deal with the endogeneity issue by using the measure
of genetic distance from the UK in 1500 relative to the English population (namely GD1500c,UK) as
an instrumental variable (IV) for GDc. We argue that GD
1500
c,UK does not have a direct influence on
the current TFP of laggard countries as the mass migration of the modern era started after 1500.
GD1500c,UK is also possibly a strong instrument because it likely highly correlated with the current
genetic distance of laggard countries which are measured relative to the US. A failure of at least
one of these two conditions constitutes a threat to identification. While the strength of GD1500c,UK can
be assessed using, for example, a weak IV test,6 unfortunately its validity cannot be tested since
the model is exactly identified (in the sense that we only have one instrument and one endogenous
regressor in the specification).
Now, suppose that the orthogonality condition E[GD1500c,UKεc(u)] = 0 is satisfied for all u ∈ U ,
i.e., GD1500c,UK is a valid instrument for GD at every quantile of the distribution of TFP. From
Chetverikov et al. (2016), β(u) can be consistently estimated following a two-step methodology as
described below.
Step 1 : For each country c and each quantile u ∈ U , estimate the uth quantile regression of TFPic
on Xic and Zc using the data {(TFPic, Xic, Zc) : i = 1, . . . , Nc} by the classical quantile
regression of Koenker and Bassett (1978):











u − 1[x < 0]
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6See Stock and Yogo (2005).
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Step 2 : Estimate a 2SLS regression of β̂c(u) ≡ β̂c on GDc using GD1500c,UK as an instrument (c =






GD = (GD1, . . . , GDG)
′, GD1500UK = (GD
1500
1,UK , . . . , GD
1500
G,UK)
′, Â(u) = (β̂1, . . . , β̂G)
′, and for
any full-columns rank matrix W , PW = W (W
′W )−W ′ is the projection matrix on the space
spanned by the columns of W.
The estimator β̂(u) in (5.22) is consistent and asymptotically normal if G → ∞ and
G2/3ln(NG)/NG → 0, along with other regularity conditions (Chetverikov et al., 2016, Assumptions
1–8), where NG = min
c=1,...,G
Nc. It is worth noting that the number of countries in our sample is
G = 94, which may not be very large as required for β̂(u) to achieve consistency and asymptotic
normality. However, the Monte Carlo simulations (see Chetverikov et al., 2016, Table A.I) show
that β̂(u) has an overall good properties even when G = 25, which is far less than 94 groups in our
sample.
5.3.3 Measurement of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
This study uses TFP data from the World Bank (WB) analysis unit, and have been estimated
following a two-step methodology. First, the production function is estimated for each industry in
each country. Then, firms’ TFP is deduced as a Solow residual of this production function.






where Yi is the output of firm i, Li is labor inputs (represented by the total annual cost of labor),
Ki is the capital (represented by the replacement value of machinery, vehicles, and equipment), and
Ai measures the TFP of the firm.
7 Due to the lack of physical output data, the WB analysis unit
employs a revenue-based estimation of the TFP, i.e., Yi is the total annual sales of the establishment.
This approach raises some econometric issues. First, input choice is likely to be correlated with the
productivity of the producers. Second, there may be a selection bias as less efficient producers
are more likely to exit from the sample. Syverson (2011) argues that the selection problem is not
important because producers with high productivity will likely be efficient regardless of the specific
way their productivity is measured.
Another problem also is that the specification (5.23) assumes perfectly competitive markets with
7We have also used the estimates of TFP based on an extension of model (5.23) that includes
raw material (Mi) and our main findings are quality the same with those using TFP measured from
(5.23).
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common production technology. This assumption is restrictive, and in order to incorporate some
form of heterogeneity, the WB analysis unit estimates the production function (5.23) by grouping
industries in sectors of two-digit ISIC codes. The elasticities of labor and capital (ak and al) are
allowed to vary by income-level categorized according to the WB classification. To control for an
average economy-level and time specific effects, dummy variables for each country and year are
included. More specifically, the econometric model used by the WB to estimate TFP at the sectoral
level is given by:
ln(Yisc) = α1 ln(Kisc) + α2 ln(Lisc) + α3 ln(Kisc)× Ic + α4 ln(Lisc)× Ic + νisc
νsci = ωc + ωy + λs + ζisc, (5.24)
where ln(Yisc), ln(Kisc), and ln(Lisc) are the natural log of output, capital, and labor respectively,
of firm i in sector s and country c; Ic is a dummy variable indicating whether country c is high
or low income based on the WB classification as of the year in which each survey was conducted;
ωc and ωy captures country and year fixed effects, while λs is sector specific effect, and ζisc are
idiosyncratic shocks. The total factor productivity (TFPisc) is the Solow residual of the production
function, therefore is approximated by the residual from the regression (5.24) including the fixed
effect terms, i.e.
T̂FP isc = ω̂c + ω̂y + λ̂s + ζ̂isc. (5.25)
5.4 Data
The data on firms are obtained from the World Bank enterprise survey (WBES). The survey was
conducted between 2006 and 2010 on more than 30,000 manufacturing firms from over 100 countries.
The survey questionnaire contains identical questions for all countries and industries were stratified
by size and income level. The survey provides an exhaustive information on firm-level productivity
(TFP) estimates (the fraction of output that is not explained by the amount of inputs used), firms’
commencement year, ownership type, sale, labor, capital and other important variables. The survey
also provides a revenue-based firm-level productivity estimates (World Bank, 2017).
The macro-level variables are collected from different sources. The treatment variable (i.e.,
genetic distance to the world technological frontier–the US) is from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2017),
and includes culture, habits, values and customs (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). It is important
to note this measure is based on the assumption that differences in gene distributions between
populations across a range of neutral genes show the time that has passed since two populations
shared common ancestors (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). In this study, we view the genetic distance
to the US as a measure of the extent of genetic relatedness between populations of laggard countries
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and the US. Following Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we use data on genetic distance weighted by
the share of population belonging to each distinct ancestral group in each country. This variable
is standardized to take values between 0 and 1, where a value of 0 shows that the two populations
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Figure 5.1: Standardized genetic distance and median TFP of firms
Figure 6.1 plots the median level of TFP against the normalized genetic distance to the US.
The scatter plots show a negative relationship between genetic distance and median TFP, thus
confirming the idea that genetic distance is related to barriers to the diffusion of technology from
the world frontier (here the US). While countries like Costa Rica and Brazil appear closer to the
US in terms of genetic distance, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands are genealogically very
far from the US. Some African countries like Morocco, Middle East countries like Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan, and Eastern European countries like Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria also
appear genealogically close to the US. The figure also illustrates some form of heterogeneity across
the distribution of median TFP, meaning that a mean-type regression may under-or over-estimate
the impact that genetic distance exerts on TFP. As such, our quantile regression approach is better
suited to this type of analysis as it captures the heterogeneity across the distribution of TFP, as
opposed to a mean-type regression analysis employed in various seminal work on the topic.
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables in the sample, this includes the
first, second and third quartiles of the main firm-level characteristics and country-level variables.
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Three observations stand out from the table. First, the dependent variable (TFP) and the treatment
variable (genetic distance) appear quite dispersed, which translates into their first, second and third
quartiles being quite different, thus highlighting some form of heterogeneity of TFP. Second, the
distribution of the technology adoption in the 15 century was more heterogeneous across countries
than it was in the 20 century, as showed per the growth of their quartiles. Finally, the genetic to
the UK in the 15 century is quite heterogeneous across the three quartiles, thus underling that the
instrument GD1500UK exhibits some variability in the sample, which is needed for the identification of
the model.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75
Total factor productivity (TFP) 1.762 1.000 -2.356 5.584 1.101 1.698 2.384
Genetic distance to US, weighted 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.07 0.020 0.036 0.040
Genetic distance to UK (1500 match) 0.017 0.012 0 0.046 0.008 0.013 0.030
Genetic distance to UK, weighted 0.018 0.013 0.001 0.058 0.005 0.013 0.030
Technology adoption (1500Ad) 0.460 0.282 0 0.9 0.166 0.466 0.758
Technology adoption (2000) 0.381 0.100 0.173 0.856 0.316 0.368 0.450
Firm age 20 16 11 214 9 15 25
Export dummy 0.104 0.306 0 1 0 0 0
Foreign dummy 0.095 0.293 0 1 0 0 0
log(Gross domestic product) 25.492 1.880 19.820 28.713 23.774 25.737 27.015
log (Per capita income) 7.765 1.036 5.338 10.185 6.791 7.746 8.748
log (Trade openness) 4.024 0.450 3.296 5.324 3.640 3.981 4.238
Institution quality -2.004 3.802 -14.118 9.610 -4.648 -2.180 0.170
Language distance 0.961 0.054 0.367 1 0.933 0.974 1
Geographical distance 9880.171 3947.158 2387.768 16465.65 8069.483 10213.47 13131.91
Religious distance 0.822 0.135 0.602 1 0.661 0.890 0.921
Legal origin 0.286 0.452 0 1 0 0 1
landlockedness 0.095 0.293 0 1 0 0 0
Tropical 0.575 0.420 0 1 0.037 0.512 1
Latitude 0.236 0.236 0 1 0.111 0.222 0.333
Africa 0.267 0.442 0 1 0 0 1
Note. Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics from the pooled sample for the main firm-level and
macro-level variables. Q 0.25, Q 0.50 and Q 0.75 symbolize the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles, respectively.
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5.5 Estimation and Interpretation
To shorten the presentation of the paper, our analysis focuses on the estimated impact of the
treatment variable of interest (genetic distance measure), i.e., the quantile estimates β̂(u), u ∈ U from
model (5.19)-(5.20). To facilitate readability and understanding our results, we use a combination
of graphical representations and summary tables.
5.5.1 Baseline results
Table 5.2 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP. Column (1) reports the two stage
least square (2SLS) estimates obtained through a mean-regression, while columns (2)-(6) contains
the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th quantile estimates. In Panel A, we do not control for micro-
and macro-level covariates, while those exogenous covariates are accounted for in Panel B. While
the robust standard errors are reported for the 2SLS estimates, the bootstrap ones are presented in
all tables for the quantile estimates. Several interesting observations are of order.
First, the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP, both at the mean and across the
quantiles, is negative after controlling micro- and macro-level exogenous covariates (Panel B),
confirming the conjecture that genetic distance acts as a barrier to technology adoption by firms
of laggard countries from the technological frontier (i.e., the US). Second, 2SLS method tends to
overestimate the magnitude of the impact of genetic distance on TFP from the lower up to the
middle upper part of the distribution of TFP, while the method overwhelmingly underestimates this
impact at the upper top of the distribution of TFP. This pattern is illustrated clearly in Figure
5.2(b) where a significant range of the quantile estimates β̂(u) are consistently above the 2SLS
estimates before falling below at the very top of the distribution of TFP. These results underline a
significant heterogeneous effect of genetic distance across the distribution of TFP, implying that a
mean-type regression analysis– such as the 2SLS method– could be misleading. For example, while
the 2SLS estimate (Panel B) indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in genetic distance from
the technology frontier leads to a 5.34% average decline in firm productivity of laggard countries,
this effect is roughly 1.65% for the countries situated at the 10th quantile of TFP, 3.50% for those
at the 30th quantile, 1.92% for those at the 50th quantile, 3.71% for those at the 70th quantile,
and 12.12% for those at the 90th quantile. Third, an appealing and certainly interesting finding
is that the impact of genetic distance across the distribution of TFP is a near inverted U-shape,
meaning that the relationship between genetic distance and TFP is not monotonically decreasing as
postulates the 2SLS estimation. Indeed, it clearly from Figure 5.2(b) and others that a country with
a very low technology adoption (ranked from 0 up to 30th quantile) and a country with moderate
technology adoption (ranked in 30th–50th quantile) or relatively high technology adoption (ranked
in 50th–70th) can be impacted identically by the same shock on current genetic distance. This may
indicate why some countries that appear closer to the US (the World technology frontier) have not
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benefited from technology adoption compared with their peers that are genealogically relatively far
from the US, or vis-versa.
Table 5.2: The effect of Genetic Distance from US on Firm Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile
Panel A: Without controls 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -6.11*** 2.25*** -1.45*** -3.97*** -6.56*** -10.37***
the US, weighted (0.5966) (0.2426) (0.2213) (0.1728) (0.1818) (0.2114)
Individual Controls No No No No No No
Macroeconomic Controls No No No No No No
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 32,038 32,276 32,276 32,276 32,276 32,276
Panel B: With all controls
FST gen. dist. to -5.3394*** -1.65*** -3.50*** -1.92*** -3.71*** -12.12***
the US, weighted (0.8409) (0.2141) (0.1788) (0.1665) (0.1965) (0.2271)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 31,212 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
variables include log (GDP), log (PCI), linguistic distance with the U.S., religion distance with
the U.S., legal origin, landlockedness, tropical land area, absolute latitude and continent dummy.
Robust standard errors for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the quantile estimates
are reported in the parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5.5.2 Alternative Measure of Productivity
To examine the robustness of our baseline results to the measurement of TFP, we also use the World
Bank’s (2017) revenue based measure of total factor productivity measure (TFPR) that excludes
material inputs.
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 present the effect of genetic distance at the mean (2SLS) and across the
distribution of TFPR, after controlling for all micro- and macro-level covariates. As before, column
(1) presents the 2SLS estimate while column (2) to (6) report the estimated quantile coefficients.
Robust standard errors are reported for 2SLS estimate, whereas bootstrap standard errors are
used for the quantile estimates. As seen, the results are qualitatively the same as in the case of
the TPF measure with material inputs included (see Table 5.2 vs. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2(b)
vs. Figure 5.3). In particular, the impact of genetic distance across the distribution of TFPR
is an inverted U-shape,thus confirming that the relationship between genetic distance and TFPR
is not monotonically decreasing as the 2SLS estimate tends to suggest. In general, the effects of
genetic distance tend to be deeper on the distribution of TFPR than that of TFP (see Table 5.3
vs. Table 5.2), especially at the top quantiles. In addition, while the impact of genetic distance
across the distribution of TFP is a near inverted U-shape, that on TFPR is an inverted U-shape,
thus supporting our main result that there is a (quasi-)inverted U-shaped relationship between firm
technology adoption and genetic distance.
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Table 5.3: Revenue based Measure of Total Productivity (TFPR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.88*** -5.00*** -1.09*** -2.05*** -5.42*** -15.39***
the US, weighted (0.6848) (0.19604) (0.1567) (0.1373) (0.1697) (0.2382)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,474 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size.
The macro variables include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin,
landlockedness, tropical land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average
RGDP, log of average RGDP per capita, log of tertiary education and log of average
openness. Robust standard errors for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the
quantile are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5.5.3 Alternative Measure of Genetic Distance
In the previous sections, we consider the US as the global technology frontier. However, several
technologies were also invented in other advanced societies (Ang and Kumar, 2014) and assuming
the US is the only global leader in technology may be too restrictive. To investigate the sensitivity
of our results to the choice of the world leader, we use the United Kingdom (UK) as an benchmark
world technology frontier. This choice is supported by Ang and Kumar (2014) and the data on
weighted genetic distance of laggard countries from the UK are from Bove and Gokmen (2017).
Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP. As seen, the
results are very similar to the baseline ones with the US as the technology frontier; see Section 6.5.
In particular, the near inverted U-shaped impact of genetic distance across the distribution of TFP
is clearly demonstrated, thus indicating a non-monotonic relationship between genetic distance and
the diffusion of technology.
Overall, the results of this section underscore the fact that our previous analysis in Section 6.5
are not driven by the choice of the global technology leader.
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Table 5.4: Alternative Measure of Genetic Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Group IV Quantile 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.52*** -2.66*** -3.64*** -1.39*** -2.57*** -10.34***
the UK, weighted ( 0.7872) (0.2028) (0.1699) (0.1609) (0.1868) (0.2205)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 31,212 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
ones include linguistic distance with the US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness, tropical
land area, absolute latitude and continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average RGDP per
capita, and log of tertiary education. Robust standard errors for 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors
for quantile estimates are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5.6 Other Robustness checks
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional covariates
and the relative weight of European countries in the sample.
5.6.1 Controlling for Additional Covariates
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and Ang and Kumar (2014) highlight that technology diffusion has
increased for more open economies. Therefore, the transfer of technology may be higher for countries
that have good quality of institution, even after controlling for geographic and cultural factors,
human capital, language and religion distance, and continent dummies, as done in Section 5.5. As
such, it is important to check whether the trade openness and the quality of institutions alter our
baseline results of Section 5.5. To address this concern, we also control for trade openness and
institutional quality in the baseline regression. Both covariates are included in our sample.
Table 5.5 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance at the mean (2SLS) and across the
distribution of TFP when trade openness and institutional quality are also controlled for. Panel
(A) reports the results when only trade openness is controlled for, while Panel (B) shows the
results when both trade openness and institutional quality are included. In all cases, both the
2SLS and quantile estimates of the impact of genetic distance on TFP are similar to our baseline
results of Section 5.5. Interestingly, controlling for trade openness and institutional quality has even
strengthened the impact of genetic distance on technology adoption, both at the mean (2SLS) and
across the distribution of TFP, thus suggesting that our baseline results are not driven by the degree
of globalization or institutional quality across countries. Furthermore, Figure 5.5, again, illustrates
the appealing finding that the relationship between genetic distance and the distribution of TFP is
a near inverted U-shape. As such, we clearly see that the 2SLS method under-and over-estimate
the impact of genetic distance at important parts of the distribution of TFP. In particular, it is
clear from Figure 5.5(b) that a country with a low technology adoption (ranked between 0–30th
quantile) and a country with moderate technology adoption (ranked between 30th–50th quantile)
or relatively high technology adoption (ranked between 50th–70th) can be impacted identically by
the same shock on current genetic distance.
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Table 5.5: Controlling for Additional Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Panel A: controlling for
openness only 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -6.05*** -6.21*** -6.17*** -2.94*** -3.82*** -13.10***
the US, weighted (1.0377) (0.2583) (0.2153) (0.2009) (0.2647) (0.3171)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,885 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Panel B: controlling for openness and Institution
FST gen. dist. to the US, weighted -7.71*** -6.75*** -6.56*** -3.28*** -3.88*** -13.94***
(1.0696) (0.2754) (0.2251) (0.2077) (0.2920) (0.3426)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,885 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
ones include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness, tropical
land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average RGDP per
capita, log of tertiary education and log of average openness. Robust standard errors for 2SLS
and bootstrap standard errors for quantile estimates are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5.6.2 Excluding European Countries
We investigate the stability of our baseline results to the exclusion of European countries from the
sample. They are two main reasons to do so. First, the measurement error in genetic distance
data for Europe is relatively smaller as the sample populations almost match the nation-state
boundaries (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). Second, technology spreads more easily to the east-west
direction which makes European countries more advantageous over more isolated countries (such as
Australasia) and over continents that are located to the north-south axis (such as Africa and Latin
America); see Diamond and Renfrew (1997). The latter hypothesis is well known as “the Diamond
gap.” Therefore, by excluding Europe from the sample, we can: (i) check the stability of our baseline
results when only the countries with a relatively larger measurement error in the genetic distance
data are used; and (ii) test whether our baseline results are driven by the Diamond gap.
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Table 5.6 and figure 5.6 presents the results. Consistent to our baseline results, genetic distance
has a large negative effect on firms’ productivity at the higher quantiles. Moreover, all the quantile
estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant at 1% nominal level compared with
our baseline results of Section 5.5. A close inspection of both the 2SLS and quantile estimates
suggests that 2SLS under-estimates the effect of genetic distance at lower and higher parts of the
distribution of TFP due the near inverted U-shape property of the relationship between the two.
Clearly, our baseline results are not driven by measurement error in the genetic distance data or the
Diamond gap.
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Table 5.6: Excluding Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Group IV Quantile 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.81*** -7.86*** -7.74*** -5.13*** -6.27*** -14.77***
the US, weighted (0.8997) (0.2348) (0.2044) (0.1956) (0.2613) (0.3062)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
Number of firms 29,310 28,997 28,997 28,997 28,997 28,997
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The
macro variables include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness,
tropical land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average
RGDP per capita, log of trade openness and log of tertiary education. Robust standard errors
for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the IV quantile are reported in the parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
5.7 Genetic Distance, Technology Adoption, and
TFP
Section 5.5 established a robust negative and near inverted U-shape effect of genetic distance along
the distribution of firms’ productivity across countries. One may argue that the specification
(5.19)-(5.20) that led to this result is a reduced-form, thus be willing to provide an endogenous
mechanism through which genetic distance impacts on firms’ TFP. Such a chain of causality could
be that genetic distance influences firms’ productivity through technology adoption, but this is yet
to be formally demonstrated. Our goal in this section is not to provide a definitive answer to the
effectiveness of such a mechanism, rather we offer suggestions that could help to advance future
research in that direction.
Previous studies documented that genetic distance is one of the persistent barriers to
contemporary technology adoption (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Ashraf and Galor, 2013a). Along
the same vein, Figure 5.7 shows the scatter plots between country-level measures of historical
technology adoption in 1500AD and standardized genetic distance to the world leader, the US. The
technology option data consists of 24 technologies provided by Comin and Hobijn (2010). In this
dataset, the 24 technologies are classified in five broad sectors: agriculture, industry, transportation,
communication, and military. Each technology is measured as a binary variable indicating whether
it was present in a given country in 1500AD. Comin and Hobijn (2010) combined them into one
factor labeled ‘Overall technology adoption in 1500 ’ (see the y-axis of Figure 5.7). This factor is
simply compute as the sample average across sectors of the technology adoption levels. As it can
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be seen from that graph, the standardized genetic distance is negatively correlated with the overall
technology adoption in the 1500AD, thus corroborating the findings of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)
and Ashraf and Galor (2013a). To examine how this relationship has evolved over time, Figure 5.8
depicts the scatter plots between the two variables in the 2000AD for all countries in the sample.
Again, the figure shows a negative correlation between genetic distance and overall technology
adoption in the 2000AD, thus highlighting the persistence of their relationship over time.
In our sample, countries such as Ethiopia, Nepal, Burkina-Faso and Mali have 0.509, 0.574,
0.674, and 0.668 respectively as standardized measure of genetic distance, thus can be classified
as having less genealogical similarities with the US. Yet unsurprisingly these countries had the
lowest overall technology adoption level in the 2000AD. For example, the four countries (Ethiopia,
Nepal, Burkina-Faso, Mali) had an overall technological adoption around 0.533, 0.3, 0.508, and 0.508
respectively in the 1500AD, which has eroded to about 0.220, 0.228, 0.236 and 0.173 respectively
in the 2000AD. Meanwhile, Argentina, for example, which is genealogically close to the US (with
standardized genetic measure of 0.249) has moved from 0.02 overall technology adoption in the
1500AD to about 0.484 in the 2000AD.
Figures 5.9 shows the scatter plots between overall technology adoption in the 1500AD and
current median firms’ TFP for all countries in the sample. As seen, overall technology adoption
in the 1500AD is strongly positively correlated with current median firms’ productivity. Since
current genetic distance is negatively correlated with overall technology adoption in the 1500AD
(as documented in Figures 5.7 & 5.8), we expect current genetic distance to have a negative impact
on the distribution (at least the median) of firms’ TFP, thus corroborating our main findings
in Section 5.5. It is nonetheless important to note that the analysis in Figures 5.7-5.9 is only
based on correlations, so more investigations are required to clarify if genetic distance influences
firms’ productivity through its impact on the technology adoption in the 1500AD. We leave these
investigations for future research.
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This paper exploits the theoretical framework of Comin and Hobijn (2010) to propose a mechanism
through which genetic distance from the world leader, the US, acts as a barrier to technology
adoption in laggard countries, thus impacting negatively on firms’ TFP in those countries. There
are some challenges in testing this theory empirically, and we elaborate on how those challenges can
be circumvent. First, the treatment variable (genetic distance) is measured at country-level while
the outcome variable (firm productivity) is available at firm-level, which makes the standard panel
data method useless in identifying the causal effect since the treatment variable will be dropped
out after a within-type transformation. Second, there is a substantial heterogeneity across the
distribution of firms’ productivity, hence a mean-type regression analysis is not appropriate. Third,
due to the presence of group-level unobservables in the model (country fixed effect), a standard
quantile regression such as in Koenker and Bassett (1978) will yield inconsistent estimates, thus is
not also appropriate in dealing with this type of problems.
Using a novel method on quantile treatment models with group-level unobservables recently
proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016) that accommodates the above problems, we show that the
impact of genetic distance on firm productivity is consistently negative and near inverted U-shaped
across the distribution of firms’ TFP. This means that firms operating in countries genealogically
far from the technology leader tend on average to have lower level of productivity, but firms in two
countries, one with a very low technology adoption and the other with a moderate or relatively high
technology adoption can be impacted identically by the same shock on current genetic distance. This
may justify why some countries that appear genealogically closer to the US have not benefited from
technology adoption compared with their peers that are far from the US, or vis-versa. We provide
several robustness checks that show that the near inverted U-shape property of the relationship
between genetic distance and the distribution of firms’ TFP is robust: (i) to alternative measures
of productivity and genetic distance; (ii) to inclusion of institutional quality and trade openness in
the model; (iii) to the exclusion of European countries whose genetic data are likely less measured
with errors than non-European countries.
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Appendix C
Table C1: Variable Definition
Variables Definition
TFP Firm -level estimates of Total factor productivity
Genetic distance to the US
or UK
The genetic distance between the current national population
of a given country and the US (or UK).It is calculated
as the average pairwise genetic distance across all ethnic
group pairs. It captures the general relatedness of
the population of a particular country to US or UK
Genetic distance to the UK
(1500 AD)
The genetic distance between the populations of a given
country and the UK in the year 1500, prior to the
major colonizations of modern times & migration
calculated as the genetic distance between the two
ethnic groups comprising the largest shares of
each countrys population in the year 1500
Technology adoption (1500 Ad)
The overall adoption level is computed as the simple average of
the sectoral adoption levels, where sector adoption levels
is the simple average of the binary adoption values
across the technologies in the sector in 1500
Technology Adoption (2000)
The overall adoption level is computed as the simple
average of the sectoral adoption levels, where
sector adoption levels is the simple average of
the binary adoption values across the technologies
in the sector in 2000
GDP Average gross domestic product (2000-2005)
PCI Average GDP per capital (2000-2005)
Export dummy =1 if a firm export
Foreign
=1 if the firm has at least 10% of
its equity held by foreigners
Small =1 if the firm has 5-9 employee
Medium =1 if the firm has 10-99 employee
Large =1 if the firm has above 99 employee
Geographic distance
Measure of the great circle (geodesic) distance
between the major cities of countries
Religious distance
Measure of religious relatedness based on
a nomenclature of world religions
Legal origen
Dummy variable that takes a value of one
if a countrys legal system is of
French, German or Scandinavian
Civil Law origin and zero otherwise
Landlockedness =1 if a firm is operating in a landlocked country
Tropical
The percentage of land area classified as tropical and
subtropical based on the Koeppen-Geiger system
Latitude
Absolute value of the latitude of a country,
scaled between zero and one, where zero is
for the location of the equator and one is for the poles
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Table C2: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max
TFP 1.762 1.000 -2.356 5.584
Genetic distance to US, weighted 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.07
Genetic distance to UK (1500 match) 0.017 0.012 0 0.046
Genetic distance to UK, weighted 0.018 0.013 0.001 0.058
Technology adoption (1500Ad) 0.460 0.282 0 0.9
Technology adoption (2000) 0.381 0.100 0.173 0.856
Age 33.5 166 11 214
Export dummy 0.104 0.306 0 1
Foreign dummy 0.095 0.293 0 1
log(gdp) 25.492 1.880 19.820 28.713
log (pci) 7.765 1.036 5.338 10.185
log (Trade Openness) 4.024 0.450 3.296 5.324
Institution quality -2.004 3.802 -14.118 9.610
Language Distance 0.961 0.054 0.367 1
Geographical Distance 9880.171 3947.158 2387.768 16465.65
Religious Distance 0.822 0.135 0.602 1
Legal origin 0.286 0.452 0 1
landlockedness 0.095 0.293 0 1
Tropical 0.575 0.420 0 1
Latitude 0.236 0.236 0 1
Africa 0.267 0.442 0 1
Note: Summary statistics for firm level as well as macro data.
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Chapter 6
Does the Presence of Foreign firms
Reduce Domestic Firms’ Financial
Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Habtamu Edjigua Nicholas Sim b
School of Economics, The University of Adelaide




Firms in the SSAs (sub-Saharan African countries for short) face severe financial
constraints. Because financial markets in the SSAs are underdeveloped, policymakers
have sought after the establishment of foreign-owned firms in their countries to help,
among others, alleviate the financial constraints faced by domestic firms. However,
there is no empirical evidence that speaks to the association between foreign firm
presence and domestic firms’ financial constraint. Using firm-level data spanning
across 36 SSAs from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, we show that the increase in
foreign firm presence can ease the financial constraints of domestic firms in the SSAs.
One reason is that foreign-owned firms are not only less financially constrained, they
are also less likely to apply for bank loans. Therefore, an increase in foreign firm
presence may reduce the competition for loans and ease the financial constraints of
domestic firms by improving their borrowing success.
Keywords: Foreign Firm Presence; Financial Constraints; Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Code: F23, O19
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6.1 Introduction
The lack of access to finance has been a major concern for businesses in sub-Saharan
Africa (Beck et al., 2009; Asiedu et al., 2013; Mlachila et al., 2013; Bah and Fang,
2015). In the SSAs (sub-Saharan African countries for short), the financial sector is
usually underdeveloped, dominated by a few big banks,1 and lacks a stock market
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Mlachila et al., 2013).2 This has prompted some
policymakers in the SSAs to pursue foreign investments, especially the establishment
of foreign-owned firms in their countries, as a way of gaining external finance as one of
the benefits (Asiedu, 2002; Basu and Srinivasan, 2002; Harrison and McMillan, 2003;
Adams, 2009). However, although such policies are in placed, there is no evidence
that the presence of foreign-owned firms may ease the financial constraints faced by
domestic firms.
In this paper, we conduct a cross-country firm-level study to shed light on this
issue. It is important to emphasize that at the outset, the association between foreign
firm presence and domestic firms’ financial constraint is ambiguous. On the one hand,
foreign-owned firms may themselves become a source of finance for local partners in
the same industry (Javorcik, 2014; Newman et al., 2015), which helps to raise the
productivity and thus creditworthiness of domestic firms (Javorcik and Spatareanu,
2011; Javorcik, 2014). On the other hand, because foreign-owned firms tend to be
more profitable and have better reputations, local banks may favor foreign-owned
firms over domestic firms in lending. The increase in market competition brought
along by foreign-owned firms may also erode the profits of domestic firms and
ultimately their capacity to borrow (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).3 As such, how
foreign firm presence affects the financial constraints of domestic firms is unclear.
Using cross-country firm-level data based the World Bank Enterprise Survey from
2006 to 2010, we show that in the SSAs, a larger foreign firm presence may relieve
1For example, the share of two largest banks’ in Burundi account 45% of the total bank asset
(Nkurunziza et al., 2012).
2In the SSAs, the average ratio of private credit to GDP is only 24%. This is dwarfed by the
ratio of 77% for all other developing economies, and 172% for high income economies.
3Some studies looks at the mechanisms through which foreign direct investment affect financial
constraints of domestic firms (see, for example, Harrison and McMillan, 2003; Héricourt and Poncet,
2009; Harrison et al., 2004).
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domestic firms of their financial constraints. To measure how financially constrained a
firm is, we use the firms’ responses to World Bank’s survey questions on credit access,
as well as objective measures such as whether a firm has had access to overdraft
facilities, a credit line or a bank loan, or it had applied for but was denied a loan.
We find that in industries where there is a larger foreign firm presence, domestic
firms tend to be less financially constrained. One reason is that foreign-owned firms
are less financially constrained than domestic firms; as such, they are also less likely
to borrow from banks. Given that foreign-owned firms are less likely to seek bank
credit, a larger foreign firm presence would benefit domestic firms by reducing the
competition for loans and enabling them to borrow more successfully.
Our study has policy relevance for the SSAs. Firstly, firms in the SSAs are the
most financially constrained compared with firms elsewhere. This has implications
on development, as the lack of finance (which is the case for the SSAs) can severely
undermine growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Bah and Fang, 2015). Therefore,
it would be helpful from a policy perspective to know if foreign firm presence may
lead to improvements in financial access, which in turn may foster economic growth.
Secondly, to gain access to foreign capital, several SSAs have implemented policies to
attract foreign investors to establish new firms or assume the ownership of local firms
(Adams and Opoku, 2015).4 However, there is no evidence that doing so may relieve
the financial constraints experienced in the host country, which this paper speaks to.5
Our paper is related to the literature that focuses on discovering the determinants
of firms’ access to finance in developing countries. The literature has identified
country-level factors that affect firms’ access to finance, such as legal system
and regulatory frameworks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), stock market
development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996), financial market development
and liberalization (Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003; Abel, 1980), as well as firm-level
characteristics including age, size, ownership structure, legal status and gender in
4For example, foreign direct investment to the SSAs has grown from $8 billion in 2000 to $18
billion in 2004, $36 billion in 2006 and $50 billion in 2012.
5Empirical evidence on credit constraints in the SSAs comes mainly from within-country studies,
which are difficult to generalize. See, for example (Harrison and McMillan, 2003) for Cote d’Ivoire,
Lashitew (2017) for Ethiopia.
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determining firm’s access to finance (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Byiers et al.,
2010; Aterido et al., 2013; Asiedu et al., 2013; Hansen and Rand, 2014a; Wagner and
Weche Gelübcke, 2015). Our work complements these studies by using a cross-country
firm-level analysis to explore if foreign firm presence may contribute towards financial
access.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we briefly review
the literature. In Section 6.3, we describe the data sources and the variables used
in this paper. In Section 6.4, we describe our estimating equation and discusses
the potential identification issues. In Sections 6.5 and 6.6, we present our baseline
results and robustness checks, respectively. In Section 6.7, we present our concluding
remarks.
6.2 Background
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the fastest developing regions in the world (Young,
2012; McMillan and Harttgen, 2014). However, despite their economic progress, the
financial systems in the SSAs remain among the least developed. For example, in
the SSAs, the financial sector is typically characterized by a lack of a stock market
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), a banking industry that is dominated by a few
banks,6 interest spreads, margins and overhead costs that are much higher than in
other regions, and a very small representation by Non-Bank Financial Institutions
(NBFI) in the credit market (Mlachila et al., 2013; Beck and Cull, 2014).
Studies have found that the lack of access to finance is the most formidable
obstacle to growth, productivity and competitiveness in the SSAs (Nkurunziza,
2010; Bah and Fang, 2015). In fact, firms in the SSAs are the most financially
constrained compared with firms elsewhere. For example, 45.6% of firms in the SSAs
reported access to finance as the most important constraint in investment while the
corresponding number is 14.6% for the OECD (Bah and Fang, 2015). On average,
only 23.5% of firms in the SSAs have access to bank loan or line of credit while
6For example, the share of two largest banks’ account 45% of the total bank asset in Burundi
(Nkurunziza et al., 2012).
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the corresponding number is 49.1% for OECD (see Appendix C). Because access to
finance implicates development, there has been tremendous effort to understand the
issue of financial access through cross-country or firm-level analyses.
The cross-country analyses typically aim to understand which country-level
variables determine access to finance. These studies have found that there is greater
access to finance in countries that has legal systems and regulatory frameworks
that strongly protect property rights, contract enforcement and credit rights
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), stock market development (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 1996), developed and liberalized financial markets (Laeven, 2003;
Love, 2003; Gelos and Werner, 2002), large national markets, income and savings
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Mlachila et al., 2013). The firm-level studies
typically stress the importance of firm-level characteristics for firms’ access to finance
such as age, size, ownership structure, legal status and owners’ gender (Beck et al.,
2006; Aterido et al., 2013; Asiedu et al., 2013; Hansen and Rand, 2014a; Wagner and
Weche Gelübcke, 2015). For example, using firm-level data from 80 countries, Beck
et al. (2006) have found that larger, older and foreign-owned firms are on average less
financially constrained.
What is striking about the literature is that little is said about how foreign firm
presence may affect the financial constraints faced by domestic firms in the host
countries. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, policymakers in the SSAs have sought
after the establishment of foreign-owned firms to gain some external finance, among
other benefits (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2003; Elkins et al., 2006; Foster-McGregor
et al., 2015).7 In the literature, closest to our study are works related to the effects of
foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic firms’ financial constraint (Harrison and
McMillan, 2003; Harrison et al., 2004). However, these studies do not focus on the
effects of foreign firm ownership, nor do they combine cross-country and firm-level
7For example, Mali and Mozambique encourage foreign firm ownership by improving business
climate, such privatization, implementing new laws, and promoting accession to international
agreement related to direct foreign investment (Morisset, 2001). Botswana and Mauritius attract
foreign firms by improving property rights and reducing restrictive compliance requirements (Basu
and Srinivasan, 2002).
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information for their analysis as we do.8
To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to employ a cross-country firm-level
approach to directly examine how the foreign ownership of firms may affect the
financial constraints of domestic firms. As such, it helps to shed light on the
relationship between foreign firm presence and the financial constraints of domestic
firms, which is ambiguous. For example, through knowledge spillover about new
products, technologies and marketing, the presence of foreign-owned firms may
improve the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry, and thus, their
creditworthiness (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011; Javorcik, 2014).9 Banks may also
prefer to lend to industries with a large foreign firm presence, which eases the
borrowing constraints of other firms in the same industries (Harrison et al., 2004).
Besides, foreign-owned firms may themselves bring in capital, and as such, be a source
of finance to their local business partners (Harrison et al., 2004).
By contrast, the presence of foreign-owned firms may create difficulties for
domestic firms to access finance. For example, foreign enterprises in developing
countries are likely to be more profitable, have more collateral and better financial
ratios. As such, banks may divert credit away from domestic firms to foreign-owned
firms. Foreign-owned firms also compete in the products market and potentially
erode the market share of domestic firms, and consequently, their ability to borrow
(Harrison and McMillan, 2003). Considering these opposing arguments, it is unclear
how foreign firm presence may affect domestic firms in the SSAs.
8For example, based on Ivory Coast’s firm-level data, Harrison and McMillan (2003) find that
domestic firms could be credit credit constrained with FDI as foreign enterprises may crowd out
domestic firms in the local credit markets. By contrast, Harrison et al. (2004) find that FDI inflow
in 34 European countries is associated with reduced firm-level financial constraints.
9A direct linkage between foreign-owned firms and domestic input suppliers, or foreign firms
input providers and domestic firms , can improve the reputation and creditworthiness of domestic
firms (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009; Newman et al., 2015).
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6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
6.3.1 Data
Our dataset is drawn from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). In this survey,
a total of more than 10,000 non-repeated firms from 36 SSAs are surveyed over the
course of 2006 to 2010.10 The WBES questionnaires contain identical questions for
all countries, and uses stratified sampling by size, industry and regions to collect
the sample of firms for each country. The survey also covers 38 industries at the two
ISIC-digit levels and contains information on the access and use of financial services as
well as several other relevant firm characteristics that are used here. The definitions
on all the variables used in this paper are provided in Table D1 in Appendix D.
Following Asiedu et al. (2013) and Hansen and Rand (2014a), we construct several
indicators to capture how financially constrained a firm is. These measures are based
on managers’ responses to the WBES survey question: “to what degree is access
to finance an obstacle to the current operation of this establishment?” Our main
measure of financial constraint, which we call it Financial Constraint, is an ordinal
variable that takes the value of 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the firm states that finance is
either not a problem (i.e. 0), a minor problem (i.e. 1) a moderate problem (i.e.
2), a major problem (i.e. 3), or a severe problem (i.e. 4). In other words, firms
that reported themselves to be more financially constrained have higher Financial
Constraint scores.
To check if our conclusion is robust, we consider three alternative indicators to
measure financial constraint. Firstly, people’s perception about the seriousness of
their financial situation is not absolute. Thus, the distinction between moderate,
major and severe financial constraint could be blurred. For this reason, our first
alternative indicator of firm financial constraint is a dummy variable that indicates
(i.e. = 1) if the firm responds in the survey that access to finance is a moderate,
10Our sample of firms obtained from Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, DRC, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritanian, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda
and Zambia.
156
major or severe problem, and 0 if otherwise. We call this indicator Serious Constraint,
which indicates if the firm has encountered what it believes to be a moderate to severe
problem of financial constraint.
Our second and third alternative indicators of firm financial constraint are based
on two objective measures. The first, which we call Credit Product Constraint, is a
dummy variable that indicates if the firm does not have access to any of the three
credit products: overdrafts, lines of credit, or bank loans. The second, which we call
Loans Denied, is a dummy variable that indicates if a firm had applied for but was
denied a loan.
The WBES database provides information on owners’ equity share. Following
the literature (see, for example, Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011; Asiedu et al., 2013),
foreign-owned firms are defined as firms in the host country where at least 10% of
their equity is foreign held. Domestic firms are defined as firms with less than 10%
foreign ownership. We construct measures of foreign firm presence for each industry
and country. These measures, described further in Section 6.4, are associated with
the proportion of foreign firms, foreign firms’ share of equity, or employment in the
industry and country.
Additionally, the WBES database provides a range of relevant firm specific
characteristics, such as firm size, ownership type, legal status, technological capacity
and financial transparency, which are used here.11 Finally, the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) database is the source of our country level controls,
which include a measure of financial development, legal system, and inflation (see
Appendix C for the variables’ descriptions).
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
To appreciate how severe the issue of firm financial constraint is in the SSAs, Figure
6.1 considers nine major business obstacles encountered by firms, i.e. Access to
finance, Access to land, Power outage, Anti-competitive practice, Infeasible tax rate,
11Our choice of explanatory variables is based largely on the existing literature related to firms’
access to finance (see, for example, Beck et al., 2006, 2008; Asiedu et al., 2013; Aterido et al., 2013;
Hansen and Rand, 2014a,b).
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Crime, Corruption, Political instability, and Licensing & permits. For each obstacle,
Figure 6.1 plots the percentage of domestic and foreign-owned firms that responded
that among the nine business obstacles, the obstacle in question was “most serious
obstacle affecting the operation of the establishment”.
Being financially constrained is among the most severe issues facing firms in the
SSAs. Figure 6.1 shows that more firms, both domestic and foreign-owned, have
reported the lack of access to finance as the most severe problem they face, than the
number of firms reporting other obstacles as their most serious concern. In fact, the
lack of finance is more severe than other traditional issues such as the lack of land,
access to power, crime and corruption.
That being said, foreign-owned and domestic firms are not equally impacted by
business restrictions. As Figure 6.1 shows, foreign-owned firms are less likely than
domestic firms to face severe obstacles in running a business. For example, concerning
the access to finance, 17.5% of domestic firms report it as the most serious constraint
while only 2.5% of foreign-owned firms respond in the same way.














Figure 6.1: Nine Major Constraints Faced By Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Table 6.1: Number of Firms and Financial Constraint Indicators by Country















Angola 785 22 2.35 .73 171 2.21 .68
Botswana 610 46 1.69 .51 283 1.36 .41
Burkina Faso 394 14 3.00 .91 54 2.42 .77
Burundi 270 17 2.30 .7 47 2.51 .72
Cameroon 363 18 2.45 .83 66 2.18 .74
Cape Verde 156 15 1.92 .64 24 2.00 .69
Chad 150 31 2.22 .67 47 1.86 .58
Congo 151 22 2.10 .66 33 1.96 .61
D.R. Congo 699 17 2.57 .77 119 2.21 .70
Eritrea 179 3 .43 .17 6 .33 .16
Gabon 179 61 1.58 .47 110 1.45 .43
Gambia 174 30 1.79 .55 52 1.36 .36
Ghana 494 5 2.65 .78 25 1.6 .52
Guinea 223 10 2.55 .73 25 2.73 .78
Guinea Bissau 159 9 2.91 .81 25 2.8 .73
Ivory Coast 526 17 2.87 .83 92 2.42 .70
Kenya 657 12 1.94 .58 80 1.72 .55
Lesotho 151 33 1.26 .36 50 .89 .22
Liberia 150 13 1.87 .56 20 1.25 .35
Madagascar 445 41 1.88 .60 185 1.66 .54
Malawi 150 32 2.08 .65 49 1.64 .52
Mali 850 7 2.29 .66 66 1.87 .52
Mauritania 237 12 2.12 .62 28 1.67 .5
Mauritius 398 11 1.88 .56 42 1.54 .52
Mozambique 473 19 2.10 .62 91 2.06 .61
Namibia 329 24 1.10 .31 79 .77 .18
Niger 150 23 2.10 .66 34 1.73 .52
Rwanda 212 16 1.50 .47 35 1.31 .37
Senegal 506 6 2.09 .61 30 1.7 .5
Sierra Leone 150 14 1.95 .62 21 1.52 .52
South Africa 937 12 .73 .22 121 .61 .19
Swaziland 307 36 1.56 .48 111 1.35 .45
Tanzania 419 12 1.82 .55 50 1.54 .48
Togo 155 30 2.28 .67 47 1.45 .43
Uganda 563 17 2.31 .73 94 1.88 .58
Zambia 484 24 1.32 .40 117 1.05 .30
All Countries 13,235 16.8 2.00 .63 2,534 1.64 .50
Note: Angola, Botswana, D.R. Congo and Mali were surveyed twice.
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Next, Table 6.1 lists the countries contained in our sample. In turn, for each
country, it lists the number of foreign-owned firms, its average Financial Constraint
score, and the mean of its Serious Constraint indicator (which reflects the percentage
of firms facing serious financial constraint).
As Table 6.1 shows, the number of foreign-owned firms across the SSAs varies
substantially, where Botswana has the largest number of foreign-owned firms in the
sample (i.e. 283) and Eritrea, which has half of Botswana’s population, has the
least (i.e. 6). Additionally, the level of financial constraint faced by firms varies
substantially across the SSAs as well. For instance, South Africa has an average
Financial Constraint score of 0.73, while Burkina Faso has an average score of 3
(where recall that a score of 0 indicates no financial constraint and a score of 4
indicates severe financial constraint).
Based on the average Financial Constraint and Serious Constraint scores for each
country, we can see that on average, domestic firms across the SSAs (except for Cape
Verde and Burundi) are more financially constrained than foreign-owned firms are.
To visualize this result, Figure 6.2 plots the average Serious Constraint score for
domestic firms in the y-axis and foreign-owned firms in the x-axis. The regression
line that fits the cross-country data points, which correspond to the “Proportion of
domestic firms facing moderate to severe financial constraint” in the y-axis and the
“Proportion of foreign-owned firms facing moderate to severe financial constraint”
in the x-axis, is flatter than the 45 degree line. This means that across the SSAs,
the proportion of domestic firms facing serious financial constraint is larger than the
proportion of foreign-owned firms facing the same.12
In Table 6.2, we report the share of foreign-owned firms across the SSAs for each
industry. The proportion of foreign-owned firms tends to be smaller in the garment,
furniture, accounting and computing machinery industries, where less than 15% of
firms in these industries are foreign owned. By contrast, foreign-owned firms are
more highly represented in the transport equipment, water transport and tobacco
industries, and in the case of the tobacco industry, 80% of firms in the SSAs are
12If the proportions of domestic and foreign-owned firms facing serious financial constraints are
the same, the data points will lie on the 45 degree line.
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Food 1629 82.20% 17.80%
Tobacco 10 20% 80%
Textiles 193 72.54% 27.46%
Garments 1036 88.13% 11.87%
Leather 106 83.96% 16.04%
Wood 327 86.54% 13.88%
Paper 73 65.75% 34.25%
Publishing, printing, and recorded media 317 86.12% 13.88%
Refined petroleum product 12 83.33% 16.67%
Chemicals 374 70.05% 29.95%
Plastics & rubber 182 66.48% 33.52%
Non metallic mineral products 203 69.46% 30.54%
Basic metals 85 72.94% 27.93%
Fabricated metal products 585 84.44% 15.56%
Machinery and equipment 111 72.94% 27.93%
Accounting and computing machinery 2 100% 0.00%
Electrical machinery and apparatus 68 75% 25%
Radio, television and communication equipment 8 75% 25%
Precision instruments 5 80% 20%
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 33 81.81% 18.18%
Other transport equipment 15 33.33% 66.67%
Furniture 697 87.52% 12.48%
Recycling 6 83.33% 16.67%
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 1 0.00% 100%
Collection, purification and distribution of water 1 100% 0.00%
Services of motor vehicles 486 75.10% 24.90%
Wholesale 592 75% 25%
Retail 2825 81.59% 18.41%
Hotel and restaurants 1195 85.36% 14.64%
Land transport 172 69.19% 30.81%
Water transport 25 44% 56%
Air transport 18 55.56% 44.44%
Travel agencies 73 71.23% 28.77%
Post and telecommunications 38 57.89% 42.11%
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 1 0.00% 100%
Computer and related activities 278 88.49% 11.51%
Total 10060 80% 20%
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Figure 6.2: Proportion of Firms Facing Moderate to Severe Financial Constraint By
Ownership Type
foreign owned.
Table 6.3: Percentage of financial constrained firms across ownership type
Financial constraint Proportion of foreign firms Proportion of domestic firms




Not a Problem 33.77% 24.68%
Finally, in Table 6.3, we show the proportion of foreign firms and the proportions
of domestic firms in each of the five categories of financial constraints. The table
shows that domestic firms are likely to be more severely financially constrained.
For example, 23.28% of domestic firms have reported that they face severe financial
constraint as opposed to 13.72% of foreign firms that have reported the same. By
contrast, about a third of foreign firms have reported that financial constraint is not
a problem as opposed to a quarter of domestic firms that have reported the same.
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For the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study, please refer to Table
D3 in Appendix C.
6.4 Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach is structured as follows.
Preliminary As a preliminary, we first show that foreign firms are less financially
constrained by estimating (see Section 5.1 for findings)
FCijkt = c1 + αForeignijkt + γ
′Xijkt + δ
′Ckt + µj + µk + µt + εijkt. (6.1)
The dependent variable FCijkt measures the financial constraint experienced by firm
i in industry j and in country k, which is reported by this firm in year t. Throughout
our paper, our main measure is Financial Constraint, which is an ordinal variable
ranging from 0 to 4 where a score of 0 indicates that the firm is not financially
constrained and a score of 4 indicates that the firm faces severe financial constraints.
The main explanatory variable in this model is Foreign, which is a dummy
variable that indicates if the firm is foreign-owned. If domestic firms are more credit
constrained than foreign-owned firms are, the coefficient on Foreign will be negative.
For controls, Xijkt is a vector of firm-level variables and Ckt is a vector of country-level
variables. Because the firms are surveyed once only, Eq. (6.1) (as are the other
regression models estimated here) is a panel at the industry, country and year level,
but not at the firm level. The term µj, generically represents the vector of industry
dummies, µk represents the vector of country dummmies, and µt represents the vector
of year dummies.
Main Estimating Equation We explore if a larger foreign firm presence may help
alleviate the financial constraints of domestic firms in the same industry. To do so,
we estimate (see Section 5.2 for findings)
FCijkt = c2 + βPresencejkt + φ
′Xijkt + ρ
′Ckt + µj + µk + µt + εijkt (6.2)
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using only the subsample of domestic firms. Our main financial constraint measure,
as before, is Financial Constraint. In addition, we consider three alternative measures
of financial constraint, namely Serious Constraint, Credit Products Constraint, and
Loans Denied discussed in Section 6.3.1, as a robustness check. Presencejkt, our main
explanatory variable, measures the presence of foreign-owned firm in industry j in
country k. We measure Presencejkt using the following indicators: (i) the proportion
of foreign firms over the total number of firms in industry j, country k and year t,
Foreign Firms Proportionjkt =
∑n
i=1 Foreignijkt
Total number of firmsjkt
(6.3)
(ii) the share of foreign firms’ equity of total equity in industry j, country k and year
t (Eq. (6.4))





(iii) the proportion of workers in foreign-owned firms over total number of workers in
industry j, country k and year t (Eq. (6.5)):





The larger these indices are, the larger foreign firm presence is in the industry in
terms of the proportion of foreign-owned firms (Eq. (6.3)), proportion of equity
held by foreign-owned firms (Eq. (6.4)), and the proportion of the workforce force
employed by foreign-owned firms (Eq. (6.5)).
Unless stated otherwise, for models with an ordinal dependent variable
(specifically Financial Constraint), we estimate them with the Ordered Probit model
and report the estimated coefficients in the tables (in Table 6.10, we consider
alternative estimation methods as a robustness check). For models with a binary
dependent variable, we estimate them with the Probit model and report the average
marginal effects associated with the regressors.
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Mechanism Finally, we provide some evidence to support an explanation (there
could be others) for why foreign firm presence may help to ease the financial constraint
of domestic firms (see Section 5.3). Firms compete for finance, which is scarce in the
SSAs. We show that foreign-owned firms are not only less financially constrained
than domestic firms are, they are also less likely to borrow from banks. Since
foreign-owned firms are less likely to seek bank credit, domestic firms would benefit
from reduced competition in the credit market when there is greater representation
of foreign-owned firms. In Section 5.3, we show that domestic firms in industries with
a larger foreign firm presence are indeed more successful in their loan applications.
This is one possible explanation for why foreign firm presence may ease the financial
constraints of domestic firms.
6.4.1 Possible Empirical Issues
Our main estimating equation is Eq. (6.2). We highlight some concerns that could
prevent us from imparting a causal interpretation on the association between foreign
firm presence and domestic firms’ financial constraint.
Reverse Causality The first possible concern is reverse causality. Due to our
regression design, we believe that reverse causality is unlikely to be a major
confounding problem. Specifically, in our estimating equation (i.e. Eq. (6.2)), our
dependent variable is the financial constraint of the domestic firm and our main
explanatory variable is the foreign firm presence of an industry. For reverse causality
to occur in the context of Eq. (6.2), we would need FCijkt (the firm i’s financial
constraint) to cause Presencejkt (industry j’s foreign firm presence); that is, domestic
firms would need to drive the composition of foreign firms in the industry.
In this regard, we believe it is empirically unlikely for our results to be driven by
reverse causality. Firstly, domestic firms in the SSAs are typically smaller. In Table
6.4, we find that the great majority of domestic firms, about 69% of them, have
19 employees or fewer. Moreover, only 7% of domestic firms employ 100 or more
workers, compared with 25% of foreign-owned firms. Therefore, because of their size,
it is unlikely for domestic firms to drive foreign firm presence in the industry and for
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reverse causality to matter empirically.
Table 6.4: The Size of Domestic versus Foreign-Owned Firms
Domestic firms Foreign-Owned firms
Small Firm (5-19 employees) 69% 42%
Medium Firm (20-99 employees) 24% 33%
Large Firm (above 99 employees) 7% 25%
Total 100% 100%
More importantly, it is also unlikely that our conclusion is driven by reverse
causal effects that are due to large domestic firms. In Section 6.4, we re-estimate our
baseline regression without the top 5% and 10% largest domestic firms in the sample.
We show that our conclusion (i.e. that foreign firm presence is statistically significant)
still holds when these firms are omitted from the regression. Therefore, there is no
evidence that our conclusion is driven by potential reverse causality stemming from
these large domestic firms as well.
Self-Selection Even if we could rule out reverse causality, it does not imply that the
association between foreign firm presence and domestic firms’ financial constraint is
causal. For example, foreign firms may still self-select into countries or industries
where domestic firms are less financially constrained. Therefore, the association
between foreign firm presence and domestic firms’ financial constraint could be jointly
determined by certain unobserved country or industry characteristics.
To address this concern, we include industry and country fixed effects to purge the
possible confounding influence of unobserved industry and country heterogeneity.13
We also control for certain time-varying macroeconomic variables such as financial
development (Financial Development), legal system (Legal System) and inflation
(Inflation) that may affect foreigners’ decisions to invest in a country. Finally,
in place of the country level controls, we use country-year fixed effects to partial
13As it turns out, we find that foreign firm presence is statistically significant for domestic firms’
financial constraint whether industry or country fixed effects are controlled for. This suggests that
foreign firm presence have an impact on domestic firms’ financial constraint beyond the influence of
industry or country fixed effects.
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out all possible country determinants, whether they are observable or unobservable,
time-varying or time-constant. Therefore, the country-year fixed effects will partial
out financial development, country-specific policies, and other country-specific
characteristics that may jointly determine foreign firm presence and the financial
constraints of domestic firms.
Measurement of Credit Constraint Another concern stems from an observation
by Hansen and Rand (2014a) that research on credit constraints may not be robust
to how credit constraints are measured.14 For this reason, we use different indicators
to measure financial constraint (i.e. Financial Constraint, Serious Constraint, Credit
Products Constraint, Loan Denied) to ensure that our results are not dependent on
the way financial constraint is measured.
Multicollinearity Lastly, we could be concerned about the multicollinearity,
especially when we include a sizable set of firm level and country level controls.
To this end, we compute that Variance-Inflation-Factor (VIF) suggested by (Belsley
et al., 2005), and to save space, we have omitted the results from the paper. We find
that all the predictors have an VIF smaller than the rule-of-thumb of 10, above which
there is evidence of multicollinearity. Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to
an issue here.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Firm Ownership and Financial Constraint
Based on Financial Constraint as the dependent variable, we report our estimates of
Eq. (6.1) in Table 6.5, which reveal if domestic firms are more financially constrained
than foreign-owned firms are. In Column (1), we control for firm characteristics only.
In Column (2), we additionally control for inflation, financial development and legal
system. In Column (3), we add industry, country and year dummies. In Column
14Hansen and Rand (2014a) show how three different measures of credit constraints lead to three
different estimates of the effects of gender on firms’ credit situation.
167
(4), we use industry dummies and country times year dummies. We find that all
else equal, foreign-owned firms have a Financial Constraint score of 0.1− 0.14 points
smaller than domestic firms have on average. This difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level across all regression specifications, suggesting that domestic firms on
average are more financially constrained than foreign firms are.
Concerning the other control variables, Table 6.5 shows that firms owned by
females tend to be more financially constrained than firms owned by males.15 It
also shows that firms that are financially constrained tend to be small, owned by
partnerships than corporations or sole proprietors, less financially transparent, and
have limited technological capacity (i.e. lacking a website). Firms in countries with
better financial development and legal system tend to be less financially constrained
as well.
6.5.2 Foreign Firm Presence and Domestic Firms’ Financial
Constraint
Previously, our results show that domestic firms tend to be more financially
constrained than foreign firms. Here, we show that domestic firms are less financially
constrained if there is a larger foreign firm presence in the same industry. To
establish this result, we use the sample of domestic firms and regress their Financial
Constraint scores on measures of foreign firm presence in their respective industries,
along with other firm and country-level control variables and industry, country and
year dummies.
In Column (1) of Table 6.6, we estimate Eq. (6.2) with the proportion of
foreign-owned firms, denote by Foreign Firms Proportionjkt, as our measure of foreign
firm presence. The negative coefficient on Foreign Firms Proportionjkt suggests that
domestic firms are less financially constrained when proportion of foreign-owned firms
in the same industry is larger.
Next, we use alternative measures of foreign firm presence. In Column (2), we use
15This result is consistent with Asiedu et al. (2013) for the case of manufacturing firms in the
SSAs.
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Table 6.5: Financial Constraint: Foreign-Owned Versus Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint
Foreign (owned) -0.109∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.0373)
Female Owned 0.081∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.009) (0.0290)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.168∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.082 0.088∗ 0.085∗ 0.085∗
(0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Sole Proprietorship 0.008 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.114 ∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Publicly Traded -0.444∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.150) (0.150) (0.149)
Private or Non-traded -0.158∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Financial Transparency -0.342∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037)
Technological Capacity -0.311∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.180
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Financial Development -0.003 -0.033∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.015) (0.012)
Legal System -0.003 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.028) (0.036)
Inflation 0.077∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.148∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.028) (0.048)
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No
Year Dummies No No Yes No
Country-Year Dummies No No No Yes
Observations 8186 7718 7518 7718
Note: Financial Constraint is an ordinal variable (from 0 to 4) that indicates how financially
constrained a firm is. Estimates of the coefficients from the Ordered Probit model are reported
here. The constant is suppressed. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the share of employment by foreign-owned firms as a measure of foreign firm presence
(i.e. Foreign Workers Sharejkt). In Column (3), we use the share of equity holdings
by foreign-owned firms (i.e. Foreign Equity Sharejkt). Regardless of how foreign firm
presence is measured, we find that the coefficient on foreign firm presence is negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, domestic firms tend to
be less financially constrained in industries where the proportion of foreign firms is
greater (Column (1)), and where foreign firms have a larger share of employment
(Column (2)) and equity holdings (Column (3)). Thus, how foreign firm presence
is measured does not affect our conclusion that it is positively associated with the
easing of domestic firms’ financial constraint.
6.5.3 Credit Competition
Why does the presence of foreign firms help domestic firms to be less financially
constrained? A possible explanation (among possibly others) is that firms compete
for credit, but credit is scarce in the SSAs. Because foreign firms tend to be less
financially constrained (see Table 6.5), they would therefore be less likely to borrow.
As such, their presence would reduce the competition for finance and increase the
success of domestic firms in borrowing from banks (Wang and Wang, 2015).
We show that this explanation is empirically plausible. Given that foreign firms
are less likely to be financially constrained (see Table 6.5), we first verify that foreign
firms, compared with domestic firms, are also less likely to apply for a loan, controlling
for firm and country-level characteristics, as well as industry, country and year
dummies (see, also, Hansen and Rand, 2014a).16 To do so, we regress a dummy
variable, Loan Application, which indicates if a firm has applied for a bank loan, on
the ownership type of the firm (i.e. domestic versus foreign-owned).
In Table 6.7, we estimate this relationship using OLS (Column (1)), Conditional
Logit (Column (2)), and Probit (Column (3)).17 All three regressions show that
16Just to emphasize, we consider loan application than the actual amount of loan received. Clearly,
the quantum of the loan may depend not only on how needy the firm is, it also depends on the
restrictions placed by banks on how much it can borrow. A loan application, however, is related
only to how financially constrained a firm is, as banks do not prohibit loan applications (they could,
however, deny the application received).
17We include country, industry fixed and year effects in the OLS and Conditional Logit regressions.
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Table 6.6: Foreign Firm Presence and Domestic Firms’ Financial Constraint
(1) (2) (2)
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.318∗∗
(0.153)
Foreign Equity Share -0.320∗∗
(0.156)
Foreign Workers Share -0.222∗∗
(0.089)
Female Owned 0.055∗ 0.055∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.217∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.065) (0.068)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.092 0.092 0.095
(0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
Sole Proprietorship -0.155∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046)
Publicly Traded -0.481∗∗ -0.481∗∗ -0.546∗∗
(0.200) (0.215) (0.237)
Private or Non-traded -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.050)
Financial Transparency -0.241∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
Technological Capacity -0.243∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.049)
Financial Development -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Legal System -0.115∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
Inflation -0.127∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054) (0.059)
Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6284 6284 5409
Note: Financial Constraint is an ordinal variable (from 0 to 4) that indicates how financially
constrained a firm is. Estimates of the coefficients from the Ordered Probit model are reported
here. The constant is suppressed. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the coefficient on Foreign is negative and statistically significant, and therefore,
foreign-owned firms are less likely than domestic firms to apply for a loan. For
example, Column (3) shows that compared with domestic firms, foreign-owned firms
are 14.2 percentage points less likely to apply for a loan on average.
Table 6.7: Foreign-Owned Firms, Domestic Firms and Loan Application
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Conditional Logit Probit
Dependent Variable: Loan Application
Foreign -0.034∗∗ -0.196∗∗ -0.142∗∗
(0.014) (0.085) (0.064)
Female Owned 0.028∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.063) (0.041)
Small (5-19 workers) -0.131∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.108) (0.103)
Medium (20-99 workers) -0.063∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.204∗
(0.019) (0.103) (0.112)
Sole Proprietorship -0.032∗∗ -0.202∗∗ -0.076
(0.015) (0.090) (0.061)
Publicly Traded -0.009 -0.077 -0.044
(0.054) (0.301) (0.174)
Private or Non-traded -0.018 -0.119 -0.053
(0.016) (0.092) (0.063)
Financial Transparency 0.075∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.072) (0.078)








Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7583 7583 7374
Note: In Columns (1) and (2), estimates of the coefficients from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression and Conditional Logit model are reported. In Column (3), the average marginal effects
from the Probit model are reported. The constant is suppressed. Robust standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
If foreign-owned firms are less likely to apply for a loan, a larger foreign firm
presence may reduce the financial constraint of domestic firms by enabling them to
borrow more successfully. For the sample of domestic firms, Table 6.8 regresses Loan
Denied, a dummy that indicates if a domestic firm has had an unsuccessful loan
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application, on each of the foreign firm presence measures (see Eqs. (6.3)-(6.5)).
Regardless of how foreign firm presence is measured, Table 6.8 shows that domestic
firms are less likely to be denied a loan when foreign firm presence is larger. For
example, Column (1) shows that if the proportion of foreign firms (over total number
of firms in an industry) increases by 10 percentage points, domestic firms in the
same industry would be 4 percentage points less likely to have had a rejected loan.
Therefore, domestic firms have been more successful in securing credit when the
proportion of foreign firms in the industry is larger.
These results suggest that a reduction in loans competition is one reason (among
possibly others) for why foreign firm presence is negatively associated with the
financial constraint of domestic firms. Foreign-owned firms are not only less
financially constrained, they are also less likely to borrow from banks. Thus, the
presence of foreign-owned firms reduces the competition for credit and improves the
access to finance for domestic firms on average.
6.6 Robustness Checks
6.6.1 Alternative Indicators of Financial Constraint
Our main financial constraint measure (Financial Constraint) is an ordinal variable
based on managers’ perceptions on how financially constraint their firms are.
However, with respect to measurements of credit constraints, Hansen and Rand
(2014a) have shown that different measures may yield different conclusions.18
Therefore, as a robustness check, we consider three alternative measures of
financial constraint. Our first measure, Serious Constraint, is a dummy variable
that indicates if access to finance is a moderate to severe problem for the firm. Our
second measure, Credit Product Constraint, is a dummy variable that indicates if the
firm does not have access to at least one of the three credit products, i.e. an overdraft,
line of credit, or a bank loan (Aterido et al., 2013; Love and Mart́ınez Peŕıa, 2014).
18Hansen and Rand (2014a) have found three different effects of gender on credit constraints in
the SSAs when three different measures of credit constraints are used. They argue that the choice
of credit constraint measurement determines the estimated effect.
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Table 6.8: Foreign Firm Presence and Loan Denial to Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Loans Denied (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.398∗∗∗
( 0.099)
Foreign Equity Share -0.392∗∗∗
(0.098)
Foreign Workers Share -0.156∗
(0.083)
Female Owned -0.004 -0.004 -0.008
(0.070) (0.070) (0.083)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.799∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.159)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.383∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.154)
Publicly Traded 0.225 0.223 0.268
(0.390) (0.390) (0.481)
Private or Non-traded -0.043 -0.043 -0.111
(0.107) (0.107) (0.126)
Financial Transparency -0.149∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.0003
(0.077) (0.077) (0.089)
Technological Capacity -0.119 -0.159 -0.056
(0.095) (0.095) (0.121)
Inflation 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Financial Development -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legal System -0.118∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2223 2223 1727
Note: Loan Denied indicates if a (domestic) firm was denied a loan application. The average
marginal effects from the Probit model are reported here. The constant is suppressed. Robust
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Our third measure, Loan Denied (which we have used in Table 6.8), is a dummy
variable that indicates if a firm has had an unsuccessful loan application.
Table 6.9 shows that all three alternative measures of financial
constraint are negatively associated with foreign firm presence (measured by
Foreign Firms Proportion), and their associations are statistically significant at the
1% level. Therefore, when the presence of foreign-owned firms is larger, domestic
firms within the same industry (as these foreign firms) are less likely to report that
they have faced moderate to severe financial constraint, have no access to credit
facilities, and were denied loans. Thus, there is no evidence that our results depend
on how the financial constraints of domestic firms are measured.
175









Foreign Firms Proportion -0.249∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.036) ( 0.099)
Female Owned 0.048∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.013) (0.009) (0.070)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.021) (0.134)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.036 0.051∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.022) (0.130)
Sole Proprietorship -0.061∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.043
(0.029) (0.018) (0.102)
Publicly Traded -0.292∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗ 0.225
(0.044) (0.128) (0.390)
Private or Non-traded -0.082∗∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.043
(0.013) (0.033) (0.107)
Financial Transparency -0.102∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.149∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.025)
Technological Capacity -0.101∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.119
(0.018) (0.015) (0.095)
Financial Development -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Legal System -0.003 0.030∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.018)
Inflation 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.010)
Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6186 2223 6277
Note: Serious Constraint indicates if a firm faces moderate to severe financial constraint. Credit
Products Constraint indicates if a firm has no access to credit facilities. Loans Denied indicates
if the firm had a rejected loan application. The average marginal effects from the Probit model
are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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6.6.2 Alternative Estimation Methods
Our baseline results are obtained by estimating an Ordered Probit model. We check
if these results are robust, in terms of sign and statistical significance, to the choice
of estimation methods. To do so, we re-estimate our model using Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) regression with industry, country, and year fixed effects to control
for confounding industry and country unobserved heterogeneity and macroeconomic
shocks, and Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) regression to mitigate the
influence of outlier observations.19 In Table 6.10, we report the OLS estimates in
Column (1) and the IRLS estimates in Column (2). Both estimates show that
domestic firms are less financially constraint (at a 1% level of significance) in
industries where the proportion of foreign firms is larger. Therefore, our baseline
results are not an artifact of the chosen estimation method.
6.6.3 Alternative Definition of Foreign Ownership
Up to this point, foreign-owned firms have been defined as firms in the host country
where foreigners hold at least 10% percent of their equity.20 We show that our
conclusions are robust if we adopt a different definition of foreign ownership based
on a different equity share in a local firm that is foreign held.
As a robustness check, we deliberately choose a more drastic alternative definition
of foreign ownership by considering a firm to be foreign owned if 50% or more of its
equity is foreign held. We find that our main conclusions are not affected even with
this alternative definition of foreign ownership. This is shown, for example, in Table
6.11, where the proportion of foreign-owned firms in the industry, and the foreign
share of equity and employment are all negatively and statistically significant for
domestic firms’ financial constraint. Therefore, our baseline results do not depend on
how foreign ownership of firms are defined.
19This can be done by minimizing the error term in the L1-norm (i.e. the absolute error) than
the L2-norm (i.e. the squared error) (Green, 1984).
2010% is a cut-off considered by others in the related literature (Asiedu et al., 2013; Javorcik and
Spatareanu, 2011).
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Table 6.10: Robustness Check #2: Alternative Estimation Methods
(1) (2)
OLS IRLS
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.431∗∗ -1.021∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.186)
Female Owned 0.060 0.137∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.092)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.079 0.081
(0.082) (0.089)
Sole Proprietorship -0.205∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗
(0.057) (0.062)
Publicly Traded -0.675∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.264)
Private and Non-traded -0.236∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.065)
Financial Transparency -0.303∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.049)








Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 6451 6284
Note: In Columns (1) and (2), estimates of the coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Iterated Least Squares (IRLS) are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in the
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.11: Robustness Check #3: Alternative Definition of Foreign Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.811∗∗∗
(0.168)
Foreign Equity Share -0.220∗∗∗
(0.067)
Foreign Workers Share -0.610∗∗∗
(0.106)
Female Owned 0.109∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.042)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.178∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.085)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.062 0.145∗∗ 0.168∗∗
(0.067) (0.066) (0.082)
Sole Proprietorship -0.100∗∗ -0.086∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.046) (0.047) (0.057)
Publicly Traded -0.585∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.860∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.241) (0.260)
Private or Non-traded -0.168∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.060)
Financial Transparency -0.285∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.044)
Technological Capacity -0.261∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.039) (0.060)
Financial Development -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Legal System -0.016∗∗ -0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Inflation 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5377 5168 5409
Note: A firm is defined as foreign owned here if at least 50% of its equity is foreign held. Financial
Constraint is an ordinal variable (from 0 to 4) that indicates how financially constrained a firm
is. Estimates of the coefficients from the Ordered Probit model are reported here. The constant is
suppressed. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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6.6.4 Omitting the Largest Domestic Firms
In Section 4.1, we have discussed why it is unlikely for reverse causality to occur.
This is because given that domestic firms are usually small, it will be unlikely for
them to have an impact on the composition of foreign firms in the industry, which is
how foreign firm presence is measured.
What about the large domestic firms? Could the statistical significance of foreign
firm presence be driven by reverse causality stemming from these firms? In this
robustness check, we re-estimate Eq. (6.2) without the top 5% and 10% largest
domestic firms and report the new results in Table 6.12 and 6.13 respectively. Even
without the large domestic firms, we find that foreign firm presence is still statistically
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, there is no evidence that these firms are driving
the statistical significance of foreign firm presence in our baseline regressions.
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Table 6.12: Robustness Check #4: Excluding the Top 5% Largest Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.592∗∗∗
(0.155)
Foreign Equity Share -0.593∗∗∗
(0.154)
Foreign Workers Share -0.551∗∗∗
(0.109)
Female Owned 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.042)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.172∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.100)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.046 0.046 0.118
(0.077) (0.077) (0.098)
Sole Proprietorship -0.121∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.057)
Publicly Traded -0.376 -0.376 -0.736∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.243) (0.276)
Private or Non-traded -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.061)
Financial Transparency -0.231∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.045)
Technological Capacity -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.062)
Financial Development -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legal System 0.014∗ 0.014∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Inflation -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Industry, Country & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5914 5914 5263
Note: Financial Constraint is an ordinal variable (from 0 to 4) that indicates how financially
constrained a firm is. Estimates of the coefficients from the Ordered Probit model are reported
here. The constant is suppressed. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
181
Table 6.13: Robustness Check #5: Excluding the Top 10% Largest Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Financial Constraint (Domestic Firms)
Foreign Firms Proportion -0.616∗∗∗
(0.157)
Foreign Equity Share -0.615∗∗∗
(0.157)
Foreign Workers Share -0.601∗∗∗
(0.111)
Female Owned 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.043)
Small (5-19 workers) 0.279 0.279 0.315
(0.175) (0.175) (0.226)
Medium (20-99 workers) 0.158 0.158 0.173
(0.175) (0.175) (0.225)
Sole Proprietorship -0.124∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.058)
Publicly Traded -0.422 -0.422 -0.656∗∗
(0.257) (0.257) (0.283)
Private or Non-traded -0.200∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.062)
Financial Transparency -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.045)
Technological Capacity -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.065)
Financial Development -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legal System 0.013 0.013 0.033∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Inflation -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Industry, Country & Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5699 5699 5060
Note: Financial Constraint is an ordinal variable (from 0 to 4) that indicates how financially
constrained a firm is. Estimates of the coefficients from the Ordered Probit model are reported
here. The constant is suppressed. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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6.7 Conclusion
Because their underdeveloped financial sector, policymakers in the SSAs have
encouraged the foreign ownership of firms to help, among others, improve the access
to finance by domestic firms. However, there is no empirical evidence that a larger
foreign presence leads to less financially constrained domestic firms. Moreover,
the association between between foreign firm presence and domestic firms’ financial
constraint is á priori ambiguous.
To study this issue, we employ cross-country firm-level data that spans across 36
SSAs. We find that in industries with a larger foreign firm presence, domestic firms
tend to be less financially constrained. The direction and the statistical significance of
this effect is robust to the way financial constraint of domestic firms and foreign firm
presence are measured, to the use of alternative estimation methods and alternative
definitions of foreign ownership, among others.
Because of the richness of the WBES surveys, we are able to explore further into
why the presence of foreign-owned firms may ease the financial constraints of domestic
firms. we find that foreign-owned firms are not only less financially constrained, they
are also less likely to borrow from banks. Moreover, in industries where foreign firm
presence is larger, domestic firms tend to be more successful in securing bank credit.
Therefore, there is evidence that foreign firm presence reduces the competition for
bank credit, and this helps the domestic firms to improve their access to finance and
ease their financial constraints.
Our paper has policy relevance, in that it offers new evidence to show that foreign
firm presence may address the most commonly voiced concern in operating a business
in the SSAs – the lack of finance. Because financial development is an extremely
important determinant of growth, it would be useful to follow up on whether the
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Table D1: Access to Finance of Firms in the SSAs versus the OECD
Sub-Saharan Africa OECD
Firms with a bank loan/line of credit (%) 23.5 49.1
Firms using banks to finance investment (%) 17.6 31.5
Investment financed by banks (%) 11.2 18.9
Firms using bank to finance working capital (%) 22.1 68.6
Working capital financed by banks (%) 8.6 40.6
Working capital financed by supplier credit (%) 11.2 14.4
Loan requiring collateral (%) 82.26 72.6
Firms identifying finance as a major constraint (%) 42.6 15.9
Note: The number in the table are averages across firms calculated from WBES (2015) webpage. The
number of SSAs and OECD countries used for this computation are 36 and 16 countries respectively.
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Table D2: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables: measures of financial constraint
Financial Constraint Ordinal response by the firm from 0 (no financial constraint)to 4 (severe financial constraint)
Serious Constraint =1 if the firm reports having moderate to severe financial constraint
Credit Products Constraint =1 if the firm has no access to overdraft, line of credit or bank loan
Loans Denied =1 if the firm has applied for but denied formal credit
Measures of foreign ownership and foreign firm presence
Foreign =1 if the firm has at least 10% of its equity held by foreigners
Foreign Firms Proportion Ratio of number of foreign-owned firms to total firms
Foreign Equity Share Ratio of equity holdings by foreign-owned firms over total firm equity
Foreign Workers Share Ratio of foreign firms’ employee to total employees
Firm-level variables
Female Owned =1 if at least one principal owner is female
Small =1 if the firm has 5-19 employees
Medium =1 if the firm has 20-99 employees
Sole Proprietorship =1 if the firm is owned by 1 person
Publicly Traded =1 for shareholding firm with share trade in the stock market
Private or Non-traded =1 for shareholding firm with non-share trade in the stock market
Technological Capacity =1 if the firm has a website
Financial Transparency =1 if the firm’s annual financial statements were audited
Country-level variables
Inflation Inflation rate [WDI ]
Financial Development Ratio of private credit to GDP [WDI]
Legal System Protection of property rights index, 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest) [WDI]
Note: Unless specified in brackets, all the variables are obtained from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey. WDI is short for World Development Indicators. AREAER is short for Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (from the IMF).
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Table D3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Financial Constraint 2.00 1.51 0 4
Foreign Ownership 0.19 0.39 0 1
Foreign Firms Proportion 0.18 0.17 0 1
Foreign Equity Share 0.19 0.17 0 1
Foreign Workers Share 0.33 0.24 0 1
Female Ownership 0.29 0.45 0 1
Small (0-19 Workers) 0.63 0.48 0 1
Medium (20-99 Workers) 0.26 0.44 0 1
Large (over 99 Workers) 0.10 0.30 0 1
Sole Proprietorship 0.5 0.5 0 1
Public Traded 0.02 0.15 0 1
Private or Non-traded 0.31 0.46 0 1
Technological Capacity 0.2 0.40 0 1
Financial Transparency 0.47 0.50 0 1
Inflation 8.2 4.2 2.05 19.57
Financial Development 38 48.7 5.08 182.62




This thesis has comprehensively examined the effect of market reform and natural
trade barriers–landlockedness– on international trade and firm performance in
developing countries.
In Chapter 2, we find that the introduction of a Commodity Exchange has a large
positive effect on coffee export in Ethiopia. In Chapter 3 , we find that an increase in
trade cost due to landlockedness has substantial negative effect on trade in Ethiopia.
Specifically, we find that landlockedness on average reduces export of coffee, leather,
crude vegetable and hide & skin by about 43%, 49%, 80% and 72%, respectively. In
addition, landlockedness has a strong negative effect on different ocean-borne import
goods of Ethiopia. For example, landlockedness reduces the import of petroleum,
fuel and fertilizer by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%, respectively. For a developing economy
that highly depends on agriculture, 68.6% reduction in fertilizer import, for instance,
has an important implication on the productivity of the sector.
In chapter 4, we find that landlockedness reduce productivity of manufacturing
firms. We hypothesize that if productivity losses from landlockedness are due to
reduction in imported inputs, We would expect that importing firms would suffer
the largest loss from this direct effect. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that
importing firm suffer a higher productivity loss compared to nonimporting firms. In
chapter 5, we document that the role that genetic distance plays as a barrier to
technology adoption and productivity of manufacturing firms. We find that firms
operating in a country that are genetically far from the technology leader tend to
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have lower levels of productivity. However, the effect of genetic distance varies
largely across the quantiles of firms’ productivity, with the the largest negative impact
observed at the higher quantiles. These findings indicate that cultural barriers to the
diffusion of technology across countries impact firm-level productivity through firms’
ability to adopt technologies from the frontier.
In chapter 6, we find that in industries with a larger foreign firm presence ,
domestic firms tend to be less financially constrained . In addition, we find that
foreign-owned firms are not only less financially constrained, they are also less likely
to borrow from banks. Moreover, where foreign firm presence is larger, domestic
firms tend to have greater success in securing a bank loan. Therefore, one plausible
explanation for our conclusion is that foreign firm presence reduces the competition
for bank credit, which helps to improve the access to finance for domestic firms.
The finding in this dissertation suggest that landlocked developing countries are
at a significant economic disadvantage due to high trade cost and dependent on other
country’s transit. Landlocked countries’ limited integration into the global economy
not only reduce their export and import but also hamper technology diffusion
and productivity spill over from advanced economies. These subsequently reduce
firm-level productivity. For Landlocked countries to increase their participation into
global trade, they should better modernize their markets and attract foreign-owned
firms. The establishment of commodity exchanges, for instance, the ECX shows that
moder agricultural market made possible to increase export revenue in developing
country.
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